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This research identifies variables that detennined the amount of autonomy
Oregon's gubernatorial leadership possessed in formulating and implementing the
Regional Strategies program, centerpiece of industrial policy in Oregon during the
latter half of the 1980s. The literature on state industrial policy points to instances in
2which the leaders of America's state governments are acting autonomously.
Gubernatorial actors appear to be formulating industrial policy goals independent of
powerful non-state groups and other state actors and developing the capacity to
transform their policy preferences into authoritative actions. The literature is largely
devoid, however, of any systematic accounting of the variables that determine the
extent to which gubernatorial actors possess autonomy. Drawing upon interviews
with key actors involved in formulating and implementing the Regional Strategies'
initiative and document research, this case study points to five principal sources of
. variation in gubernatorial success. These are as follows:
(I) Economic crisis. The inability of longstanding industrial recruitment
practices to reconcile divisions caused by Oregon's deepest recession since the Great
Depression eroded support for existing state economic development arrangements,
enabling Oregon's newly elected Governor Neil Goldschmidt to reform state
economic development policy along industrial policy lines and accumulate
discretionary authority for state economic development spending denied his
predecessors.
(2) The division of power between the executive and legislative branches of
Oregon state government. Reacting to tensions founded in localism, regionalism, and
concern with having its authority usurped, Oregon's legislature placed limitations
upon Governor Goldschmidt's industrial policy mandate. Legislatively-enforced
measures precluded the competitive evaluation of local economic restructuring plans,
frustrating a key Administration goal, and instead made equity and political
expediency the driving force behind key industrial policy decisions. Legislators also
3denied the Administration authority it was seeking over semi-autonomous state
agencies, impeding its plan to consolidate control over state economic development
policymaking.
(3) State fiscal capacity. Industrial recruitment's failure led voters to
establish a statewide lottery with proceeds dedicated to economic development. The
lottery expanded Oregon's fiscal capacity for economic development, providing the
Goldschmidt administration an instrument with which to fund industrial policy.
(4) The degree to which local interests were fiscally dependent upon state
revenues. Administration success in securing key industrial policy goals was a direct
consequence of its ability to use the discretionary authority it possessed over lottery
spending to enforce local compliance with its policy preferences. The Administration
proved more successful in circumstances in which local authorities were fiscally
dependent upon gubernatorial controlled state lottery revenues for funding local
economic development projects than in instances in which local interests were
independent of the state for revenues.
(5) The character of private capital investment. Economic development is
contingent upon the investment of private assets, over which Oregon's political
.leadership exercised little direct control. The failure of anticipated private investment
to materialize frustrated Administration plans to use lottery money to leverage private
investment in favored projects. Investment induced by Oregon's industrial policy
initiative was likely to promote job growth in low wage sectors, frustrating the
Administration's goal of using industrial policy to generate high wage jobs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
America's state governments have been involved in the promotion of local
economic development since 1791 when the New Jersey legislature incorporated
Alexander Hamilton's private company, the Society for Establishing Useful
Manufacturers, as a vehicle for industrial development (Eisinger 1988). Modern state
economic deveiopment policy dates to the Great Depression, when states began to use
fiscal and other incentives to lure business investment to local communities, a practice
known as industrial recruiting.
More recently, the post-1970 period has been marked by an notable shift in
the character of state economic development activity away from industrial recruitment
and towards industrial policy (Goldstein 1986). State industrial policy activity has
drawn attention from a number of quarters. One sign of the interest state industrial
policy activity has evoked are the major books offered on the subject by Eisinger
(1988), Osborne (1988) and Fosler (1988).
THE PROBLEM
The literature on state industrial policy points to instances in which the
leaders of America's state governments appear to act autonomously (Gray and Lowery
1989:4). Reference here is made to the ability of elected policy makers to formulate
and pursue goals peculiar to themselves and apart from those of non-state g~oups.
2While the leaders of America's state governments appear to act
autonomously in some of their industrial policy interventions, in other instances, state
industrial policy activity appears to be shaped less by state leaders than by the interests
of private, non-state groups. This suggests that the autonomy state leaders possess in
their industrial policy interventions is situational. Unfortunately, case studies of state
industrial policy ac;:tivity are largely devoid of the type of systematic framework useful
for identifying both the circumstances in which autonomous action is evinced and the
limitations upon the amount of autonomy state leaders possess. In consequence, the
literature on state industrial policy raises more questions about the amount of
autonomy state leaders enjoy in their industrial policy interventions than it answers.
The question of how much autonomy political leaders possess in formulating
and implementing public policy is important. It is widely assumed among modern
political theorists that political leaders have interests apart from those of non-state
groups and that political leaders embody these goals in their public policy
. interventions (Ourr and King 1987). Analysts have used the concept of state
autonomy to analyze economic and social policy in the United States and Western
Europe (Heclo 1974; Weir and Skocpo11985; Gurrand King 1987) and Taiwan
(Amsden 1985). These treatments have made valuable contributions to our
understanding of public policy. It is likely that America's state governments have
interests apart from those of private groups and actors and seek to embody these goals
in their public policy interventions. The literature points to three such interests. These
are 1) the state's role in providing public goods; 2) maximizing their tenure in office;
and 3) maximizing the budgetary and administrative capacity of the bureaucratic
apparatus over which the state leaders themselves preside (Rueschemeyer and Evans
1985:44-45; Ourr and King 1987:14-17). .
3This research examines the variables that define the amount of autonomy that
state leaders possess in formulating and securing these types of goals through
industrial policy. It analyzes the case of the Regional Strategies program, centerpiece
of state industrial policy activity in Oregon during the latter half of the 1980s under
the administration of Governor Neil Goldschmidt..
The Approach
The current research creates a record of the key events that characterized
formulation and implementation of the Regional Strategies program. These events are
interpreted within an analytical framework that serves to distinguish how
programmatic features indicative of state autonomy were manifested in the Regional
Strategies policy process. The framework consists of six features which, drawn from
the literature, are as follows:
• The initial impulse to industrial policy will be provided by
forces arising within state government and not private groups.
• State industrial policy will embody goals peculiar to state
leaders and apart from those of private non-state groups;
• State leaders will demonstrate an ability to override opposition
to their industrial policy interventions;
• The programmatic choices that shape industrial policy will be
based upon objective analysis;
• State industrial policy focuses public resources upon emerging
sectors of the economy; and
• State industrial policy is characterized by concerted action
amongst the economic development agencies of state
government.
4The Contribution
Drawing upon this framework, I conclude that the Goldschmidt
Administration ability to act autonomously varied with place, time and the
constellation of actors involved in the Regional Strategies process. My analysis points
to the following sources of variation in the amount of al~tonomy possessed by
Oregon's state leaders in formulating· and implementing industrial policy:
Economic crisis: The inability of longstanding industrial recruitment
practices to reconcile divisions caused by Oregon's deepest recession
since the Great Depression eroded support for existing state economic
development arrangements, enabling Oregon's newly elected Governor
Neil Goldschmidt to reform state economic development policy along
industrial policy lines and accumulate discretionary authority for state
economic development spending denied his predecessors.
The division of power between the executive and legislative branches of
Oregon state government: Reacting to tensions founded in localism,
regionalism, and concern with having its authority usurped, Oregon's
legislature placed limitations upon Governor Goldschmidt's industrial
policy mandate. Legislatively-enforced measures precluded the
competitive evaluation of local economic restructuring plans, frustrating
a key Administration goal, and instead making equity and political
expediency the driving force behind key industrial policy decisions.
Legislators also denied the Administration authority it was seeking over
semi-autonomous state agencies, undermining its plan to consolidate
control over state economic development policymaking.
State fiscal capacity. Industrial recruitment's failure led voters to
establish a statewide lottery with proceeds dedicated to economic
development. The lottery expanded Oregon's fiscal capacity for
economic development, providing the Goldschmidt administration an
instrument with which to fund industrial policy.
The degree to which local interests were fiscally dependent upon state
revenues. Administration success in securing key industrial policy goals
was a direct consequence of its ability to use the discretionary authority
it possessed over lottery spending to enforce local compliance with its
policy preferences. The Administration proved more successful in
circumstances in which local authorities were fiscally dependent upon
gubernatorial controlled state lottery revenues for funding local
economic development projects than in instances in which local interests
were independent of the state for revenues.
5The character of private capital investment. Economic development is
contingent upon the investment of private assets, over which Oregon's
political leadership exercised little direct control. The failure of
anticipated private investment to materialize frustrated Administration
plans to use lottery money to leverage private investment in favored
projects. Investment induced by Oregon's industrial policy was likely to
promote job growth in low wage sectors, frustrating. the Administration's
goal of using its industrial policy to generate high wage jobs.
Last, I argue that efforts to overcome limitations upon its ability to act in
implementing industrial policy led the Goldschmidt Administration to practice an
entrepreneurial form of politics in which is circumvented established channels of
public authority in an attempt to reorder the political environment within which it
operated.
One thing I do not attempt to do here is to measure the extent to which the
Regional Strategies program actually resulted in economic development. My concern
is with the issue of state autonomy and not with program impacts. As a practical
matter, however, attempts to measure the amount of development resulting from the
Regional Strategies program would face formidable obstacles. For one thing, this
analysis is concerned mainly with the time period leading up to the inception of the
Regional Strategies program and the fIrst two years of the program's implementation
(1987-88). It is unlikely that measurable changes in job growth and development
would show up in such a brief period. More importantly, the rate and character of
local economic development is a function of an innumerable host of factors of which
state government's role is but one. Furthermore, it is commonly held that whatever
role state government plays in promoting local economic development, its role is
subordinate to federal fIscal and monetary policy and the overall level of activity in
the greater national and world economies (Blakely 1989). It would thus be very
6difficult if not impossible to specifically measure the degree to which the Regional
Strategies program per-se resulted in economic development.
I do make some remarks on the likely character of development if the
Regional Strategies program was to have its intended effect However, it is to
highlight issues pertaining to state autonomy that these remarks are directed. The
concern here is with state autonomy and not with measuring with measuring program
impacts.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Chapter II reviews the literature to identify the principal features indicative of
state autonomy and sets forth the methodology employed in examining my hypothesis,
including my data and information collection techniques. Chapters III, IV, and V
present a detailed record of the actors and interests, events and circumstances that
shaped formulation of the Regional Strategies initiative. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII
record of the forces that shaped implementation of the Regional Strategies initiative in
each of three different regions of Oregon: Central Oregon, Southern Oregon, and
Klamath County. In each case, attention is focused upon using the record presented to
address the hypothetical concerns posited above. In Chapter IX, the concluding
chapter, I draw upon preceding discussion to identify the five above cited sources of
variation in the amount of state autonomy evinced in formulation and implementation
of the Regional Strategies program.
CHAPTER II
THE RESEARCH AGENDA
The concept of state autonomy is central to the state-centered paradigm for
public policy analysis. State-centrism can be contrasted to the two paradigms waich
have traditionally dominated public policy analysis in the liberal democracies of North
America and Western Europe. These are pluralism and Marxism. While scholars
have developed revisionist perspectives on these two paradigms, the fundamental
tenets of each remain little changed. In the pluralist view, government is the
instrument through which competing and collaborating groups ,express their policy
preferences. Public policy simply allocates the benefits and costs of public activity
that arise from this competitive and collaborative process. Marxists view the state as
an arena for class struggle and public policy as 'an instrument through which dominant
classes aim to guarantee favorable production relations and promote accumulation.
Both Pluralism and Marxism are society centered, viewing public policy as an
instrument embodying the demands of private interest groups. 1
THE CONCEPT OF STATE AUTONOMY
Events in the post-Second World War period have led political theorists to
recogniz~ that the structure of the state and the timing and character of state policy
action shape how private groups define their own interests, influence the
organizational tactics and strategies employed by interest groups, encouraging some
types of group formation and collective action but not others, and raised certain kinds
of political issues but not others (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985:253). Neither of the
8society centered paradigms serves well to explain policymaking which does not
simply translate social demands into policy but shapes the nature of social action as
well (Skocpol 1985: 4-6). This recognition served as an impulse to the emergence of
the state-centered paradigm. which eschews the view of public policy as simply a
response to the demands of social groups.
Autonomy as a Prerequisite for Effective State Action
The state-centered paradigm is founded upon the theory that state leaders
have interests separate and apart from those of non-state groups and that state leaders
embody these interests in the programmatic arrangements that define their public
policy interventions. The literature points to three such interests. One is the state's
role in providing public goods (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985:44-45). The
legitimacy of the state depends upon its ability to provide public goods. Private
actors. with a focus upon short-term profitability. will not fmd it in their interests to
provide public goods. A second interest setting state leaders apart from prIvate groups
is a desire to maximize their tenure in office. Private actors do not share in this
interest since. by defmition, they do not hold public office. Third. state leaders have
an interest in maximizing the budgetary and administrative capacity of the
bureaucratic apparatus over which they preside since doing so is likely to enhance
their ability to attain their other programmatic objectives (Gurr and King 1987:14-17)
The extent to which state leaders are able to translate their interests in public
goods provision. political perpetuation and bureaucratic capacity building into a
programmatic set of goals is contingent upon the degree of autonomy they are able to
acquire from dominant interest groups. The autonomous state leader retains a degree
of power independent from non-state groups and may employ this power to formulate
and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands of interest groups
9(SkocpoI1984:9; Held 1987:115). Autonomous state leaders "may choose to align the
state and its policies with one or another societal interest, but that is a matter of choice
more than a response to structural necessity (Gurr and King 1987:9).
Leaders of capitalist states must acquire a certain degree of autonomy if they
are to effectively formulate and implement public policy (Rueschemeyer and Evans
1985:49-68). Effective policy action requires that the state possess sufficient
resources. In capitalist economies, the state must extract these resources from the
private economy, primarily in the form of taxes. The manner in which the state
extracts resources distributes different burdens upon different groups and individuals.
By the same measure, in its public policy interventions, the state differentially
distributes benefits. Conflict will surround the state's role in determining how the
costs and benefits of state action will be distributed, as private groups compete,
seeking to benefit from and avoid the cost of state action. State leaders must acquire
some measure of autonomy in order to resolve these conflicts over the distribution of
costs and benefits if they are to effectively execute public policy interventions.
Limits on State Autonomy·
The degree to which public policy interventions reflect autonomous action by
state leaders is reflected in the extent to which they translate their "preferences into
authoritative actions [and] the degree to which public policy confonns...to [the]
resource-weighted preferences of [political leaders]" (Nordlinger 1981:20). State
leaders never act wholly autonomously; instead state leaders possess relative
autonomy. This is because state autonomy is always subject to constraints. For this
reason, it is appropriate to speak of the relative autonomy of state leaders.
The literature points to four key constraints upon the autonomy of state
leaders. First and foremost, the degree of autonomy that leaders of capitalist states
10
may exercise is constrained by the state's dependence upon the private economy for
the revenues needed to finance state operations and to provide the public goods upon
which political support depends. Capitalists unhappy with state action may withhold
the investment of their assets, denying the state the revenues it needs to conduct its
policy interventions (Block 1977).
State autonomy is also constrained by technical, institutional, and political
limitations (Gurr and King 1987:21-22). Effective policy formulation and
implementation requires the efficient collection and processing of information.
Technical constraints refer to limitations upon the ability of state leaders to acquire
and process this information. Institutional constraints refer to limitations on the ability
of state leaders to·get individuals and the complex bureaucratic organizations that
comprise the state apparatus to act as state leaders want them to act.· Political
restraints refer to the limitations upon the autonomy of state leaders founded in the
division of powers between different branches of government, including the executive,
legislature, and courts.
The literature points to certain situations which are likely to increase the
prospects for state leaders to override these constraints and act autonomously. Most
importantly, state autonomy is likely. to be enhanced under crisis conditions, when
existing policy arrangements break down. Resultant divisions within dominant classes
or between interest groups may lead to an increase in the autonomy of state leaders.
Pressure for change from subordinate classes or interest groups may also lead to an
increase in state autonomy (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985:63). The collapse of
existing policy arrangements that accompanies crisis may free:
government officials (or aspiring politicians) [to undertake] new
initiatives, conceivably well ahead of social demands, if existing state
capacities can be readily adapted or reworked to do things that will bring
11
advantages to them in their struggles with competitive forces (Weir and
SkocpoI1985:118).
State Capacity to Intervene
The concept of state autonomy is founded not only upon the assumption that
state leaders have interests separate from those of dominant social groups, but that
state leaders also possess the ability to act on their interests and transform their
preferences into authoritative actions. The degre~ to which state leaders can act
autonomously in pursuit of their interests is largely contingent upon the fiscal and
administrative capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus over which they preside.
Fiscal capacity is defmed in terms of the fiscal resources state leaders may
command in conducting public policy. State leaders are more likely to be able to
pursue their goals if they exercise discretionary control over public monies as opposed
to having public monies dedicated for specific uses (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985).
State leaders are also more likely to be able to pursue their goals if the groups whose
behavior they are hoping to influence through their policy interventions are fiscally
dependent upon, as opposed to independent of, the state for the revenues necessary to
their operation (Gurr and King 1987:124).
Administrative capacity is defined primarily in terms of access to a well
developed policy delivery system. As regards the administrative capacity of the state
apparatus in capitalist, federalist democracies, there is something of a paradox.
Federalist systems of government are usually characterized by fragmentation and a
lack of cohesion within and across different levels of government Federalist
bureaucracies are fungible; private groups may seek to exploit bureaucratic fungibility
for the purpose of directing public interventions towards aims other than those state
leaders embrace. ~ublic bureaucratic organizations may develop internal goals
12
separate from those of state leaders. It is generally held that state leaders must
command integral control of the complex organizations involved in policy delivery if
they are to overcome these centrifugal tendencies and translate their policy
preferences into authoritative actions, control best achieved through centralization.
On the other hand, effective policy formulation and implementation requires the
efficient collection and processing of information, operations which are best
accomplished by decentralized administrative structures. Also, in a market economy
with a federated system of government; decentralization is required for the state
apparatus to be able to establish the linkages needed to ensure the responsiveness of
private market forces and other levels of public authority (SkocpoI1985:16-17;
Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985:49; 55-57).
Autonomy of the Federalist American State
According to Skocpol (1985: 12), "there is less structural basis for state
autonomy in the United States than in any other modern liberal capitalist nation." The
reasons are found in America's decentralized economy and system of federal
governance.
More so in America than in most other western democracies, there is little
public control over strategic parts of the economy. This limits the ability of state
leaders to mobilize economic resources for public purposes while making them highly
susceptible to the veto capitalists can exercise over state behavior. Similarly, more so
in America than in other western democracies, public authority is divided among
differ~nt branches and levels of government which are highly fungible and susceptible
to penetration by interest groups (SkocpoI1985:23-24). The fragmentation that
characterizes American government impedes concerted action by public bureaucracies
both within the same and between different levels of government. The proliferation of
13
special committees that characterizes'America's multi-cameral legislatures allows
interest groups multiple points of access to the governing process. Legislatures may
impede executive initiatives because they view them as a "power grab that could strip
[their] authority and disrupt carefully cultivated relationships among congressional
committees, interest groups, and...administrative agencies" (Weir and Skocpol
1985:141). Also, more so in America than in other western democracies, public
authority is rooted in local bases of power. American federalism affords local
governments a central role in the public policy process. To the degree that local
economies generate revenues sufficient to reduce local government dependence upon
revenues from higher levels government, local government leaders may pursue goals
apart from those of higher levels of public authority, posing additional obstacles in the
way of the ability of superior state leaders to attain their goals (Gurr and King
1987:124). For all of these reasons, public policy in America is less likely to embody
the cohesive goals of autonomous state leaders than a conglomeration of disparate
goals cast in piecemeal terms (Weir and SkocpoI1985).
INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT: THE SUBORDINATE STATE
The origins of modern state economic development policy trace back to the
Great Depression when America's state governments began to use fiscal and other
incentives to lure business·investment to local communities, a practice known as
industrial recruiting. The operational routines through which industrial recruitment
interventions unfold varies with place. By all indications, however, there is little in
industrial recruitment activity that is indicative of state autonomy.
Industrial recruitment reflects the competitive environment within which
economic development takes place in America. In America, the owners of mobile
14
capital can choose to invest in any state or locality they desire. Business interests
whose profitability is tied to local place economies will compete to attract mobile
capital. Their efforts transform government into a focus of growth-related activity.
Locally-based business interests will seek to harness public resources in pursuit of
their goals by recruiting government officials into growth coalitions--coalitions "of
interest, recruited and organized along territorial lines...to attract scarce capital"
(Logan and Molotch 1987:34-35). The dependence of state organizations upon
revenues extracted from the private economy makes state leaders susceptible to
growth coalition recruitment and precludes state leaders from shaping their economic
development interventions in terms adverse to business.
Because the owners of mobile capital can choose to invest in any state or
local community they desire, they may play states and local communities against each
other in seeking to secure the most favorable investment conditions. State and local
governments must respond to the demands of private capitalists if they are maintain a
level of investment necessary for sustaining social and economic viability. This has
led state governments to use their regulatory powers to enact measures aimed at
creating permissive business climates. They have acted to see that their rates of
business taxation and labor, environmental, land use, and other regulatory regimes are
more favorable than those found elsewhere (pierce, Hagstrom, and Steinbach 1979;
Swanstrom 1985:141-145; Logan and Molotch 1987; Cox and Mair 1988).
The same circumstances that drive state governments to provide permissive
business climates have led the leaders.of America's state governments to engage in
industrial recruitment. Industrial recruitment activities reflect the inability of state
government officials to make critical choices between particular industries; the
incentives offered under the aegis of industrial recruitment are typically offered
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indiscriminate of the type of business activity a beneficiary is involved in. Industrial
recruitment involves little analysis of the overall costs and benefits of recruiting
particular enterprises to different communities or regions and the degree to which
recruitment of a business enterprise will contribute to the long-teon welfare of local
residents (Litvak and Daniels 1981; Eisinger 1987).
Industrial revenue bonds (IRB) are the most prevalent industrial recruitment
incentive. With the passage of enabling legislation in Idaho in 1982, all fifty U.S.
states governments offered IRB funding.to businesses willing to invest in local
communities.(Eisinger 1988:157-158). Industrial revenue bonds are revenue bonds
issued by the state on behalf of specific enterprises (Litvak and Daniels 1979). This
makes IRB's a dedicated so~ce of funding over which state leaders can exercise little
discretionary authority.
In many cases, the costs associated with theincentives offered under the
aegis of industrial recruitment are either hidden off budget or externalized. Industrial
revenue bonds help illustrate this point. Because they are revenue bonds, indebtedness
lies not with the issuing authority but with the beneficiary firm. Hence, IRB's impose
little direct cost upon state and local 'government fmances (Litvak and Daniels
1979:99-101; Swanstrom 1985). The incentives at the core of industrial recruitment
activities are typically administered by a "line agency of state government, typically a
department of economic development or commerce" (Fosler 1998:4). Industrial
recruitment activities often involve other state and local government agencies as well,
including state highway and employment departments and local land planning
agencies and community colleges. To the degree that several government agencies are
involved in industrial recruitment, their activities are usually conducted by means of
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ad-hoc contacts between representatives of the recruited fIrm and individual agencies
(Litvak and Daniels 1979:99-101; Swanstrom 1985).
The incentives offered under industrial recruitment activities impose few
direct costs upon state and local government tmances. Being characterized by
institutional fragmentation and little coordination between state and local government
agencies, industrial recruitment also places minimal demands upon the administrative
apparatus of government. The modest fiscal and administrative demands industrial
recruitment places on public authorities helps explain the popularity in~ustrial
recruitment has enjoyed as the centerpiece of state economic development policy,
according to Litvak and Daniels (1981:99-101).
INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE AUTONOMOUS STATE
. The framework I employ in this analysis consists of six features which the
literature points to as being indicative of state autonomy. Although these features are
not mutually exclusive, they are treated individually here. Doing so helps identify the
different contexts within which the amount of autonomy state leaders possess in their
industrial policy interventions can be viewed. Phrased as postulates, the six features
are as follows:
The Initial Impulse to Industrial Policy will be Provided by Forces Arising Within
State Government and not Private Groups
America's state governments came to embrace industrial policy amidst the
economic distress that prevailed throughout much of America during the 1970s and
1980s. The decline of traditional industries led to widespread joblessness. State
revenues were reduced, impairing state government's ability to'provide public health,
welfare, safety and environmental services. State leaders saw this as a threat to their
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prospects for remaining in public office (Eisinger 1988). At the same time, state
leaders came to see traditional industrial recruitment practices as an unlikely remedy
to the distress afflicting their states.
In part, confidence in industrial recruitment was undermined by academic
studies showing that state-provided incentives to have a marginal influence upon the
locational decisions of most firms. These studies showed such longstanding business
concerns as securing an adequate supply of labor and energy, access to markets and
raw materials and agglomeration economies to be the dominant influences upon
business location (Steinnes 1977; Wasylenko 1980; Pascerella and Raymond 1982;
Marlin 1982; Schmenner 1983; Swanstrom 1985; Howland 1986; Ambrosius 1986).
Confidence in industrial recruitinent was also undermined by several highly publicized
and costly industrial recruitment failures. In the most prominent case, Pennsylvania
provided over $65 million in low cost loans, highway and rail improvements, worker
training subsidies and local tax abatements for construction of a Volkswagen
manufacturing plant. However, Volkswagen generated only half the number of jobs it
promised and the plant was closed in 1987, after only ten years of operation (Osborne
1988:46). In another prominent industrial recruitment failure, the City of Yonkers
spent over $3.5 million to subsidize construction of a plant for Otis Elevator. Otis was
subsequently taken over by United Technologies, which closed the plant after only
five years of service (Eisinger 1988:316-317).
Governors disaffected With industrial recruitment set out to devise new policy
arrangements which could promote economic development, bolster tax revenues and
thus, bolster their political fortunes. In some cases, governors directed staff in their
own offices to devise industrial policy arrangements. Osborne (1988) and Ferguson
and Ladd (1988) describe Governor Michael Dukakis as having employed this
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approach in Massachusetts. Elsewhere, governors created independent commissions
and directed them to promulgate industrial policy arrangements, as in Rhode Island
Eisinger (1988) credits the political leadership of these states with having taken the
lead in promulgating industrial policy arrangements apart from conventional budget
deliberations and in advance of the demands of private groups.
Theory posits that autonomous state leaders can initiative policy activity
independent of private non-state groups. These depictions of the role public
authorities played in Massachusetts and Rhode Island are indicative of autonomous
state behavior.
State Industrial Policy will Embody Goals Peculiar to State Leaders and Apart from
those of Private Non-state Groups
Governors including Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts and Jim Blanchard
of Michigan embraced industrial policy arrangements because they recognized that
industrial recruitment was unlikely to resolve the economic crises that threatened their
ability to provide public goods and hence threatened their future political fortunes
(Osborne 1988). This p<:>ints to two goals embodied in state industrial policy
interventions. One is to bolster state government's ability to provide public goods.
The other is to extend the tenure in public office state leaders enjoy. Both of these
goals are indicative of autonomous behavior.
State Leaders will Demonstrate an Ability to Override Opposition to their Industrial
Policy Interventions
Gray and Lowery (1989:4) argue that governors have succeeded in shaping
industrial policy arrangements "in the face of opposition of major private interests."
.They cite as an example the case of Rhode Island where the state's political leadership
put together the Greenhouse compact, a 976 page, $750 million industrial policy plan
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to restructure Rhode Island's economy over the opposition of not only powerful
business interests but over the opposition of powerful labor groups as well. Ferguson
and Ladd (1988) depict Governor Dukakis as having overc.ome opposition by
powerful Boston area business groups in forging industrial policy in Massachusetts.
Osborne (1988:48- 80) credits Pennsylvania's Governor Thornburgh with having
created the Ben Franklin Partnership, modeled along industrial policy lines and
"perhaps the best economic development system in the country," despite opposition
from workers in traditional industries and their elected officials. Osborne (1988:145-
174) credits Michigan's Governor Blanchard with having forged industrial policy
initiatives in Michigan over the opposition of the state's labor unions, perhaps the
most politically powerful in the nation (peirce and Hagstrom 1983:253-258).
The literature explains the success state leaders appear to have enjoyed in
overcoming opposition to their industrial policy activities in terms of tWo factors.
First is the dimiilished credibility of the two groups commonly viewed as being key
actors in the economic development policy domain: business and labor. Eisinger
(1988:78-80) holds that the distress experienced throughout much of America during
the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the inability of traditional business practices to
provide for economic viability. This undermined the legitimacy of business claims to
leadership in the economic development domain. By the same measure, many
attributed the declining competitiveness of the American and steel industries to
exorbitant labor contracts. This undermined organized labor's influence upon state
economic development activity. With their credibility diminished, these groups have
found themselves less able to block policy initiatives they opposed and hence, state
leaders have found themselves more successful in overriding their opposition. .
Next, Bowman and Kearney (1986) cite reductions in the amount of federal
aid flowing directly to local governments as a factor explaining the success state
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leaders have enjoyed in overriding opposition to their industrial policy initiatives.
With federal aid to local governments either reduced or being channeled through state
government intermediaries, local government reliance upon state government
authority has increased. This has enhanced the leverage state leaders are able to exert
upon the local governments typically recruited into growth coalitions and thus, to
override opposition to industrial policy.
Again, we see here indications of autonomous state behavior under industrial
policy. In contrast to industrial recruitment, which is characterized by the inability of
state leaders to override opposition, state leaders are depicted as being able t~ override
the opposition ofpowerful business groups in their industrial policy interventions.
State Industrial Policy Focuses Public Resources Upon Emerging Sectors of the
Economy
State leaders embraced industrial policy as a response to the industrial
displacement of the 1970s and 1980s. State leaders attributed this distress to the
inability of traditional industries to compete in an increasingly globalized economy.
Recognition that global economic competition would only increase in the future
convinced state leaders of the impropriety of focusing their economic development
activities upon mature industries. In a break with traditional industria,l recruitment
activities, which offered public assistance regardless of the type of business activity
the beneficiary firm is involved in, state leaders used their industrial policy
interventions purposefully to promote only industries in emerging sectors of the
economy.
There is a certain equivocation in the literature as to what constitutes an
emerging economic sector. In most cases, states have defined emerging sectors of the
economy in terms of industries producing capital intensive, high value-added goods
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that demand highly selective occupational skills with prospects for rapid growth in
worldwide demand. Massachusetts targeted "technology-based" firms whose products
or services are "sufficiently innovative to provide competitive advantage." North
Carolina supported businesses doing "research leading to the development of products,
processes or services." Industrial policy in Pennsylvania focused state assistance upon
electronics and biotechnology enterprises while industrial policy in Michigan is
explicitly directed towards promoting technological innovation in the automobile
sector. Mississippi explicitly listed fourteen industries eligible for assistance under its
Advanced Technology Initiatives Act (Eisinger 1988:269).
Theory posits that the leaders of the autonomous state can override powerful
interest groups. An industrial policy focus upon specific industries reflects a state able
to make critical choices and hence is indicative of state autonomy.
The Programmatic Choices that Shape Industrial Policy will be Based Upon Objective
Analysis
In making the programmatic decisions that shape industrial policy, state
leaders appear to be guided not by political considerations but by objective
assessments of how public resources can best be used to generate economic growth in
different localities (Eisinger 1988; Osborne 1988). Osborne (1988:258-259), for
example, notes industrial policy initiatives in Pennsylvania and Michigan were based
upon "strategic audits," which "focused in on their economic bases, identified their
strengths and weaknesses, and developed initiatives that exploited those strengths and
remedied those weaknesses."
Dewar (1986:150) argues that under industrial policy, policy choice must be
based upon objective analysis. This is because:
industrial policy aims to select and provide public support for
"winners"--industries likely to both provide high economic benefits and
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to flowish in a state's particular environment. Picking winners requires
that policy choices be based upon an understanding of the problems
facing local economies and the competitive advantage offered by
different areas, an assessment of the prospects for future growth in
specific industries and the factors that promote industrial growth, why
some flffilS locate in an area while others do not, what state and local
government can do to promote sector growth that industry will not do for
itself, and what are the opportunity costs of investing public resources in
one industry and not another.
Effective information collection and processing is central to the capacity of
state leaders to formulate and pursue goals apart from those of dominant private
groups. Case evidence depicting state leaders as basing their industrial policy
decisions upon objective analysis can therefore be seen as indicative of autonomous
state behavior.
State Industrial Policy is Characterized by Concerted Action Amongst the Economic
Development Agencies of State Government
Industrial recruitment is characterized by administrative·fragmentation
amongst public authorities. The organizational arrangements through which state
leaders have sought to pursue their industrial policy aims vary with place. Still, as a
general rule, state industrial policy interventions are characterized by administrative
structures that provide for more cohesive action amongst state agencies. For example,
Governor Thornburgh sought to infuse cohesiveness into state industrial policy
activity in Pennsylvania by consolidating once autonomous agencies. A similar
approach was taken by Governor Thompson in Illinois (Clarke 1986:37; Osborne
1988:43-81). Elsewhere, state leaders have sought to lend institutional cohesion to
their industrial policy initiatives by creating select task forces Qr development cabinets
composed of agency heads and other key administration staff. Arkansas is a case in
point. Governor Clinton brought together in a task force the heads of state agencies
responsible for industrial development, employment secwity, vocational training,
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housing and higher education. So did Governor Celeste in Ohio (Clarke 1986:30;
Osborne 83-110). In Massachusettst Governor Dukakis took a different approach to
organizing his industrial policy interventions. He appointed a "Development Czart"
with responsibility for coordinating seven cabinet level offices (Clarke 1986:39;
Fosler 1988; Osborne 1988:175-210). Eisinger credits strategic economic
development plans for coordinating the economic development activities of various
state agencies in several states. There appears to be little uniformity in terms of the
scope of these plans and the process by which they are developed. But according to
Eisinger (l988:27-28)t the plans serve to "focus resources...on certain targeted
industries of special significance..and prevent diffusion of effort."
Whatever particular arrangement prevailst the new institutional arrangements
that characterize industrial policy are held to serve two purposes. They are aimed at
infusing the state apparatus with the cohesion necessary to objectively collect and
process the information upon which the programmatic decisions that state leaders
make in shaping industry policy decisions are based. And they allow state leaders to
concentrate the effective policy instruments of the state government. Using public
resources to exploit indigenous comparative advantage and promote growth at the
sector level is a complex task requiring coordination over a wide range of public
service inputs. These include harmonizing fiscalt regulatoryt taxt educationt training
programs and investment in infrastructure in a fashion most likely to promote growth
in a targeted class of industries (Goldstein 1986:3).
theory posits that state leaders are more likely to be able to translate their
policy preferences into authoritative actions if they are able to exercise concerted
control over the complex organizations involved in policy delivery. Industrial policy
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is characterized by cohesive institutional arrangements and is thus indicative of state
aut~nomy.
. The Shortfall of Theory
The literature points to instances in which the leaders of America's state
governments appear to be acting autonomously in their industrial policy interventions.
The industrial policy literature does not indicate that state leaders act autonomously in
all instances, however. For example, some states have focused their industrial policy
interventions upon promoting growth in emerging industries. Michigan, Mississippi,
Massachusetts and North Carolina have been cited as examples. Others, notably
Wisconsin, Maine and Massachusetts, have used industrial policy not to promote
growth in emerging industries but to protect declining steel, textile, and automotive
industries (Eisinger (1988:307-329). Rhode Island's Greenhouse Compact did aim to
identify, select and promote the development of a select group of "sunrise" industries
in the technology sector. But the Greenhouse compact also aimed to stabilize older
industries that were "losing ground to inte~ational competition" (Silver and Burton,
1986:132). Clearly, in practice then, state industrial policy activity is not always
fo~used upon emerging industries.
Evidence depicting state leaders in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania as having embraced industrial policy in advance of non-state actors and
over the opposition of powerful business groups has been cited as evidence of
autonomous state behavior. Yet, Lampe (1988) provides convincing evidence that
industrial policy initiatives in Massachusetts were shaped less by ideas originating
within the administration of Governor Dukakis than by dominant Boston area business
interests, especially the First National Bank of Boston. Under the so-called "New
Social Contract For Massachusetts," concluded between Governor Dukakis and
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Boston area technology fIrms, the latt~r agreed to create 60,000 new jobs in return for
favorable tax policies. The Contract is held as a watershed in state industrial policy
making. In fact, market forces would have create9 these jobs anyway, and technology
industry leaders·knew this (Lampe 1988:155-156). Did Governor Dukakis actually
possess the critical initiative in forging the "Contract," or did it represent a concession
to business sector demands? The answer and hence the degree to which the Dukakis
Administration possessed autonomy is far from clear.
Strong opposition from Rhode Island business and labor groups was crucial
in convincing voters to reject funding for the Greenhouse Compact by a margin of
four to one (Silver and Burton 1987:131- 146). The Greenhouse Compact was never
implemented. According to Osborne (1988:43-81), in Pennsylvania, political
pressures forced Governor Thornburgh to extend industrial policy activities aimed at
promoting the technology sector to small communities otherwise lacking the inputs
requisite to technology industries. This raises questions on the degree to which state
leaders have indeed been able to override opposition in forging their industrial policy
interventions and on the degree to which industrial policy interventions have been
targeted as well.
Nor is it clear that the programmatic decisions that have shaped state
industrial policy interventions have indeed been based upon objective factors instead
of political expediency. Osborne notes that industrial policy initiatives in
Pennsylvania and Michigan were based upon "strategic audits," which "focused in on
their economic bases, identified their strengths and weaknesses, and developed
initiatives that exploited those strengths and remedied those weaknesses." Dewar
(1986) has studied industrial policy making in Minnesota. She concludes that
technical analysis played little role in industrial policy decisions. This was because:
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Legislators and the governor wanted visible, newsworthy projects
to create jobs, and they wanted many such projects quickly...In the short
run, taking any action to try to solve employment problems was more
important for political purposes than its actual effect on the regional
economy. [Technical analysis] interfered, in part because the visible
projects were not necessarily technically or financially feasible, but also
because analysis took time (D~war, 1986:152).
In an essay entitled "Industriai policy: A Dissent," Schultze (1983:9) argues that
American government is inherently incapable of basing economic development policy
choices upon objective criteria. He argued that this was because basing policy choice
upon objective criteria required picking winners and losers and:
The one thing that most democratic systems--and especially the
American one--cannot do well at all is to make critical choices among
particular firms, municipalities, or regions, determining cold-bloodily
which shall prosper and which shall not.
In light of this evidence, the autonomy state leaders possess in their industrial
policy interventions appears to be above all else, situational, varying with the
circumstances and the constellation of forces arrayed in the economic development
domain. Unfortunately, the literature as it currently stands does little to define the
situations that determine the relative degree of autonomy state leaders possess in their
industrial policy interventions. The key problem is the lack of any systematic
accounting of how factors peculiar to the political economies of individual states have
shaped state industrial policy. For example, among the three major books on state
industrial policy, only Eisinger (1988) proceeds systematically from a set of precepts
and assumptions. But Eisinger's analysis is based primarily on an aggregate mapping
or inventorying of state industrial policy activity, as Anton (1989:340) notes. Because
his analysis is based upon aggregate data, he takes little account of how industrial
policy interventions have been shaped by forces peculiar to the political economies of
d,ifferent states and hence, the circumstances that define the amount of autonomy state
leaders possess. Perhaps more importantly, Eisinger's analysis appears to be driven
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by an a-priori assumption that state industrial policy interventions unfold in practice as
designed; he appears to assume that the reality and rhetoric of state industrial policy
are one and the same. The tone of his analysis is highly sympathetic. Critical
perspective is often lacking.
The contributions offered by Osborne (1988) and Fosler (1988) are case
oriented. However, the accounts offered by these contributors are nonsystematic.
They proceed from no precepts or assumptions establishing the parameters within
which to judge how state industrial policy activities' are configured and hence, how
much autonomy state leaders possess. This point has been acknowledged by
reviewers. For example, Anton (1989:340) credits the value of the "first hand
accounts" of industrial policy formulation Osborne offers. Nonetheless, he describes
Osborne's contribution as "a work of political journalism, breezy in tone...[which
reduces] complicated problems to simple either/or choices." Bollens (1989:244- 245)
criticizes Fosler in a similar tone, writing that Fosler "frequently approximates a
journalistic rather than an analytic style when describing the process of policy
formation." Adds Bollens: "Indeed, the writing style is similar in many respects to
journalist David Osborne's new book on the same subject."
THE RESEARCH AGENDA
In what situations do state leaders acquire autonomy in their industrial policy
interventions? How much autonomy do state leaders possess in their industrial
policy activities? The prominent position industrial policy has assumed on statehouse
agendas makes these important and urgent questions. This research tries to provide
answers to these questions identifying the variables that determined the amount of
autonomy that state leaders possessed in formulating and implementing the Regional
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Strategies program, centerpiece of industrial policy in Oregon during the latter half of
the 1980s under the Administration of Governor Neil Goldschmidt.
The Regional Strategies program comprised an excellent case study for this
purpose. It's operative arrangements embodied key industrial policy principles. For
example, under the terms of Regional Strategies, Oregon's counties were directed to
target for promotion an industrial sector with high prospects for future employment
growth. Selection of these industries was to be based objective analysis of the
strengths and weakness of local economies. Also, Regional Strategies was
accompanied by measures aimed at reorganizing and centralizing Oregon state
government. Hence, there are ample grounds upon which to base the hypothesis that
formulation and implementation of Regional Strategies will evince state autonomy.
Research Boundaries
Responsibility for implementation of Regional Strategies was entrusted to
Oregon's thirty-six counties. Each was responsible for targeting an industry for
promotion. The Goldschmidt Administration encouraged contiguous counties to join
together and implement Regional Strategies through multi-county regions. In some
instances, two or more counties did jointogether. In other instances, however,
Regional Strategies was implemented by single counties alone. In at least one case, a
county first joined with other counties in a multi-county region but later seceded to
implement its own unilaterdl strategy. Table I summarizes the outcome of
implementation of the Regional Strategies program. A variety of industries were
selected by a number of regions.
To manage this analysis within available time and resources, I decided to
narrow my analysis of the implementation phase of Regional Strategies to just three of
TABLE I
REGIONAL SmATEGIES SUMMARY TABLE
LOTTERY TOTAL
REGION COUNTIES STRATEGY DATE FUNDING FUNDING
Coos Coos Pon 2/18/88 $542,680 $5,834,680
Central Crook Tourism 3/4/88 $715,000 $20,379,174
Oregon Deschutes
Jefferson
Baker Baker Tourism 4/8/88 $450,000 $6,080,000
Oregon Clackmas Tourism 7nla8 $10,293,065 $115,702,904
Tourism Clalsop
Alliance Columbia
Lincoln
Multnomah
Tillamook
Washington
Yamhill
Lane Lane Tech Transfer 8/16/88 $2,250,000 $22,568,800
Southern Cwry Tourism 8/22/88 $3,089,684 $87,682,997
Oregon Douglas
Jackson
Josephine
Marion- Marion Agriculture 8f}:l/88 $2,096,110 $3,929,510
Polk Polk
Linn- Linn Tech Transfer 12/1/88 $1,553,500 $3,278,239
Benton Benton
Malheur Malheur Agriculture 1/10/89 $315,000 $549,000
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TABLE!
REGIONAL S1RATEGIES SUMMARY TABLE
(continued)
LOTTERY TOTAL
REGION COUNTIES S1RAlEGY DATE FUNDING FUNDING
Klamath Klamath Tech Transfer 2/1/89 $558,462 $9,491,478
Hood River Hood River Agriculture 2(1/89 $165,000 $382,000
North Gilliam Tourism 2/13/89 $735,000 $3,151,165
.Central Shennan
Wasco
Wheeler
Morrow- Morrow Agriculture 3/14/89 $1,080,000 $11,588,700
Umatilla Umatilla
Harney- Harney Secondary 6/19/89 $411,000 $3,698,000
Lake Lake Wood Products
Statewide
Total: $22,996,821 $268,102,793
Notes:
Date is date approved. Listed in order ofapproval dale.
Finding listed for illustrative purposes only. Some funding never materialized.
Tech Transfer=Technology Transfer
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these regions. My criteria for selecting these regions was as follows. Broadly
speaking, program implementation produced two different kinds of o~tcomes. In most
cases, Regional Strategies produced collaborative multi-county regions; in other cases,
single counties implemented Regional Strategies unilaterally. Also, the overwhelming
number of Oregon's counties--twenty-six of the state's thirty-six total counties--
implemented strategies targeting tourism. As with the implementation of multi-county
strategies, the implementation of tourism strategies emerged as a key Administration
preference. Also, widespread implementation of the Regional Strategies program was
preceded by a prototype case, meant to serve as a model upon which subsequent
strategy efforts could be modeled. To identify the political and economic impulses
that led to these divergent outcomes and.which point to the circumstances conducive
to gubernatorial success, I sought to select·cases which resulted both in multi-county
groupings and unilateralism, where tourism was and wasn't targeted, and a prototype
case. This criteria could best be met by selecting the cases of Central Oregon,
Southern Oregon, and Klamath County. Figure I depicts the location of these regions.
Methodology
The record and analysis presented in this dissertation draws upon document
research--Iegislative and other official government documents, newspapers, and other
periodicals--and especially upon interviews, conducted with key actors in the Regional
Strategies process. I prepared a list of interview candidates upon the basis of
reputation--names mentioned in press clippings, official documents and the sort--and
subsequently expanded as appropriate through the use of traditional snowball
sampling techniques. My analytical approach is inductive, drawing upon interviews
and documents as the basis upon which ,conclusions about the Regional Strategies
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process are drawn. An effort was made to carefully attribute the sources of the
information presented herein. Especially in the case of interviews, however, some
circumstances were attested to with such frequency that systematic attribution of all
sources would involve endless citations. In these instances, only those sources
responsible for the initial or principal insight have been cited. When possible,
citations drawn from newspapers and other documents are used to corroborate
assertions made during interviews. Passages in which no sources are attributed
represent the views the writer has drawn from the cited information.
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NOTES
1. For a more detailed discussion of Pluralism and Marxism, see Carnoy
(1984), Alford and Friedland (1985), or Held (1987).
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPULSE TO INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN OREGON
The Regional Strategies program has its roots in the economic crisis that
prevailed in Oregon during the fIrst half of the 1980s. The crisis produced sectionally
divergent demands for state economic development intervention. The failure of
industrial recruitment's to reconcile these demands fueled calls for state economic
development policy refonn, providing the impulse to reform proposals incorporating
key industrial policy principals.
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OFOREGON'S ECONOMIC CRISIS
The fIrst half of the 1980s was a period of economic hardship for many
Oregonians. Table II helps explain why. Between 1979 and 1981, 100,000 .
Oregonians lost their jobs. In winter, 1981-82, Oregon's unemployment rate stood at
over 11 percent, sixth highest in the nation. Not once in the following four years
would Oregon's unemployment rate drop below the national average. In October,
1986, twenty-five of Oregon's thirty-six counties were classified by the U.S. Labor
Department as Labor Surplus Areas: counties in which unemployment rates
throughout the preceding twenty-four months had exceeded the national average by 20
percent or more. Oregon's per-capita income, which stood slightly above the national
average in 1978 slipped by 1984 to only 91 percent (Joint Legislative Committee on
Trade and Economic Development 1986). During the first half of the 1980s,
businesses in Oregon were more likely to declare bankruptcy than those in almost
every other state of the union (Oregonian January 27, 1985).1
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TABLE II
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS IN OREGON
JULy 1979 JAN. 1982 OCT. 1986
United States
Oregon
Portland Metro
Rest of Stateb
Unemployment Ratea
5.7%
7.4%
5.8%
7.8%
8.5%
11.1%
10.7%
15.2%
7.1%
8.4%
6.5%
9.2%
Total Employment, Oregon's Lumber and Wood Products Sector
86,900 54,500 67,400
Number of total 36 Oregon Counties Designated Labor Surplus.Arease
N/A 22 26
Net Population Migration. Oregon. April 1. 1980 Census - July 1, 1986 Estimate
(-) 89,896
Notes
a Seasonably Adjusted
b State unemployment rate with the three county Portland metropolitan area removed
from calculations. .
c Labor Surplus Area defined by the U.S. Department of Labor as counties in which
unemployment rate exceeded U.S. national average by 20 percent or more.
Source: Oregon Employment Division; Center for Population Research and Census
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Oregon's crisis was largely due to it's heavy dependence upon the wood
products industries. In 1979, wood products accounted for over 40 percent of total
manufacturing employment in Oregon versus 3.3 percent for the nation as a whole
(Commerce Department 1979). No other American 'state was as dependent upon the
wood products industries as Oregon. Most of the lumber, plywood and veneer
produced in Oregon was consumed by the building trades. The onset of the 1979-
1981 recession, the worst in the U.S. since the Great Depression, was signaled by a
decline in construction activity, leading to a collapse in the demand for Oregon's
wood products. With the Federal Reserve pursuing a tight money anti-inflationary
policy, building activity remained moribund through early 1982, when interest rates
eased, spurring construction activity. The demand for Oregon's wood products
rebounded. Yet, although production in Oregon's mill works expanded by over 54
percent between 1982 and 1985, mill work employment increased by less than 15
percent (Timber Operators Council nd; Department of Commerce 1982, 1985).
The reason recovery in output so outpaced employment growth was because
as the demand for Oregon's wood products boomed, the mill owners invested heavily
in labor saving technologies. In consequence, for many of the thousands of Oregon
mill workers who lost their jobs during the decade's fIrst two years, recovery in the
demand for wood products meant not a return to work but instead, classification as a
displaced worker. Employment in Oregon's lumber and wood products sector dropped
from 85,000 to 67,000 between 1979 and 1986. As for those who continued working
in the restructured wood products sector, they could expect to be paid a wage in 1985
which, when measured in real terms, averaged some 17 percent below 1979 levels
(Employment Division 1985; 1979).
The result was an exodus from Oregon's small cities and rural areas as
displaced wood workers and others dependent upon their trade left home to search for
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work elsewhere. Hibbard (1989) estimates that as many as one in four Oregon
households experienced major disruption'during this period, either through layoff or
through having a household member move away to seek work. Lane County, the
state's second most populous county and one of the most dependent upon wood
products, saw its population decline by almost 10 percent between 1980 and 1986.
Between 1980 and 1986, out-migration was so great in coastal Coos County, where
the unemployment rate rarely dropped below 20 percent, that the County's population
declined by almost 15 percent (Schafer 1987). In fact, all but four of Oregon's thirty-
six counties experienced net population out-migration between 1980 and 1986. In
consequence, Oregon's population in the latter year was 90,000 less than in the former
(Center for Population Research and Census 1987).2
In his history of the coastal community of Coos Bay, the mill and log
shipping community on Oregon's south-central coast, Robbins (1988:160) depicts the
fIrst half of the 1980s as a period in which economic crisis caused an increase in "(the)
sexual and physical abuse of chi1dren...spousal beatings... alcoholism." The
Ministerial Association in the south central Oregon city of Klamath Falls reported that
counseling for drug~ alcohol, and child abuse increased tenfold between 1980 and
1985 (Keller January 8, 1990). Almost certainly, these types of disorders increased
not only in Coos Bay and Klamath Falls, but in other communities as well.
Economic crisis eroded the fIscal resources of Oregon's local governments.
Oregon's real estate market was stilled. Property values declined throughout most of
Oregon between 1979 and 1985 with the state's total assessed property value in the
latter year being some 5 percent less than in the former. Property taxes are the
primary source of local government finance in Oregon. Excepting 1982, local
property tax collections did not actually decline. But this result was achieved only at
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the cost of significantly higher property tax rates (Department of Revenue nd). In
addition to property taxes, county governments in Oregon receive revenues from the
U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management for timber harvested upon
federal forest land otherwise exempt from conventional property taxation. For this
reason, county government has historically been viewed as an important source of
public service delivery throughout much of Oregon. But with fewer trees being cut by
the moribund wood products industry, these rev~nues dropped by almost half (47%)
between 1979 and 1984, when measured in real terms (Forest Service, nd; Bureau of
Land Management nd). Statewide, when measured in real terms, local government
property tax and timber harvest revenues totaled 8 percent less in 1982 than in 197~
(Department of Revenue nd). Faced with declining revenues, local governments
channeled their available resources into maintaining the most visible and personalized
services--education, public safety, health, and welfare. Local government
expenditures for other purposes were deferred, especially those for capital projects
which, when measured in constant dollars, declined by 40 percent between 1981 and
1986 (Seidel 1990).
State finances suffered also. Oregon's system of state government financing
is poorly diversified, being overwhelmingly dependent upon personal income tax
collections.3 In 1979, for example, personal income taxes accounted for over 70
percent of state government general fund revenues (Executive Department 1983). As
the recession unfolded and unemployment rolls surged, personal income plunged. So
did personal income tax collections. Measured in real terms, personal income tax
collections in Oregon were for the 1979-81 biennium only 68 percent of initial
projections. The decline in personal income tax collections was accompanied by a
reduction in federal transfer payments. Under the Reagan Administration, federal
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contributions to the state treasury declined, with the real value of federal transfer
payments to Oregon dropping by 13 percent between 1979 and 1983. With bothtax
collections and federal transfers curtailed, real gross state general fund revenues
during the 1985-87 biennium were 12 percent less than during the 1979-81 budget
period (Executive Department 1985; 1987; 1989). Declining revenues meant curtailed
service delivery. Measured in real terms, expenditures by the state transportation and
education departments each suffered 11 percent declines between the 1979-91 and
1983-85 budget periods. For Oregon's Adult and Family Services Division, the drop
was almost 14 percent (Executive Department 1983; 1987). As a result of budget cuts,
Oregon's Employment Division, certainly one of the busiest of public agencies during
this period of high unemployment, saw 188 positions eliminated in July, 1984
(Employment Division 1984). State transfers to local governments declined by over
42 percent between the 1979-81 and 1983-85 budget periods (Executive Department
1979; 1983).
THE FAILURE OF INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT
The onset of economic crisis coincided with the installation of new political
leadership in Oregon. Vic Atiyeh fIrst campaigned to be elected Oregon's governor in
1974. He lost, but ran again in 1978. Successful the second time around, he was
inaugurated as Oregon's chief executive in January, 1979. He "had the misfortune to
take over the statehouse just as the Oregon economy began to disintegrate" (Peirce and
Hagstrom 1984:826). Within six months of his taking offIce, economists at the
Oregon Employment Division (OEQ) began to report signs of weakness in the key
mill working and construction sectors. At the end ·of his first year in office, Labor
Trends, OED's monthly publication, suggested that Oregon was going through a
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"transitional period" (Employment Division 1979). The bottom fell out in April, 1980,
with Labor Trends reporting that the recession had burst on the scene like a "bull in a
China shop" (Employment Division 1980). Layoffs abounded through the winter of
1981-82, when the state's unemployment rate peaked at close to 12 percent.
Oregon as an Administratively Weak State
The Atiyeh Administration responded to the economic crisis with a program
aimed at recruiting industry. Industrial recruitment may have made sense to the
Atiyeh Administration. The state government over which the Atiyeh Administration
presided throughout the fIrst half of the 1980s was fiscally weak. It was also
administratively weak. In fact, the state government apparatus over which Governor
Atiyeh presided may have been one of the most administratively weak of the fIfty U.S.
state governments. This conclusion is suggested,by Abney and Lauth (1985:101-102),
who rank Oregon fIrst among the fifty U.S. states in terms of the degree to which state
agency heads interact with interest groups. Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985:50-60)
and Weir and Skocpol (1985:141-148) cite exactly this type of interaction as a key
indicator of weak administrative capacity and government fragmentation.
The administrative weakness that characterized Oregon's state government
apparatus was the product of long standing cultural, political and economic tensions.4
These tensions have imbued Oregon with a system in which constitutionally mandated
checks and balances divide state between the governor, legislature and a number of
semi-autonomous public commissions. The balance of power inherent to ~his
.arrangement serves to restrain state government intrusion into local affairs and
prevents the state's sectional interests from gaining too great an advantage at the
expanse of others. Bu't the result is an administratively weak and fragmented state
government apparatus in which the executive branch, lacking overall authority, often
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faces difficulties in orchestrating concerted action by state agencies. Lending a
practical perspective to the administrative weakness attributable to these
circumstances, the Oregonian (November 2, 1989) reported:
the Oregon constitution, with its numerous checks and balances
provides for a. weak executive. Oregon's inability to remedy several
problems...almost certainly [is] mainly the result of constitutional
constraints.
Perhaps nothing better exemplified the administrative weakness of Oregon
state government than the Oregon Economic Development Department (EDD). The
Economic Development Department.was created in 1973 as a product of disputes over
who should control the state's economic development policy making apparatus. Prior
to 1973, responsibility for Oregon state government's involvement in economic
development activities was installed in the Economic Development Division, an
integral part of the governor's office and in ad-hoc advisory panels serving at the
governor's pleasure. This arrangement gave Oregon's governor broad discretion in
determining the scope and substance of state economic development activities.
However, this arrangement proved objectionable to key members of the Oregon
legislature. Subsequently, a new arrangement was forged, one which removed
responsibility for Oregon state government's involvement in economic development
from the governor's office, leading to a significant diffusion of this authority.
Legislation passed into law in 1973 created EDD as an independent cabinet
level agency of the Oregon state government bureaucracy. A state Economic
Development Commission, composed of five members nominated by the Governor
and confIrmed by the state senate, was also established. The Commission's role was
to set state economic development policy. EDD's role was to implement Commission
policies. The Commission was also invested with authority for appointing EDD's
director and for approving applications for state industrial revenue bond funding. This
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arrangement established the Commission as EDD's governing body. Yet, the
Commission's control over EDD was not to be exclusive. The legislation that created
EDD also directed the agency to undertake initiatives ordered not only by the
Commission but by the governor and legislature as well.
Given the multiple centers of authority to which EDD was seemingly
accountable, it is unsurprising that the agency's'early history was replete with disputes
over exactly who was in charge of the agency--the quasi-independent Economic
Development Commission, the Governor, or lawmakers. Perhaps the most important
consequence of the disputes that came to surround the administration of Oregon's
state economic development policy apparatus were charges that EDD's activities were
poorly coordinated with those of other state and local agencies. There was in fact a
well founded basis for this charge. During the 1970s, EDD been charged with the task
of preparing a statewide economic development plan defining what roles other
components of the state bureaucracy could play in fostering local economic growth.
The planning effort reflected the recognition that state agencies besides EDD,
although having no explicit economic development mandate, nonetheless provided
services affecting a community's prospects for economic development. For example,
one agency targeted in the 1970s planning effort was Oregon's Department of
Transportation (ODOT). ODOT had an implicit role in promoting local economic
development since it was responsible for building and maintaining the state's
highway system, upon which the efficient movement of commodities depended. To
take another example, Oregon's Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
administered funds used for building and maintaining local water and waste treatment
facilities. Again, there was an implicit economic development dimension to DEQ's
responsibilities; it funded facilities necessary for supporting industrial development
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and population growth. In fact, the economic development plan EDD set out to
prepare during the 1970s was never completed. Despite the expenditure of perhaps as
much as $1 million, the planning effort collapsed. In large part, failure was due to
EDD's inability to coordinate its planning effort with other elements of Oregon's state
government bureaucracy (Slavin forthcoming).
It is clear that there was no easy solution to the obstacle fragmentation posed
to coordinated economic development planning in Oregon. For example, Governor
Atiyeh's administration was preceded by the administration of Governor Bob Straub;
it was Governor Straub who directed EDD to prepare the statewide economic
development plan. When a resignation created a vacancy in the top EDD spot in
1977, Governor Bob Straub moved to have his own candidate installed as EDD
director. By doing so, he aimed to increase EDD's responsiveness to gubernatorial
initiatives and hence overcome problems posed by fragmentation. However, under the
terms of EDD's founding legislation, it was the Economic Development Commission,
not the Governor that was empowered to appoint the agency's director. Dominated by
appointees of the previous administration, the Commission balked at Governor
Straub's choice. Straub responded by firing recalcitrant Commissioners. Through this
maneuver, he succeeded in installing his own choice as EDD head. Still, its was clear
that machinations such as that employed by Governor Straub posed few long term
prospects for overcoming the administrative fragmentation afflicting Oregon state
government. Vexed that Straub had upset the balance of power initially crafted into
EDD's governing arrangements, lawmakers subsequently enacted a law prohibiting
the removal of sitting economic development commissioners for any but malfeasant
offenses.
It would in fact be wrong to solely blame EDD for the failure of its 1970s
planning effort. The administrative fragmentation and dispersed authority that
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characterized EDD's governance was systemic, extending to other agencies as well.
For example, both ODOT and DEQ were governed under commission arrangements
quite similar to that under \yhich EDD operated. In consequence, there existed no
absolute authority necessary for bringing the components of Oregon's fragmented
state apparatus together around a common goal. Indeed: given these circumstances, it
would have been somewhat amazing had EDD succeeded in completing the statewide
economic development plan that it set out to prepare during the 1970s.
The Two Oregons
To recruit investment to Oregon, Governor Atiyeh made a series of highly
publicized overseas trips. Included were visits to Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.
Some sense of the efficacy of the Atiyeh Administration's industrial recruitment
campaign can be gained from the following information. Industrial Revenue Bonds
(lRBs) were the chief incentive offered by Oregon in seeking to recruit investment to
local communities. There was an increase in IRB activity under the Atiyeh
Administration. At $98.2 million, the sum total of IRB issues in 1984 alone was more
than double the $41.3 million total for the four year period 1976-1979. During the
Atiyeh Administration's tenure in office, Oregon issued $354 million in IRBs to ftrms
which, in aggregate, promised to create 6,358 new jobs (EDD'nd). A report prepared
for the Oregon legislature in 1985 found, however, that firms receiving IRB funding
between 1980 and 1985 created only one-fourth the number of jobs initially promised
(Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Development 1985). Furthermore, these
jobs were not uniformly distributed.
After hovering above ten percent for most of.the preceding two and a half
years, Oregon's statewide unemployment rate fmally began to decline in the Spring,
1982. But job growth was concentrated in the diversifted economy of the Portland
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metropolitan area. Although the Portland metropolitan area accounted for just half of
Oregon's total population, it generated two-thirds of the 68,000 jobs added statewide
between 1982 and 1985. The result was a growing disparity between the economic
fortunes of Portland area residents, on one hand, and most of those living elsewhere in
Oregon. Unemployment statistics help illustrate this. In December, 1984, the
unemployment rate in metropolitan Portland was,'at 7.5 percent, only slightly above
the national average of 7.2 percent IfPortland was removed from calculations,
however, Oregon's unemployment rate swelled to 11.4 percent (Employment Division
1985). Job growth bolstered Portland area government tax revenues. If Portland area
local government revenues are removed from calculations, real local government
property tax and timber revenues were 24 percent less in 1982 than in 1979. With
Portland area governments excluded, real local government revenues did not recover
to 1979 totals until 1985 (Department of Revenue nd) Economic bifurcation only
became more pronounced as Oregon neared mid-decade, prompting the Oregonian
(January 27, 1985:Al) to report "Oregon's economy is rapidly becoming two. There
is the Portland area, and there is everythingelse."
The Atiyeh Administration's industrial recruitment campaign exacerbated
Oregon's economic bifurcation. Between 1980 and 1985, Oregon issued a total of
$267.43 million in IRBs. Six counties accounted for $167 million or 62.5 percent of
this total: Multnomah, Washington, Clackamas, which comprise the Portland
metropolitan area, and Marion Benton, and Linn--rnid-Willamette Valley counties
with diversified economies revolving around agriculture, government, education and
manufacturing. These three Willamette Valley counties closely trailed the Portland
area in recovery. Only $100.3 million, or 37.5 percent of IRB funding during this
period went to counties east of the Cascade Mountains or south of the Willamette
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Valley, where economic conditions were most distressed. And of this total, $4.7
million went to Hanna Nickel in 1985, a Douglas County ore smelter which
nonetheless closed down two years later. Another $31.5 million of this total was used'
for mill retrofits which may actually have reduced employment in the mill sector even
as the demand for wood products was increasing (EDD nd).5
If the literature on industrial recruitment is to be believed, IRB funding most
probably favored the Portland and mid-Willamette Valley areas because they were
intrinsically attractive to business. These areas comprised large markets with a
diversifi~ labor supply, easy airport access, universities and a well developed
transportation grid. Still, realization that IRB funding--the core'instrument of the
Atiyeh Administration's industrial recruitment program--prirnarily ~enefited Oregon's
most developed areas fueled a widespread consensus that the state's economic
development needs exceeded what industrial recruitment could accomplish.
Labor's Disaffection
A good place to begin examining the attitude of Oregon's labor movement
towards the Atiyeh Administration's economic development policy is with a white
paper titled "reclaiming Oregon's economy," published by the Oregon AFL-CIO in
1982. Decrying that "Urban growth areas have received 79% of IRB investment in
Oregon," and that IRBs "tend to promote investment in the more developed and
economically secure areas of the state, rather than in less developed areas where
investment is needed," the report attacked the Administration's focus upon industrial
recruitment6 That union criticism of Governor Atiyeh's program reflected the
proclivity of IRB funding to be focused upon Oregon's most developed areas is
perhaps unsurprising. Oregon's labor movement was heavily rooted in the wood
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products sector and union membership, heavily concentrated in the state's timber
dependent small cities and rural areas.
In "Reclaiming," Oregon's labor movement report went on to argue that "a
silicon chip factory...does not salvage the plywood mills whose housing orders are
drying up" and shortly thereafter, posed the question, in regard to ventures targeted for
recruitment to Oregon, "Do the private sector fmns...pay wages as high as those to
which Oregon workers are accustomed as a result of forest products past high
profitability?" The reference here was to another labor grievance. According to
fonner Oregon AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Bob Baugh (October 23, 1989),
Oregon's labor movement saw the Atiyeh Administration's economic development
activities as being aimed mainly at recruiting high technology investment to Oregon.
As union leaders saw it, the jobs materializing from Governor Atiyeh's recruiting
efforts were unlikely to be high wage positions in unionized industries. Instead, they
viewed the industrial recruitment effort as most likely to generate the type of low
wage, non unionized assembly jobs often associated with electronics assembly. There
is an implicit concern with work force bifurcation expressed here which, taken in
historical context, has often been construed as threatening labor movement solidarity.
Concomitant with his efforts to recruit business investment to Oregon,
Governor Atiyeh sought to reduce taxation and regulation of business. When
interviewed, Governor Atiyeh (April 30, 1991) said that he viewed such relief, aimed
at improving Oregon's business climate, as necessary if his industrial recruitment
campaign was to succeed. Under the aegis of improving Oregon's business climate,
Governor Atiyeh vetoed a bill which would have expanded state workmen's
compensation benefits, a key union goal. But perhaps no other incident caused as
much animosity between Oregon's labor unions and the Atiyeh Administration as the
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battle over the plant closing bill during the 1981 session of the Oregon legislature.
The bill's central provision would have required fInns with ,over 100 employees to
provide advance notice of large scale work force curtailments and layoffs. With union
members being laid off in record numbers, the bill was strongly backed by Oregon's
labor movement. Oregon's business community vehemently opposed the bill.
Governor Atiyeh believed that prior notification would discourage business
investment in Oregon and drive away businesses already located there. He saw prior
notification as a threat to his business climate campaign and led opposition to this, the
most controversial of the bill's provisions. Other less controversial provisions of the
plant closing bill became law. The prior notifIcation provisions never did.
In 1982, Governor Atiyehcharged a Blue Ribbon Commission with
identifying ways of improving Oregon's business climate. The commission was
composed of business leaders; the panel lacked union representation (Oregonian April
25, 1982). That the unions went unrepresented on the commission highlighted another
feature of the Atiyeh Administration's economic development policy vexing to the
unions; Governor Atiyeh (April 30, 1991) believed that direct labor participation in
fashioning his administration's economic development policy would undermine his
industrial recruitment program by discouraging business investment in Oregon. From
AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Bob Baugh's perspective, the Atiyeh Administration
was denying Oregon's labor movement a consultatory role in shaping his economic
policy at a time at which its ranks were being devastated by record layoffs.
At best, Oregon's labor movement viewed the Atiyeh Administration's
economic development program as punitive. At worst, the labor movement viewed it
as a deliberate attempt at union busting. In light of this, it is unsurprising that
Oregon's labor movement emerged as probably the most vehement critic of the Atiyeh
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Administration's economic development policy. Oregon AFL-CIO President lTv
Fletcher made this point when he was quoted in the April 19, 1983 edition of the
Oregonian as saying "Sure I think Vic really believes he has been pro-labor in his
political career. Only the record doesn't show that." The same edition of the
Oregonian reported that relations between Atiyeh and the AFL-CIO leader had
become so strained that the two refused even to speak to each other.
Business Sector Criticism
A headline appearing in the October 19, 1982 edition of the Oregonian read:
"Business Not Hedging: The Whole Bet Is On Atiyeh." Without doubt, Governor
Atiyeh was the candidate of choice among Oregon's business community in the 1982
gubernatorial elections. Business support for Atiyeh was in part due to the role his
opponent, Democratic State Senator Ted Kulongoski, had played in sponsoring the
prior notification provisions of the plant closing bill. With strong business sector
bac~g, Governor Atiyeh raised over $1.1 million for his 1982 reelection bid, twice
what Kulongoski raised (Oregonian November 2, 1982:A1). Deep pockets helped
Governor Atiyeh win 62 percent of votes cast in Oregon's 1982 gubernatorial election,
giving him the largest winning percentage in an Oregon gubernatorial race since Mark
Hatfield won a second term as Oregon's governor in 1964 (Oregonian November 4,
1982:Al).
Governor Atiyeh's efforts to relax taxation and regulation of Oregon
businesses received widespread support from all sectors of Oregon's business
community. Still, especially during his second term in office, Governor Atiyeh
increasingly found himself in the position of having to defend his economic
development policy from criticism by key elements of Oregon's business leadership..
In fact, just nine months into his second term, he found himself doing so. The
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occasion was the September, 1983 annual conference of the Associated Oregon
Industries, Oregon's main business lobby. Covering the conference, the Oregonian
reported:
Governor Vic Atiyeh took off his coat and rolled up his sleeves
Friday in defending his economic development program before business
and industry leaders, some of whom have been critical of his efforts.
tlyou have undoubtedly noticed, as I have, some business leaders
questioning the states economic development program [he said]
(Oregonian September 24, 1983).
The criticism against which Governor Atiyeh defended himself at the AOI conference
was the product of splintering among regionally based factions the Oregon's business
community and the Atiyeh Administration's failure to accommodate competing
business sector economic development agendas that emerged as a consequence. At
the root of this splintering were the territorial inequities endemic to Governor Atiyeh's
industrial recruitment effort.7
The Portland area had begun growing out of the recession by the time
Governor Atiyeh's second term began. More so than anything else, it was the
expansion of Oregon's high technology sector, centered in Portland's west side
suburbs, that fueled metropolitan area growth. Securing increased funding for higher
education emerged as a key aim of west side technology businesses. On another level,
economic expansion encouraged a coalition of metropolitan area business and
government leaders to embark upon an ambitious effort to attract additional capital
investment to the area. At the core ~f the coalition's agenda was a plan to construct a
Convention Center in Portland's city center.
Governor Atiyeh's industrial recrQitment program and the agenda of
Portland's business interests were highly collateral. Portland's growth coalition
sought to attract new capital to the area: as noted earlier, the Portland area was the
most likely destination for capital recruited to Oregon by the Atiyeh Administration.
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Governor Atiyeh also emphasized the importance of higher education in his economic
development program. Witness, for example, comments the Governor delivered
amidst a special 1982 session of the Oregon legislature, one of four such sessions
called that year to deal with recurrent budget shortfalls. Speaking before Portland's
City Club, Governor Atiyeh "stressed the importance of graduate programs in science
and technology at state colleges and universities as an incentive for new business to
locate in the state" (Oregonian January 30, 1982:AI3).
In contrast to metropolitan Portland, Oregon's -timber dependent communities
continued to experience not an influx but an exodus of capital during this period.
Making reference to Governor Atiyeh's forays to recruit overseas investment, John
Mitchell, the U.S. National Bank Vice-President, commented in 1985 that "the major
foreign investments won't hit the rural areas" (Oregonian January 27, 1985). Business
leaders from Oregon's small cities and rural areas recognized that few if any of the
fIrms accepting Governor Atiyeh's invitation to open shop in Oregon were likely to
choose to do so in their own distressed communities.
Oregon has traditionally had a large small business sector: an official from
the Oregon Economic Development Department once called Oregon "the number 1
small-business state in the country," with more small businesses per-capita than any
other state" (Oregonian January 16, 1989). Itis in Oregon's small cities and rural
areas that small businesses are especially prevalent. Small city and rural area business
leaders developed an economic development agenda apart from that of Portland's
business community. This agenda included calls for direct state fmancial assistance to
small business owners. Also included on this agenda was a plan, offered by non
metropolitan lawmakers during the 1985 session of the Oregon legislature, to hire a
private contractor to run 12 regional "Buy Oregon" projects. These would have been
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aimed at promoting purchases of business commodities from local rather than out-of-
state suppliers. Backers of "Buy Oregon" aimed to have the program administered by
an independent contractor. They appear to have aimed to establish a parallel
economic development apparatus to that administered by the Atiyeh Administration,
which they saw as too committed to an industrial recruitment program favoring the
Portland area, one which would more closely pursue their own economic development
objectives. According to the Oregonian (November 20, 1985), members of the Atiyeh.
appointed Economic Development Commission opposed "Buy Oregon" because they
thought it would harm those Oregon businesses that sold products to other states.
The frrst half of the 1980s was a period of pronounced economic bifurcation
and a scarcity of public resources in Oregon. These circumstances fueled conflicts
over state economic development policy, differences which affected Oregon's
business community and fueled the type of criticism Governor Atiyeh had to defend
himself against at the 1983 AOI conference.
Early Industrial Policy Proposals
Disaffection with Governor Atiyeh's economic development program fueled
caIls for reform. The two most prominent were articulated by the Oregon AFL-CIO
and by the City Club of Portland, a private, non-profit association composed of
executives, professionals and academics drawn from Portland metropolitan area
business, civic, education, and government circles.
Recall the 1982 "Reclaiming" document in which Oregon's labor movement
attacked the Atiyeh Administration's economic development policy. "Rec.laiming"
went further, articulating the labor movement's agenda for reforming state economic
development policy along lines commensurate with its own goals. This agenda was
posed around the following question:
54
What projects can re-employ a large number of skilled and semi
skilled workers, at or near their accustomed wage, taking maximum
advantage of the area's concentration of forest products capital stock,
labor force training, the state's existing resources, and location? (AFL-
CIO 1982)
The AFL-CIO's answer was expressed in a call for state economic
development policy reform described in the "Reclaiming" report as a "comprehensive,
fair and sound approach to planning Oregon's economy" (AFL-CIO, 1982). The
essence of this reform package is perhaps best captured in the following pro.visions:
Oregon needs a state wide economic development policy which is
coordinated both administratively and geographically to deal with job
death (closures) as well as job birth (the attraction of new industry).
Implementation of this policy requires a greater level of
communication between related administrative departments than
currently exists. Departments such as the Bureau of Labor and
Industries, the Employment Division, the Department of Economic
Development, the Apprenticeship and Training Divisio'n, and other
departments dealing with facility siting, land use planning, etc., need to
coordinate information gathering and the generation of a rational
program for industrialization.
There is also a need for better communication and coordination
between state agencies and major constituencies outside of the
government, (such as organized labor and community based
organizations).
Greater incentives could be provided to encourage the investment
of new capital in economically depressed areas. This would help to
preserve those communities which have been the most devastated by the
declining economy.
The City Club is a private, non-profit association composed of executives,
professionals and academics drawn from metropolitan area business, civic, education,
and government circles. Normally, the City Club functions to evaluate, debate, and
advocate policy options for guiding Portland's future development. In late December,
1983, however, the City Club published a report premised upon the view that
"Economic Development in Portland is more than a Portland metropolitan issue. It
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involves policies and actions at the state level also" (City Club of Portland 1983:148).
With the publication of the 1983 document, entitled "Report on Economic
Development Coordination," the City Club broadened the scope of its involvement to
include a review ofthe Atiyeh Administration's economic development policy..
The City Club's 1983 "Report" was based upon interviews with nineteen
persons. Oregon AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Bob Baugh was one of those
interviewed. However, more so than anyone else, the report appears to have
articulated the views of Oregon's business leadership. At least thirteen of the nineteen
people interviewed during preparation of the "Report" could be said to be directly
representing private businesses interests, including some of Oregon's largest
corporations: First Interstate Bank of Oregon, Pacific Power and Light Company, the
Burlington Northern and Southern Pacific Railroads, Portland General Electric
Company, and Tektronix, Inc. An officials from Norris, Beggs and Simpson, one of
Oregon's largest commercial property brokers also contributed to the "Report" as did
representatives of the Portland Chamber of Commerce and the Sunset Corridor
Association, which often functioned as a trade association for the technology
industries located in Portland's rapidly growing west side ~uburbs.8
The City Club report endorsed the Atiyeh Administration's efforts to
demonstrate that ~IOregon is open for business," this being a metaphor for its business
climate measures. Otherwise, the "Report" called for the Atiyeh Administration to
adopt certain state economic development policy reforms. Most notably, the report
called for Governor Atiyeh to assume a leading role in establishing in Oregon some
sort of system of industrial targeting. It called for Atiyeh to personally assume
leadership of the state Economic Development Commission and use this post to build
consensus over the:
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relative emphasis that should be placed on...large or small
companies and traditional businesses in forest products, agriculture and
tourism or new types such as computer and genetic engineering business
(City Club of Portland 1983:157).
The "Report" further called upon Governor Atiyeh to develop a:
strategy for economic development which unites public and private
efforts at the state and local level in ...(1) in day-to-day site processing
(tactical activities), (2) in long-range public and private budgeting to
encourage economic development (strategic activities), and (3) in setting
ultimate goals by which strategies may be planned and tactics
implemented (City Club of Portland 1983:155; 157).
The AFL-CIO and City Club reports are notable because they show Oregon's
labor movement and business leadership--key constituencies with strong interests in
state economic development policy--proposing state economic development policy
reforms embodying key industrial policy principles: planning, the institutional
consolidation of state economic development activities, and industrial targeting. This
is not to say that these two important constituencies had arrived at any consensus over
a reform package, however. They remained divided over important issues. To take
the most obvious, the City Club report signalled the business leadership's endorsement
of more permissive business climate measures, anathema to labor.
Governor Atiyeh appears to have paid little heed to these calls for reform of
state economic development policy. A report contained in the January 7, 1984 edition
of the Oregonian helps make this point. It summed up Governor Atiyeh's r~action to
the call for economic development policy reform contained in the City Club bulletin
by reporting"Atiyeh, is ignoring the report." Commenting upon the reports
recommendations, Governor Atiyeh said "It's hard for me to see how they arrived at
that conclusion." By all indications, he remained committed to industrial recruitment,
a point brought home several days earlier when, commenting on his Administration's
record on economic development, he cited "20 companies that have contacted the
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department of economic development about possibly locating in Oregon. The
likelihood of getting all 20 is not good," Governor Atiyeh said, "but I can assure you
that there will be some companies coming here" (Oregonian January 5, 1984:F3).
Erosion in Public Confidence
Tensions surrounding state economic development policy in Oregon during
the first half of the 1980s came to a head in meetings of the Oregon state legislature.
Throughout this period, Governor Atiyeh and lawmakers from the Democratically
controlled legislature battled over economic development policy. The 1985 legislative
session saw the debate over state economic development policy become unusually
rancorous. The session began with Oregon State Senate President John Kitzhaber
outlining the following priorities for legislative attention: "the declining quality of jobs
in Oregon; problems of dying communities; the lack of development in rural areas;
enhancing the role of small business; exploiting areas in which Oregon enjoys
advantages over other states; and development of industries that engage in national
and international trade" (Oregonian January 26, 1985). Not long thereafter, however,
Governor Atiyeh defended his industrial recruitment program before the Oregon
Legislature's Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Development (T&E). In a
seeming rebuke of efforts to expand state economic development policy beyond
industrial recruitment, he argued that state economic development resources "should
be used for one time events and not for continued funding of state government
programs" (Oregonian January 5, 1985). This led Vera Katz, the Speaker ofthe
Oregon House of Representatives to complain that the Atiyeh Administration's
economic development policy "could wind up increasing the economic disparity
between Portland and rural Oregon." Katz went on to call economic development
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policy under Atiyeh "a collection of isolated and disconnected tactics searching for a
strategy" (Oregonian February 22, 1985:C2).
Katz's use of the word "strategy" is instructive. Senate President Kitzhaber
and Senator Joyce Cohel), head of the legislature's T&E committee also spoke
repeatedly of an economic development strategy during the 1985 legislative session,
revealing that, Governor Atiyeh aside, the call for a systematic reform of state
economic development policy had penetrated to. the highest levels of Oregon state
government. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that Oregon's legislative leadership
had reached consensus on a reform package. No consensus existed, as the Oregonian
reported in its edition of January 26, 1985.
In November, 1984, Oregonians established a statewide lottery, the proceeds
of which were dedicated to economic development. The lottery was the product of a
ballot initiative. Voters, frustrated with Salem's inability to devise an effective
response to the state's economic bifurcation, had elected to bypass the legislative
process. The lottery was no panacea to the state's economic development problems,
however. Instead, the lottery embroiled Governor Atiyeh and legislators in disputes
over how lottery proceeds would be spent which, feared House Speaker Katz, could
"degenerate into a economic blood feud between Portland and the rest of Oregon"
(Oregonian February 22, 1985:C2).
Governor Atiyeh's second term in office expired in January, 1987.
Constitutional provisions prohibited him from seeking reelection to a third term as
Oregon's governor. The evidence suggests, however, that he would have done poorly
had he been able to seek reelection. Forty percent of respondents to a public opinion
poll by published by the Oregonian on January 5, 1986 rated Governor Atiyeh
negatively. Information on the approval ratings of Governor Atiyeh's predecessors
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was unavailable. But given that Governor Atiyeh Won reelection in 1982 with the
largest victory margin in twenty years, the results of the 1986 poll could only be
construed as reflecting a significant decline in public confidence in his administration.
The poll showed the Oregon legislature to have been held in even lower esteem, with a
44 percent negative rating. Public's confidence in Oregon's political leadership was
eroding. At the heart of this erosion in confidence was its perceived failure to remedy
the problems posed by the state's bifurcating economy. Governor Atiyeh may have
tacitly admitted as much when, in his last year in office, he told the Oregonian (April
22, 1986) that economic development would be the leading issue when voters went to
the polls in November, 1986, to choose his successor as Oregon's chief executive.
SUMMARY
The recession of the early 1980s plunged Oregon into economic crisis. The
diversified urban economy of metropolitan Portland entered a period of growth while
crisis conditions continued to prevail in many of Oregon's timber dependent small
cities and rural areas. Industrial recruitment not only failed to narrow the growing
disparity between the "two Oregons" but appeared likely to actually contribute to this
disparity. The inability of industrial recruitment to accommodate the sectionally
divergent economic development policy aims spawned by economic bifurcation led
Oregon's AFL-CIO and business leadership to propose economic development policy
reforms revolving around economic development planning. Badly divided, Oregon's
political leadership proved unable to translate calls for reform into a practical reform
program. Failure to do so eroded public confidence in the state's political leadership.
More so than anything else, it was political conflict that highlighted the
failure of industrial recruitment in Oregon. The literature says nothing about
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industrial recruitment engendering political conflict, identification of the conflict that
arose from the use of industrial recruitment in Oregon appears to be' a significant and
previously unexplored finding. This point will receive further elaboration in the
concluding chapter.
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NOTES
1. Unlike the first half of the 1980s, the 1970s were a period of rapid growth for
Oregon. Between 1970 and 1980, both the state's population and gross manufactured
output expanded by over 25 percent (Secretary of State 1985-87). In a deoade in which
Oregon's population and economy expanded rapidly, public interest focused upon
controlling growth and protecting the environment. During the 1970s, Oregonians passed
laws expanding public park lands, requiring deposits on recyclable pop and beer bottles
and cans, and establishing the most comprehensive system of statewide land use planning
iIi the nation.
2. The four counties were Jackson and Josephine, located in southwestern
Oregon, Lincoln County, located on Oregon's central coast, and Washington County,
which comprises the west side of the metropolitan Portland area.
3. Oregon's voters have repeatedly refused to adopt a sales tax. As of 1989,
voters in Oregon had defeated ballot proposals to establish a statewide sales tax on eight
separate occasions.
4. This is because IRB funding can be used only to make capital improvements,
including facility construction and the procurement of machinery, and not to meet
operating expenses such as wages. The propensity for most businesses is therefore to use
IRB funding to insta11 labor saving technologies (Litvak and Daniels 1979).
5. As regards the administrative fragmentation characteristic of Oregon, some
historical perspective is helpful. Oregon's early settlers came from New England. They
brought with them a strong sense of localism and aversion to centralized authority (Peirce
and Hagstrom 1983:821-824). According to Elazar (1972:85-110), these attributes are
intrinsic to the "Moralistic" political culture with which Oregon is infused. He argues
that a fundamental tenet of "Moralistic" political cultures is the problem of reconciling
"localistic communitarianism with government bureaucracy."
Oregon is a large state--its 96,699 square miles make it the tenth largest in the
United States--divided by high mountain ranges, rivers, broad valleys and vast high
desert plateaus and basins. Oregon's size and complex geography have traditionally
impeded travel and communications between communities. Territorial diversity has also
engendered regionally differing modes of economic,production in Oregon: farming in the
Willamette Valley, ranching and irrigated agriculture in the eastern desert areas, fishing
on the coast, and wood products all over but especially in the southwest. According to
Terence O'Donnell (November 8, 1989) Oregon's geography acts as a centrifugal force,
dividing regions and communities and feeding localistic tendencies. The
centrifugalness, localism and aversion to central authority traceable to Oregon's early
settlement and territorial diversity are manifest is what Peirce and'Hagstrom (1983:821-
824) call the "Oregon System."
Rarely has the "Oregon System" been manifest as it was during the early years
of the 20th century, when collusive practices between large landholding railroads,
bankers, land speculators and Oregon's political leadership fueled a strong political
reform movement. The opening salvo was fIred in 1902 when Oregonians adopted, by an
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11-1 ratio, the ballot initiative and referendum. In doing so, "Oregon citizens
appropriated to themselves... the final decision on virtually all momentous decisions."
Subsequently, "in six elections, starting with 1904, Oregon voteI:s expressed their will on
107 specific constitutional or statutory proposals" The result, according to political
scientist Frederic C. Howe. was to make Oregon "the most complete democracy in the
world" (Peirce and Hagstrom 1983:824-825). In practical terms, this meant a highly
fragmented state government structure in which power was widely diffused.
6. Because it is unclear how the AFL-CIO defmed developed areas, the writer is
unable to account for the discrepancy between the AFL-CIO's 79 percent figure on IRB
funding and the six county 55 percent figure offered earlier by the writer.
7. Analysis in this section draws upon interviews I conducted with prominent
Oregon business leaders. Included were Richard Reiten (February 27, 1990). former
head of the Portland office of the prestigious business consulting firm Arthur Anderson
and Company and at the time of this writing, President of Portland General Electric
Company, the investor owned utility providing service throughout Portland and much of
its surrounding area. Also interviewed were David Bolander (November 22. 1989),
President of the Pacific Power and Light Company, the Fortune 500 utility that serves
much of the rest of Oregon. John Mitchell. Vice-President of U.S. Bank. of Oregon
(November 13, 1989). Oregon's largest bank., and Rob Miller (December 21. 1989).
President of Mount Jefferson Farms and a key leader of the Willamette Valley business
community.
8. The following list of persons interviewed in preparation of the 1983 City Club
"Report on Economic Development Coordination" helps cast light on the degree to which
it reflected the view of Oregon's business leadership:
Bob Baugh, Secretary-Treasurer. Oregon AFL-CIO.
Floyd Bennett, Vice-President for Corporate Affairs and Economic Development. First
Interstate Bank of Oregon.
James Burke. Executive Director, Council for Economic Development in Oregon.
Larry D. Campbell, Vice-President. Plantek.
Robert H. Domries, Burlington Northern Railroad.
Jacob Fried, Portland State University.
Jim Gardner. Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic
Development of the Oregon Legislature.
Louis P. Growney, Industrial Development Director, Pacific Power and Light Company.
Clifford Hudsick, Director of Economic Development Services. Port of Portland.
Sharon Kafoury. Executive Director. Portland Chamber of Commerce.
Allan R. Mann. Oregon Economic Development Department, Portland Region.
Jack McConnell. Norris. Beggs and Simpson. Realtors.
Alan Mellis. Director of Economic Development, Portland General Electric Company.
Duane Moore. Southern Pacific Rail Road.
Jack Nelson. Mayor. Beaverton, Oregon.
Steve Peterson. Manager. Business Development Division, Portland Development
Commission.
John Rees. President, Sunset Corridor Association.
Richard D. Smith, Tektronix Inc.
Rodney Stubbs, President. Plantek.
CHAPTER IV
BUILDING SUPPORT FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The role state actors played in bringing industrial policy to Oregon was less
one of originator of ne~ policy ideas than one of seizing upon and mobilizing political
support for principles fIrst articulated by private non-state groups. New political
leadership embraced industrial policy as a vehicle for promoting economic
restructuring and more immediately, as a vehicle for fashioning an electoral coalition
between groups which, divided by other differences, nonetheless shared a common
interest in industrial policy reform.
INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT REPUDIATED
Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial election matched Democrat Neil Goldschmidt
against Republican party nominee and outgoing Oregon Secretary of State Norma
Paulus in a race the Oregonian (November 5, 1986:AI) described as having been
decided on the basis of who voters felt "could best change the state's economic
fortunes."l According to Goldschmidt campaign planner David Bragdon (October 31,
1989), Goldschmidt entered the race for governor in order to address what he viewed
as Oregon's leading economic development challenge.2 This was the growing
disparity between the economic fortunes of metropolitan Portland and Oregon's
distressed timber dependent areas. Since the Portland area appeared to have few
problems in attracting investment on its own account, this challenge boiled down to
renewing the economies of Oregon's timber dependent small cities and rural areas.
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Gubernatorial aspirant Goldschmidt's views on state government's role in
promoting economic restructuring in Oregon was shaped by key limitations. One
pertained to the role the U.S. federal government played in Oregon's economy. State
government had little control over logging on federal forest lands, where most of
Oregon's timber supply was drawn. Oregon also had no authority over foreign trade.
Oregon could neither regulate yields on federal forest lands nor prohibit the export of
raw logs, hoping to increase log supplies to the mills, creating jobs and boosting tax
receipts. Similarly, Oregon had no control over U.S. monetary policy and therefore
could not lower interest rates with the aim of stimulating home building and the
demand for wood products, again with the hope of boosting employment and taxes.
Another limitation pertained to the dominant position private investors play in
determining the conditions under which capital is invested in the United States. Even
if Oregon state government could have increased log supplies, prohibited log exports
or lowered interest rates, Goldschmidt recognized that there was little state
government could do to prevent privately owned mill works from increasing
production by expanding automation instead of hiring more workers and thus,
undermining efforts to revitalize timber dependent economies. In light of these
circumstances, Goldschmidt believed that Oregon's wood products sector would only
decline in its ability to provide for the economic viability of timber dependent
communities. Consequently, he believed that revitalization of Oregon's distressed
timber dependent communities required that they reduce their dependence upon wood
products by diversifying into new economic activities.
Campaign planner David Bragdon said that from the campaign's earliest
days, Goldschmidt recognized that as a vehicle for promoting economic
diversification, "more of the same wouldn't do." He was referring to the type of
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industrial recruitment program at the heart of Governor Atiyeh's economic
development policy, which experience showed was unlikely to direct investment to
timber dependent areas but instead, to Oregon's most highly developed areas.
Goldschmidt's repudiation of the Atiyeh Administration's economic development
policy was immediate and unequivocal. In late May, 1985, for example, he began a
ten city tour of Oregon, the purpose of which was to "help him decide whether he
wants to be a candidate for governor of Oregon in 1986." His first stop was in Coos
Bay, a timber dependent community experiencing 20 percent unemployment
Speaking before business and labor groups, Goldschmidt attacked the Atiyeh
Administration's economic development program for its "lack of focus" and its
"neglect of Oregon's timber dependent communities" (Oregonian May 29, 1985:B2).
Goldschmidt's attacks upon Governor Atiyeh's economic development record became
increasingly virulent as the campaign progressed to the point where, appearing before
Portland's City Club one month before the election, he called Governor Atiyeh's
economic development policy "an absolute travesty" (Oregonian October 4, 1986).
BUILDING AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY COALITION
At the heart of the Goldschmidt campaign's election platform was a plan to
reform state economic development policy. The Goldschmidt campaign's embrace of
economic development policy reform was driven by two principal aims. One was to
provide a service which the private sector was unwilling or unable to provide of its
own accord--inducing economic restructuring in Oregon's less developed regions.
The Goldschmidt campaign's embrace of economic development reform was also
driven by political exigencies. Goldschmidt's campaign platform served as the basis
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for the recruitment of an electoral coalition which carried Goldschmidt to success in
Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial election.
Seeking the Rural Vote
The Goldschmidt campaign made a concerted effort to win the support of
Oregon's rural voters, who by alI accounts, benefited little from the Atiyeh
Administration's industrial recruitment program. Prior to entering the race for
governor, Goldschmidt's sole experience with elected office was as city commissioner
and mayor in Portland. He had never held statewide office in Oregon. He also had a
decidedly liberal reputation. So did voters in Multnomah County, which in 1986
accounted for half of all voters in the three county Portland region. Few analysts
doubted that in his bid to be elected governor, Goldschmidt would win the Portland
vote. Outside of Portland, Goldschmidt's grip on the electorate was much more
tenuous. According to Terrence O'ponnell (November 8, 1989) of the Oregon
Historical Society, Oregon's small cities and rural communities tend to be politically
conservative. Small and rural community voters have also traditionally seen
themselves a~ being dominated by Portland. In consequence, they have often proved
reluctant to elect Portland area candidates to statewide office. Goldschmidt's general
election opponent, Norma Paulas, had risen to run for governor after growing up in
poverty in the rural Oregon town of Burns. This could only have enhanced her
prestige among nonmetropolitan voters. These circumstances led the Oregonian (July
2, 1986) to report that "there were good reasons to believe that voters living outside
metropolitan Portland would not easily relate to Goldschmidt." Yet by the same
account, Goldschmidt could prevail in the gubernatorial contest only if he could win a
sizable share of the non metropolitan vote.
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Goldschmidt signalled his intention to contest the rural vote even before he
initially announced his candidacy. Recall his "testing the waters" tour that brought
him to Coos Bay. Speaking there, he called Portland "the head living off the body of
the rest of the state" (Oregonian May 29, 1985); Clearly, Goldschmidt was seeking to
distance himself from the propensity most voters had to identify him with Portland
and in the process, curry favor with non metropolitan voters. Portland was
Goldschmidt's political base so his remarks in Coos Bay must be considered
implausible. More instructive was Goldschmidt's promise to lead an "Oregon
Comeback," which would extend economic recovery to "those counties and
constituencies that are most in need of a revived economy" (Oregonian November 7,
1986). He proposed to effect his "Comeback" by asking each area 0 the state to
prepare "short lists" which could be placed on a "statewide economic development
agenda" allowing Oregon's governor to concertedly focus state economic
development activities upon prioritized economic development goals (Oregonian May
29, 1985).
As expected, Neil Goldschmidt did very well among Portland's voters in
Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial election. A high turnout gave him a 32,000 vote victory
margin among Multnomah County voters. It's true he won only two of the seventeen
largely rural Oregon counties east of the Cascade mountains. But if the state's six
most heavily urbanized counties are excluded from the statewide tally, Goldschmidt
still won over 52 percent of the popular vote (Oregonian November 7, 1986).
Commenting upon the Goldschmidt campaign's performance, Jeff Mapes (October 31,
1989), political reporter for the Oregonian credited Goldschmidt's ability to "hold his
own in most of the rural counties" to his promise to reshape state economic
development policy in leading the "Oregon Comeback."
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Securing Union Support
The Goldschmidt campaign also made a concerted effort to recruit the union
vote. Oregon's labor unions have traditionally supported Democratic candidates in
gubernatorial elections. Yet there were reasons to question how strongly the unions
would support Goldschmidt. According to Bob Baugh, former Oregon AFL-CIO
Secretary-Treasurer and a principal architect ofthe AFL-CIO's 1982 "Reclaiming"
report, (October 23, 1989), Goldschmidt's campaign opponent Norma Paulus had a
good record on labor issues while serving as Oregon's Secretary of State. Union
voters were also wary about the strong support Goldschmidt received from
environmentalists. Many wood products workers viewed environmentalism as a threat
to their livelihood. And union voters in the wood products sector could be expected to
view Goldschmidt with the type of skepticism traditionally accorded Portland area
candidates by residents of small cities and rural areas.
The Goldschmidt campaign sought to dispel concerns over its links to
Oregon's environmental movement as early as July, 1985. While citing his record as
evidence of his commitment to environmental protection, he argued nonetheless that
in managing the state's natural resources, Oregonians should "do anything we can so
they provide work for our citizens" (Oregonian July 3, 1985:01). According to
former Oregon AFL-CIO leader Bob Baugh (October 23, 1989), Goldschmidt
promised the union leaders that if elected, he would afford the unions a consultatory
role in shaping his economic development policy. Above all, however, Goldschmidt
based his appeal to the unions upon a promise to create jobs. He conveyed this
promise to the annual 1986 conference of the Oregon AFL- CIO, he said that "the state
could no longer be divided into a number of regions, those that work and those that
did not," adding that "the state has an investment every place" (Oregonian August 22,
69
1985:B2). He reiterated his plan to refashion state economic development policy
around a "state economic agenda," which would direct state resources to where they
were most needed and could be best employed. Oregon's labor movement responded
enthusiastically to the Goldschmidt campaign. Covering the 1985 AFL-CIO
conference, the Oregonian (August 22, 1985) reported "there was little doubt it was
love at fIrst sight between Goldschmidt and the labor leaders." In fact, Goldschmidt
received the endorsement of all but one of Oregon's labor unions in his race for the
Governor's offIce (Oregonian October 27, 1987). The sole dissident union was that of
the nurses, which endorsed Paulus.
Building Bonds With Business
As a candidate for the governor's office, Neil Goldschmidt made a concerted
effort to elicit business community support.· Speaking before Portland's City Club one
month before Oregon's 1986 gener~ election, he contrasted his career to that of his
opponent for the governor's offIce, Norma Paulus. Only "one candidate in this race
has actually worked in business, has earned a profit and lost money, and I've done
both" said Goldschmidt as he contrasted his own career to that of Paulus, whose adult
working life had been spent entirely in the public sector (Oregonian October 27,
1987). Addressing the 1987 conference of the Association of Oregon Industries,
Oregon's main business lobby, Goldschmidt reminded his audience that as mayor, he
had worked closely with Portland's business community to revitalize the city's
downtown. Above all, he cast his appeal for business support in terms of his promise
to refashion state economic development policy. Referring to his plan to establish a
statewide economic development agenda, Goldschmidt promised Oregon's business
leadership that if elected, he would establish a "business plan for the state" (Oregonian
October 4, 1986) which would make multiple state agencies work together with
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private business. According to Goldschmidt campaign materials, his administration
would result in "an unprecedented level of private investment" (Goldschmidt
Campaign nd).
The Goldschmidt campaign appears to have enjoyed success in recruiting
business sector support. The Oregonian noted as much in an edition published the day
after Oregon's November, 1986 gubernatorial election. The Oregonian (November 5,
1986:A1) reported that gubernatorial candidate Neil Goldschmidt "broadened his
appeal to include prominent business people, who have traditionally backed
Republicans."
Submerging Differences
When interviewed, Goldschmidt campaign aid David Bragdon (October 31,
1989) told the writer that "people got very nervous when ever Neil spoke about it."
Asked to elaborate about what he meant by "it," Bragdon responded that he was
referring to Goldschmidt's economic development platform. By people, Bragdon
referred to Goldschmidt's campaign staff. According to Bragdon, the Goldschmidt
campaign recognized the appeal its plan to reshape state economic development policy
would hold to various constituencies, including Oregon's labor unions, -rural voters
and business leadership, and deliberately sought to promote its reform plan as a means
of recruiting their electoral support. At the same time, the Goldschmidt campaign
recognized that the state economic development question raised distributional issues
around which these constituencies-might diverge. The Goldschmidt campaign sought
to avoid this prospect by deliberately submerging is economic development plan in
unifying rhetoric.
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Despite the ambiguity that surrourided the Goldschmidt campaign's public
pronouncements on state economic development reform, the campaign did have a
palpable reform agenda. Goldschmidt's campaign statements hinted at the plan's
three key features (Bragdon October 31, 1989; Baugh October 23, 1989, March 5,
1990; Webber November 18, 1989). First, local governments in each region would be
encouraged to join together in promoting growth in a single targeted industry. Next,
Oregon state government would conclude "memorandums of understanding with local
governments' which stipulated specific actions the state would take to support local
industrial promotion activities. And Oregon state government would be reorganized,
increasing the governor's power over the state's fragmented bureaucracy and allowing
the governor to concertedly direct the state's economic development resources to
where they might most effectively contribute to local economic development efforts.
More will be said of this scheme in the following chapter. At this point, its is more
important to note the following.
First, the Goldschmidt campaign's plan for state economic development
reform aimed at concertedly directing state resource allocations towards fueling
growth in a-priori selected industries. Seen in this light, the Goldschmidt campaign's
plan for reshaping economic development policy in Oregon appears as an incipient
blueprint for statewide industrial policy. Second, recall that the City Club's 1983
proposal for reforming state economic development policy had called for industrial
targeting. Also recall that the Oregon AFL-CIO's 1982 "Reclaiming" report called for
a statewide economic development plan that would systematically coordinate and
concentrate state economic development activities. In short, the Goldschmidt
campaign's scheme to reform state economic development policy along industrial
policy lines embodied tenets articulated by private non-state groups well before he
entered the race to succeed Governor Atiyeh as Oregon's chief executive.
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The Goldschmidt campaign's coalition building strategy appears to have paid
dividends. Goldschmidt won the overwhelming support of Oregon's labor movement.
He also benefited from unusually strong business sector support. Oregon's labor and
business leaders recognized Goldschmidt's coalition building effort for what it was.
For example, commenting on Goldschmidt's 1986 gubernatorial campaign, former
Oregon AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Bob Baugh (March 5, 1990) told the writer that
"nobody else had tried to bring us together before." Baugh was asked what he meant.
By "us," Baugh meant Oregon's labor unions and business leadership. Business
leaders David Bolander (November 22, 1989:), former President of Pacific Power and
Light Company' and Richard Reiten (February 27, 1990) former President of Portland
General Electric Company, expressed similar sentiments when interviewed.
Still, that the Goldschmidt campaign's promise of economic development
reform found favor with leaders of Oregon's labor movement and business community
should not be interpreted to mean that they shared consensus on economic
development policy goals, for this was not the case. To take the an obvious example,
in 1986, amidst Goldschmidt's campaign for governor, power company executive
David Bolander called for Oregon to improve its business climate by rolling back state
workers compensation benefits, amongst the highest in the nation (Oregonian June 20,
1986). This was a proposal to which the AFL-CIO's Bob Baugh was unalterably
opposed. Oregon's labor and business leaders agreed to endorse the Goldschmidt
campaign's economic development platform not because their economic development
goals coincided but because each had an interest in economic development and each
saw Goldschmidt's plans for reforming state economic development policy along
industrial policy lines as a vehicle for attaining these aims.
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Mandate for Industrial Policy Reform
Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial election offered voters a choice. Neil Goldschmidt
promised to reform state economic development policy so as to transform the state into
an active agent of economic restructuring. His opponent, Norma Paulus was seen as
offering voters little in the way of reform. For example, debating Goldschmidt before a
City Club audience in October, 1986, one month before election day, Paulus:
told the group that state government had ignored the business
Community in developing strategy, and that as a result, Oregon lag~
behind the state of Washington, which...has allowed the business sector
to dictate economic policies of Washington (Oregonian October 4,
1986).
Paulus charged that "in the past, the state legislature has antagonized rather than aided
business." She also said that if elected governor, she would "insist" that the state's
business community be allowed to set economic policy priorities. Exactly what this
would have meant in practice remains unclear to the writer. But as the Oregonian
reported, there was little in Paulus remarks to indicate that she envisaged breaking
significantly from the economic development program of the Atiyeh Administration, a
point Goldschmidt drove home in his comments before the City Club audience.
The Goldschmidt campaign prevailed in Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial
election, capturing 53 percent of votes cast. Goldschmidt won the governor's office
by what the November 7, 1986 edition of the Oregonian described as a "respectable
margin." His victory was widely interpreted as providing him a mandate to reform
state economic development policy. Goldschmidt wasted little time in moving to put
his mandate into practice. The same edition of the Oregonian reported that his
transition team would immediately "start developing the regional economic agendas
that Goldschmidt made a central theme of his campaign."
SUMMARY
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Neil Goldschmidt embraced key
industrial policy principles originally articulated by private labor and business groups
as a vehicle for promoting economic restructuring but more immediately, as a vehicle
for fashioning an electoral coalition between groups which, divided by other
differences, nonetheless shared a common interest in state economic development
policy reform. Successful in his bid for the Governor's office, Goldschmidt emerged
from Oregon's 1986 gubernatorial election with a mandate to reform state economic
development policy along industrial policy lines.
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NOTES
1. Prior to facing off with Paulas, Goldschmidt defeated State Senator Ed
Fadeley in Oregon's May, 1986 Democratic party primary election, capturing 70
percent of votes cast (Secretary of State nd).
2. Neil Goldschmidt was not interviewed during the course of this research.
Despite attempts to do so, the writer was unable to arrange an interview. However,
Roger Smith (December 8, 1989), chief of Goldschmidt campaign fund raising, was
interviewed. So was Bill Scott (November 7, 1989), manager of Goldschmidt's
gubernatorial campaign. Scott was a longtime Goldschmidt confident; earlier he had
served Goldschmidt as an aide during his tenure as mayor of Portland. Also
interviewed were David Bragdon (October 31, 1989) and Mike Wetter (November 2,
1989), key staffers on the Goldschmidt campaign's issues team. Unless cited
otherwise, the discussion in this chapter is based upon interviews conducted with these
Goldschmidt campaign officials.
3. Goldschmidt's roots in Oregon ran deep. He had studied political science
at the University of Oregon after growing up in Eugene, the state's second largest city.
He earned a law degree at UC Berkeley before returning to Portland to become first a
legal aid·attorney, then a city commissioner (1970-71) and next, the city's mayor
(1972-79). In 1979, President Jimmy Carter made Goldschmidt U.S. Secretary of
Transportation. With Ronald Reagan's election as President, Goldschmidt became an
executive at Nike Inc., the sports apparel maker. In 1985, Goldschmidt announced his
resignation from Nike to enter the race to succeed Governor Atiyeh as Oregon's chief
executive.
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CHAPTER V
THE POLmCS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY ADOPTION
The Goldschmidt Administration's plan for reforming state economic
development policy along industrial policy lines aimed to promote growth "in emerging
industries, objectify policy choice, centralize economic development administration,
and perpetuate the Administration's tenure in office, features indicative of state
autonomy. Its mandate to reform state economic development policy not
withstanding, however, the Administration had to secure legislative authority to put its
industrial policy scheme into practice. Lawmakers attached several conditions to their
authorization. These conditions point to limitations that tensions founded regionalism,
localism, and rivalries between the branches of Oregon state government placed upon
the Goldschmidt Administration's prospects for autonomous action.
REGIONAL STRATEGIES AS INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Aides to Governor-elect Neil Goldschmidt began drafting the Regional
Economic Development Act shortly after Oregon's November 1986 election. The Act
created the Regional Strategies program, the centerpiece of the Goldschmidt
Administration's industrial policy scheme. The Act was introduced in the Joint
Committee on Trade and Economic Development (T&E) of the Oregon state
legislature as HB 3011 on February 20, 1987 and passed out of T&E on April 24,
1987. It was adopted by both houses of the Oregon legislature shortly thereafter.
Governor Goldschmidt signed the Act into law on, May 11, 1987.1
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Through the Regional Strategies program, the Goldschmidt Administration
aimed to provide a public good--economic development--which private market forces
were unlikely to provide of their own accord. Section 3 (2)(b) of HB 3011 helps make
this point. It reads: "the Legislative Assembly finds that regional strategies are key to
the state's economic revitalization."
Section 4 (1) of HB 3011 provided that "not later than 60 days after the
effective date of this Act, by rule, the department shall adopt standards for regional
economic development strategies." Drawing upon the provisions ofHB 3011 and the
standards developed by EDD, the principal features of the process by which the
Regional Strategies program was to be enacted can be identified. These features point
to an economic development policy arrangement focused upon promoting growth in
emerging industries, stressing the objectificati'on of policy choice, and consolidating
and centralizing administration of economic development planning, features indicative
of state autonomy.
Regional Strategies aimed to focus state and local economic development
activities upon "economically viable industries, with reasonable long term growth
prospects, including...innovative new industries" (HB 3011 Section 4 [2][aD.
Commensurate with this goal, each of Oregon's thirty-six counties was to select a
"principal industry or economic activity" which would serve as the focus of state
supported activities to promote local economic development (HB 3011 Section 5 [1]).
Program guidelines promulgated by EDD defmed a principal industry as:
A basic industry such as tourism/recreation, secondary wood
products manufacturing, manufacturing of special types of goods, high
technology, agriculture, or food processing; or a focused economic
activity, such as research and development or international trade, which
has a demonstrated potential to create jobs in a particular industry (EDD
nd a).
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Each county was to base selection of its target industry or economic activity upon an
analyses of the local economy, the purpose of which was to:
identify and analyze the specific [local] economic opportunities
and liabilities, to identify and analyze unique resources in the region that
might be marshaled [sic] in support of a regional strategy [for promoting
local economic development], and to evaluate strategy ideas (EDD nd a).
Criteria were provided to guide counties in principal industry selection. The most
important provision required that selection of a county's principal industry be guided
by its potential for creating "family wage jobs." The potential for creating "family
wage jobs" was the main performance standard upon which Regional Strategy
selections were to be based. Guidelines established by EDD lent fairly precise
definition to exactly what counted as a family wage job. The economic development
agency's guidelines defined a family wage job as "a full time equivalent job with a
wage greater than 80 percent of the median income for a family of two in the county
where the majority of employees reside" (EDD nd a).
The Regional Strategies arrangement was clearly intended as a vehicle for
consolidating and centralizing the administration of economic development planning
in Oregon. Section 3 (10 of HB 3011 helps make this point. It read, in part: "to be
effective, regional strategies must have the coordinated support of all available
resources." In turn, the provisions aimed at coordinating economic development
activities can be seen as having been directed at increasing Oregon's administrative
capacity for economic development.
There were several dimensions to the Regional Strategies capacity building
scheme. First, the Regional Strategies arrangement aimed to consolidate and.
coordinate economic development planning activities at the local level. Referring to
an arrangement by which two or more counties would join together in a compact to
target a single principal industry or economic activity for promotion, Section 6 of HB
79
3011 provided that "Wherever possible, the governing bodies of counties shall work to
fonn multi-county regional strategies." HB 3011 did not prohibit counties from
unilateral implementation of Regional Strategies unilaterally. The clear intent of HB
3011 was to discourage counties fr.om doing so, however.
Next, the Regional Strategies arrangement aimed to systematically channel
local demands for economic development assistance to state government. Section 5 of
3011 provided that "each cou~ty or group of counties that form a region submit a
regional strategy," including a statement identifying its chosen principal industry or
economic activity and the economic analysis upon which the decision to select the
industry was based. Also to be included in Strategy submissions was a project list.
Section 5 of HB 3011 established the project lists "as a basis for state financial
assistance to projects to aid a regional economy." The lists were to be comprised of "a
spirited [sic] list of activities to be undertaken or funded by the state from lottery
proceeds and other sources." Included under other sources were "funds from...state
agencies, such as the Oregon Department of Transportation or the State Marine
Board" (EDD nd a). Also included as sources were local governments and the federal
government. Section 4 of HB 3011 provided that "public investments [be] matched, to
the maximum extent possible, by the contributions of private financial and other
resources."
Under the terms of HB 3011, the governing board of each county party to a
Regional Strategy was required to hold two public hearings. The first was to be held
prior to selection of a principal industry or economic activity, the second, prior to any
vote on formal strategy adoption. Counties were required to provide two weeks notice
prior of the hearings.
'" ..'
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Upon formal adoption of a Regional Strategy, it was to be forwarded to
officials at the Oregon Economic Development Department. Section 5 of HB 3011
made EDD responsible for overseeing administration of the Regional Strategies
program. The Department's responsibilities included providing technical assistance to
local authorities seeking to analyze their economies, select target industries and put
together project lists. Also, EDD was directed to review Strategy submissions to
ensure compliance with the program's founding statutes and administrative rules.
Section 7 of HB 3011 provided EDD with another important responsibility as well.
This was to "coordinate adopted Regional Strategies with existing state and local
economic development efforts." This points to the third element in the Regional
Strategies arrangement aimed at building Oregon's capacity for economic
development planning by consolidating and centralizing economic development
functions: EDD was to serve as a vehicle for coordinating the concerted response of
state agencies to the requests contained in strategy project lists. The Economic
Development Department's role in overseeing implementation of Strategies will be
discussed at length later ~ this chapter. Further comment on how EDD was supposed
to coordinate the economic development of state agencies is deferred until then.
Last, Section 7 of HB 3011 reserved for Oregon's governor sole discretion
for approving or rejecting, and therefore providing funding for, submitted Strategies.
Oregon's governor had the final word in deciding what industries were targeted for
promotion, what Strategy projects would be funded and hence, by what measures
industrial promotion would be effected. This provision had the effect of centralizing
ultimate responsibility for the decisions that defined the Regional Strategies program
in the office of Oregon's governor. If the Governor chose to accept a county's
Strategy, HB 3011 directed that he sign an agreement with the county's governing
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board. This agreement committed each of the two parties--the county and the
governor--to fulfill obligations delimited under the terms of the pertinent project list.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES IN REGIONAL STRATEGIES
The Regional Economic Development Act was intended not only as a vehicle
for promoting economic restructuring but as a vehicle for pursumg another aim as
well. It was designed as an° instrument for perpetuating the Goldschmidt
Administration's tenure in office. This point was first raised in an interview I
conducted with Alan Webber, (November 11, 1989), a longtime Goldschmidt
confident. Webber advised Goldschmidt in the formulation of the Regional Strategies
arrangement.
According to Webber, the arrangements set forth in HB 3011 were largely
modeled upon a neighborhood planning system that Goldschmidt had established
while serving as Portland's mayor during the 1970s. Under the Portland system,
neighborhood planning organizations channeled "neighborhood needs reports," annual
lists of prioritized demands for municipal services, to city hall. The analogy between
the neighborhood system and Regional Strategies becomes clear if Oregon's counties
are substituted for Portland's neighborhoods and the Strategy project lists for the
neighborhood needs reports.
That Regional Strategies was diffused from Goldschmidt's experience in
Portland is perhaps unsurprising. As Abbott (1983) notes, Goldschmidt was elected
mayor at a time when Portland's municipal government confronted a crisis of public
authority not dissimilar in many ways to that faced by Salem in the mid-1980s. More
telling, however, is the fact that upon adopting Goldschmidt's neighborhood planning
proposal, the Portland city council did not permit Mayor Goldschmidt to oversee the
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program's implementation himself. According to Abbott, they feared Goldschmidt
would use the program to build a personal political organization. As with the Portland
neighborhood program, the policy arrangement cast by HB 3011 offered opportunities
for the building of such an organization .since under Regional Strategies, Governor
Goldschmidt would enjoy great discretion in disbursing state lottery dollars. He
would thus be well positioned to reward those interests which provided support for his
own future political ambitions.
Clearly, Governor Goldschmidt did not lack for political ambition. He was
successfully elected mayor of a major American city at the relatively young age of 32.
Without assurance of victory in his quest for the governor's office, he had quit a high
paying job as a Nike executive. As to exactly what his future political aspirations
might have been, this is unclear. At the least, he probably aspired to a second term as
governor. Commentators have long speculated upon the vulnerability of either of
Oregon's two veteran Republican senators to a Democratic challenger capable of
generating widespread support statewide. Since Oregon's governor was
constitutionally limited to two terms, Goldschmidt may also have hoped to ultimately
succeed one of the two.
The potential for the Goldschmidt Administration to have used Regional
Strategies to build political support was recognized in the Oregonian. Inits June 28,
1987 edition, published about a month after HB 3011 was signed into law, the
newspaper reported that Regional Strategies gave Governor Goldschmidt "a mandate
to organize in areas of the state where Republican Norma Paulus out polled him in
November." In light of this, it can be concluded that the Regional Strategies the
Regional Strategies arrangement embodied, in addition to economic development,
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another goal indicative of state autonomy as well, this being the perpetuation of the
Goldschmidt Administration~s tenure in public office.
LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS UPON AUTONOMY
The Goldschmidt campaign's 1986 election victory was widely seen as a
mandate on the economic development policy question which, by 1987, had
dominated public policy debate in Oregon for over six years. This could only have
placed great pressure upon lawmakers to approve Goldschmidt's plan to reform state
economic development policy along industrial policy lines. Still, many lawmakers
viewed state economic development policy reform with skepticism. This became
clear the fIrst time Goldschmidt Administration officials met to discuss Regional
Strategies with lawmakers from the legislature's T&E Committee. The Oregonian
(January 29, 1987) sought to capture the tone ofthe meeting under the headline
"Governor's Economic Planners Grilled."
The Goldschmidt Administration succeeded in securing legislative
endorsement of Regional Strategies. The legislature's endorsement of the
Administration's plan was not unqualified, however. Instead, lawmakers attached
several conditions to their Regional Strategies authorization. These conditions point
to limits upon the prospects that the policy arrangements provided for in HB 3011
would lead to an expansion in Oregon's capacity for economic development and the
Goldschmidt Administration's prospects for to independently pursue its goals.2
Gambling With Economic Development
Funding for the Regional Strategies program was to be provided under the
terms of SB 964. The omnibus appropriations bill reserved $25 million in state lottery
money for the use in funding projects submitted as part of local strategy project lists.
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Oregon's voters had. established the lottery through the initiative process in November,
1984, dedicating lottery proceeds to economic development.
The ftrst half of the 1980s was a period of au.sterity for Oregon. With
budgets for established programs being cut back, little money was available to launch
new initiatives. The lottery changed this.. It created a large pool of money which, as
long as it was spent for economic development, had few strings attached. The lottery
greatly expanded the economic development policy making capacity of Oregon state
government, making the Regional Strategies program possible. It merits noting,
however, that the boost that the lottery provided to Oregon's policymaking capacity
was tenuous. Lawmakers inserted a proviso into SB 964 that made distribution of
lottery money appropriated for the Regional Strategies program contingent upon its
availability. There was a precedent for this. Officials had estimated that the year
beginning July 1, 1985, would generate some $121 million in lottery proceeds for state
economic development programs. But sales of lottery tickets had fallen short, forcing
officials to lower this estimate by 20 percent, to $98 million (Oregonian January 31,
1986). As it happened, lottery sales subsequently increased and Regional Strategies
was never faced with a shortfall in its appropriated $25 million. The proviso was thus
rendered moot. Still, these circumstances highlight an important issue. While the
availability of lottery money increased Oregon's economic development policy
making capacity, the boost in capacity was not certain. It depended upon the
vicissitudes of lottery gaming. In effect, Oregon was gambling with its capacity for
economic development.
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Division of Powers
The Goldschmidt Administration's plan for reshaping state economic development
policy called for concentrating a great deal of power in the hands of Oregon's
governor. The Administration sought sole authority for dispensing $25 million in
lottery money. The Administration also sought to extend the control Oregon's
governor could assert over Oregon's fragmented state bureaucracy. Goldschmidt's
electoral mandate made it difficult for lawmakers to deny him the authority he sought.
Still, lawmakers were careful to minimize the prospects that an expansion in the
Goldschmidt Administratiqn's authority would result in a commensurate reduction in
their own authority. They inserted a Sunset Clause into HB 3011, which limited the
Regional Strategies program to a single biennium only. Lawmakers also denied the
Goldschmidt Administration control it was seeking over several of the quasi-
independent policy making commissions that oversaw the operations of key
components of Oregon's bureaucratic apparatus. Insertion of the Sunset Clause into
HB 3011 and denial of authority over the commissions points to rivalries endemic to
the division of powers between Oregon's branches of government as the source of
limita~ons upon the likelihood that the Goldschmidt Administration would be able to
secure key industrial policy goals.
Sunset Clause The Sunset Clause was inserted into HB 3011 (Section 8) at
the insistence of lawmakers on the T&E Committee. The Sunset Clause provided that
authorization for Regional Strategies would expire on July 1, 1989. All strategies had
to be complete and approved by the Governor at that time. The Su~set Clause limited
Regio.nal Strategies to one biennium only.
The Goldschmidt Administration opposed the Sunset Clause. According to
Goldschmidt aides involved in drafting HB 3011, Governor Goldschmidt believed it
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would take more than a single two-year biennium of strategy development to promote
economic restructuring and renewal in Oregon's lesser developed regions (Bragdon
October 31, 1989; Wetter November 2, 1989; Lohman November 21,1989). It was on
these grounds that EDD's David Lohman argued against insertion of the Sunset
Clause before the T&E Committee. Lohman told T&E lawmakers that:
The whole idea behind the regional strategies is to allow the
regions to develop an economic strategy that's going to be significant
enough--that it's going to be self-sustaining--that it's going to be a major
hit If we are going to look·at funding only in this biennium, then I think
we're looking at a much smaller effort in terms of the regional'strategies
(Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development
February 23, 1987).
The argument that a single biennium would be insufficient to effectively promote
economic restructuring in Oregon's less developed regions appears a credible enough
reason for the Goldschmidt Administration to have opposed the Sunset Clause. The
Administration's plan to use the Regional Strategies program as a vehicle for
recruiting political support in a reelection bid suggests another reason as well.
Installed in office for a four year term, the Administration was likely to be
campaigning for reelection not during the 1987-88 biennium but during the 1989-91
biennium. If the Ad~nistration's ability to dispense lottery money was to serve as a
vehicle for recruiting electoral support, it was likely to most effectively do so during
the two year period coinciding with the 1989-91 biennium.' In other words, the Sunset
Clause would have precluded the Administration from dispensing lottery money
during the period in which doing so was most likely to serve the Administration's
political agenda.
The Goldschmidt Administration had good reason to view the Sunset Clause
as a potential impediment to its ability to pursue two key goals--economic
restructuring and politicalperpetuation. The Administration's protestations not
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withstanding, lawmakers were adamant that the Sunset Clause be included in HB
3011. Trade and Economic development Committee Chairman Wayne Fawbush made
this clear in remarks directed to Roger Smith, Lohman's chief:
So, while as far as you're concerned this is a permanent part of the
Goldschmidt administration, we're approaching it from the point of that
its a two year program. Period [sic] (Joint Legislative Committee on
Trade and Economic Development February 20, 1987).
Legislative insistence upon the Sunset Clause appears to have been driven by three
concerns. First, according to Senator Fawbush, the T&E Committee insisted upon
inserting the Sunset Clause into HB 3011 because it did not want to provide ongoing
authorization for a program the need for which might no longer exist in two years
(Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development February 20,
1987).
The second reason why legislators insisted upon inserting the Sunset Clause
into HB 3011 was insinuated in the June 28, 1987 edition ofthe Oregon. According to
the newspaper, prior to the advent of Regional Strategies, local communities seeking
state assistance for economic development projects had to depend upon the "largess of
the Joint Trade and Economic Development Committee and the JointWays and
Means Committee. Sometimes, the results looked like pork barrel politics." With
Regional Strategies, reported the Oregonian, "the governor holds the barrel." I cited
this article in asking two key lawmakers about the Sunset Clause. The lawmakers
wer~ Larry Campbell (November 4, 1989), Republican minority leader in Oregon's
House of Representatives and a T&E Committee member during the legislature's
1987 session and Vera Katz, Speaker of the Oregon House of Representatives during
the same period (November 2, 1989). Their answers led me to conclude that
legislators insisted upon inserting the Sunset Clause into HB 3011 not only because
they wanted to avoid providing ongoing authorization to a program a future need for
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which might not exist but also because they did not want to establish a precedent for
future erosions of the control they themselves exercised over lottery spending.
Limiting the authorization for Regional Strategies toone biennium only meant that
authority for spending lottery money would revert back to the legislature after the
conclusion of the 1987-88 biennium.
Partisan politics also appears to explain why lawmakers insisted upon
inserting the Sunset Clause into HB 3011. This became clear in the interview I
conducted with Representative .campbell. ~ampbell was leader of the minority party
Republicans in Oregon's House of Representatives during the legislature's 1987
session. He was,. by reputation, one of the legislature's most highly partisan
politicians. Campbell said the Sunset Clause reflected the apprehension he and his
fellow Republican lawmakers felt over granting the Goldschmidt Administration
discretionary authority over $25 million in lottery money. Campbell and his
Republican colleagues realized that the Regional Strategies program provided the
Goldschmidt Administration a "mandate to organize in areas of the state where
Republican Norma Paulus out polled him in November" (Oregonian June 28, 1987).
The legislature's Republicans had no desire to assist Goldschmidt in this matter. They
insisted on inserting the Sunset Clause into HB 3011 because they believed that by
limiting Regional Strategies to one biennium only, they prohibited the Administration
from dispensing lottery money during the period in which it would be gearing up for
reelection and thus undermined the Administration's ability to use Regional Strategies
to expand its political base.
The Sunset Clause limited authorization for Regional Strategies to one
biennium only. In doing so, it placed a constraint upon the Goldschmidt
Administration's ability to pursue its goals, forcing the Administration to stress
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expediency in local strategy implementation so as to set the stage for reauthorizing
Regional Strategies, as will become clear in later chapters. Insertion of the Sunset
Clause into HB 3011 had little to do with objective calculations of how Oregon's
resources might best be tapped to promote economic restructuring. To the contrary,
there would appear to be merit in the Administration's argument before the T&E
Committee that economic restructuring would take several iterations of Regional
Strategies intervention and therefore, that the Sunset Clause could comprise an
obstacle to an effective restructuring effort. Whatever the merits of this argument, it
was subordinated to the reluctance of lawmakers to cede the Administration too much
authority at their own expense and to political rivalries. Politics, not objective
calculations of how best to promote economic restructuring led to the insertion of the
Sunset Clause into HB 3011.
Barriers to Centralization The commissions that presided over key Oregon
state government agencies infused Oregon state government with a high degree of
fragmentation. Furthermore, because the commissions were composed of political
appointees serving fIxed terms, an incoming administration would always find itself
dealing.not with commissions composed of its own appointees but with the appointees
of a preceding administration. This was the situation the Goldschmidt Administration
inherited when it came into office--having to deal with a fragmented commission
structure composed of commissioners appointed during the preceding eight year
tenure of the Atiyeh Administration.
The Goldschmidt Administration believed that a successful economic
restructuring effort required that Oregon's capacity for economic development be
increased by consolidating control over the state government bureaucracy. The
Administration apparently saw the existence of diffuse commissions filled with
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appointees from a previous administration as an impediment to concerted economic
development action and consequently, attempted to subordinate certain key
commissions to the Governor's authority. Doing so could have maximized the
likelihood that the agencies over which these commissions presided acted concertedly
and with minimal deviation in pursuing the Administration's goals. The
Administration's vehicle for boosting the Governor's control over key state agencies
was an early draft of HB 3011, which contained the following three provisions:
The Economic Development Commission shall provide expedited
consideration of requests for loans if the Governor finds that the business
activity to be financed is essential to the implementation of an adopted
regional economic development strategy (Section 6).
The Environmental Quality Commission shall give priority in the
distribution of funds available through the federal Clean Water Act to
projects that are designated by the Governor as essential for the
implementation of an adopted regional economic development strategy
(Section 9).
The Oregon Transportation Commission shall give priority to
projects designated by the governor as essential for the implementation
of an adopted regional economic development strategy (Section 10).
The clear aim of these provisions was to boost the governor's power over Oregon's
fragmented state government apparatus. However, none of these three provisions
were included in the enrolled final version of HB 3011 that authorized Regional
Strategies. All three were deleted from HB 3011 at the insistence of lawmakers on the
T&E Committee (Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Development February>
28, 1987). According to Representative Campbell (November 4, 1989) of the T&E
Committee, these provisions were rejected on the grounds that they would have
concentrated too much power in the hands of Oregon's governor. In vetoing these
provisions, lawmakers denied Goldschmidt authority he sought to enhance Oregon's
capacity for economic development planning. Commensurately, they also denied him
authority he sought to expand the autonomy of the governor's office.
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The apparent upshot of the rejection of the Goldschmidt Administration's
efforts to subordinate the state Economic Development, Environmental Quality and
Transportation Commissions to the Governor's office was to make the state Economic
Development Department responsible for coordinating the provision of assistance
sought from state agencies under the aegis of Strategy project lists. Clearly, this
arrangement offered the Administration less robust control over the state's
bureaucratic apparatus than it would have preferred. For whereas the Administration's
initial plans had called for the direct subordination of key policy making bodies to its
authority, under the terms of HB 3011, EDD was endowed only with responsibility for
coordinating "adopted Regional Strategies with existing state and local economic
development efforts" (HB 3011 Section 7). The economic development department
was given no explicit authority, coercive or otherwise, with which to ensure this
coordination. Furthermore, no mechanism was provided to ensure that the
commissioners that retained quasi-autonomous authority over the Economic
Development as well as the Environmental Quality and Transportation Departments
and other state agencies did not embrace goals and promulgate directives inconsistent
or even at odds with those of the Governor.
If the arrangement by which EDD was directed to oversee implementation of
Regional Strategies offered the Administration less robust control over the state's
bureaucratic apparatus than it would have preferred, it is clear nonetheless that the
Administration aimed to employ this less robust arrangement to the maximum
advantage possible. A look at the composition of EDD's Regional Strategies unit
makes this point. The unit was created subsequent to authorization of Regional
Strategies. It was made responsible for overseeing EDD's Regional Strategies
responsibilities, including coordinating "adopted Regional Strategies with existing
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state and local economic development efforts" (HB 3011, Section 7). All three of the
staffers hired by EDD to oversee Regional Strategies were former Goldschmidt
campaign staffers (Wetter November 2, 1989; Sanderlin June 11, 1990; Delman
January 29,1991). This sort of patronage is not necessarily unusual. Still, the three
campaign staffers could be assumed to have a high degree of personal loyalty to
Governor Goldschmidt That former campaign workers were placed in these positions
is indicative of the high degree of control that Governor Goldschmidt aimed to assert
over the Regional Strategies program.
Regionalism
The so-called "no-seconds" clause was inserted into HB 3011 as Section 8
[2]. In statutory terms, the no-seconds clause prohibited any county from submitting a
second strategy request for state assistance before every county in the state had its
strategy approved by the Gov~rnor. As a practical matter, however, its insertion into
HB 3011 was more pervasive. For what the no-seconds clause really did was to
ensure that every area of Oregon received a share of the lottery money allocated to
fund Regional Strategies and thus, to limit the degree of discretion the Goldschmidt
.Administration would be able to exercise in using the Regional Strategies arrangement
to pursue its economic development goals.
As originally drafted, HB 3011 did not contain any "no-seconds" clause. It
was inserted into HB 3011 as an amendment, mainly at the insistence of lawmakers
from Oregon's rural areas and small cities. They feared that metropolitan counties,
having greater administrative resources, would mobilize more quickly than their own
districts and might come back for a second helping of lottery money before their own
constituencies.saw their fIrst. Rural and small city lawmakers inserted the no-seconds
clause to preclude this possibility. Still, rural and small city lawmakers had a deeper
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purpose in inserting the no-seconds clause. For at the same time they amended HB
3011 to include the no-seconds clause, they extracted from the Goldschmidt
Administration a promise that every area of Oregon would receive a share of the
lottery money.
The Goldschmidt Administration opposed the no seconds rule. Deputy
Director Lohman of EDD explained to the T&E Committee that Governor
Goldschmidt wanted Regional Strategies to emphasized "quality, not speed" (Joint
Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development, February 25, 1987).
When interviewed, Lohman (November 21, 1989) elaborated. He said that Governor
Goldschmidt wanted to competitively evaluate the different strategy proposals
submitted to him, funding the most promising fIrst and reserving action on less
promising proposals, that needed more work, for the following biennium. He believed
this was necessary in order to selectively concentrate the state's limited economic
development resources in a mass critical enough to promote development. The
Administration saw the no-seconds clause as likely to lead to the diffuse and hence
ineffectual application of state economic development resources. The Administration
may have had another reason to oppose the no-seconds clause as well. The
Administration may have viewed no-seconds as an impediment to its ability to attain
its political goals. For by requiring the Administration to allocate lottery money to all
areas of the state, lawmakers limited the Administration's ability to use the Regional
Strategies arrangement to favor supportive constituencies at the expense of less
supportive constituencies.
Support for and opposition to the no-seconds clause broke down along
regional lines. Whereas lawmakers from Oregon's.rural areas and small cities insisted
upon it, their counterparts from the Portland metropolitan area allied themselves with
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the Goldschmidt Administration in opposing the clause. For example, State Senator
Glenn Otto, who represented east Portland in the Oregon legislature and sat on the
T&E Committee called no-seconds "unfair" (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade
and Economic Development February 25, 1987). But rural and small city lawmakers
insisted upon insertion of the no-seconds clause into HB 3011 as the price of
authorizing the program. They were well positioned to do so. For of the twelve
legislators who Sat on the committee during the 1987 legislative session, seven were
from outside the Portland area. Ascendant on the T&E Committee, lawmakers from
Oregon's small cities and rural areas succeeded in making the no-seconds rule a part
ofHB 3011.
As with the Sunset Clause, insertion of the Sunset Clause into HB 3011 had
little to do with objective calculations of how Oregon's resources might best be tapped
to promote economic restructuring. To the contrary, there would appear to be merit in
the argument that economic restructuring could best be promoted by concentrating
state resources where they could do most good,· instead of diffusing their application.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it was subordinated to regional rivalries.
Political calculations, not objective calculations of how best to promote economic
restructuring led to the insertion of the no-seconds clause into HB 3011.
Localism
Earlier it was argued that localism is a fundamental tenet of Oregon politics.
Localism came into play amidst the legislature's deliberations over HB 3011 in terms
qf provisions relating to the establishment of multi-county regions and the decision to
make Oregon's counties responsible for local implementation of Regional Strategies.
It's already been noted that Section 6 of HB 3011 provided that "wherever
possible, the governing bodies of counties shall work to form multi-county regional
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strategies." Goldschmidt viewed the need for multi-county collaboration as a
fundamental tenet of Regional Strategies. For their part, lawmakers appear to have
been of two minds over this provision. Seemingly adhering to Goldschmidt's
position, T&E Committee Chairman Wayne Fawbush said that he would consider
Regional Strategies a "failure" if it were not implemented through multi-county
regions (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development February
27, 1987). Fawbush wanted language inserted into HB 3011· that would have had the
governor designate regional groupings. Other lawmakers were concerned about the
prospect that Goldschmidt might impose regional groupings of his own liking
regardless oflocal preferences. Included was Yamhill County's Stan Bunn. This
placed. the Goldschmidt team in a seemingly equivocal position. Before the T&E
Committee, EDD's David Lohman testified that "the Governor would not be imposing
his own ideas on what regions should be." (Joint Committee on Trade and Economic
Development February 18, 1987). In the end, compromise language was worked out.
Section 4 [3] of HB 3011 provided that EDD "expedite and facilitate the definition of
regions, based on historical, cultural and economic links among counties by
recommending groupings of counties to form regions." In any event, it's's important
to note that nothing in HB 3011 prohibited individual counties from submitting
Strategies unilaterally.
As will become clear in Chapter VII, there was something of a prescient
quality in the concerns lawmakers expressed over multi-county implementation of
Regional Strategies. Chapter vn will depict the Goldschmidt Administration acting
forcefully to forge a multi-county strategy compact in Southern Oregon, overriding
local preferences in the process. It will be argued that the forcefulness of the
Administration's action was driven, in part at least, by fear that a failure to deliver on
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multi-county implementation of Regional Strategies would color the program as, to
quote Senator Fawbush, a "failure," threatening the Administration's goal of seeing
the Regional Strategies program reauthorized. By the same measure, Chapter VII will
show local officials citing Lohman's promise to Senator Bunn that the Governor
would refrain from imposing his idea of what regions should be when protesting the
Administration's region building maneuvers.
Finally, according to Gordon Fultz (November 21, 1989), Executive Director
of the Association of Oregon Counties (AOC), Oregon's counties were ambivalent
over the role HB 3011 provided for them. They looked forward to the prospect of
lottery funding for economic development ,projects. But they were reluctant to assume
responsibility for conducting econo'mic analysis and preparing and submitting Strategy
projects lists.
At the time Goldschmidt was formulating his Regional Strategies
arrangement, county governments in Oregon had little experience in the economic
development domain. This was documented in a report published in 1989 by
Oregon's Bureau of Governmental Research and Service (BGRS), a research institute
affiliated with the University of Oregon. According to BGRS, in 1986 "There [did]
not appear to be any clearly identified economic development personnel in county
government" (Bureau of Government Research and Service 1989). This could only
have cast doubt upon the administrative capacity of county governments to effect
provisions of HB 3011, especially technical tasks such as analyzing the local
economy. Furthermore, the years leading up to 1987 were, for many of Oregon's
counties, a period of fiscal scarcity. Meeting established responsibilities strained their
available resources. The counties did not look forward to being'saddled with
additional responsibilities with which they were unaccustomed. This was especially
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true in light of the fact that HB 3011 made no provision for using lottery money to
enable counties to meet the administrative responsibilities accorded them under HB
3011. Lottery money could be used only to fund Strategy projects.
It is instructive to note here that the question of allocating lottery money to
provide counties with the resources necessary for meeting their Regional Strategies
responsibilities was raised with Goldschmidt by Dr. Larry Blake, President of the
Oregon Institute of Technology. Formerly, he had been a community college
President in North Carolina where he had worked on economic development issues.
During his campaign, Goldschmidt invited Blake to meet with him to discuss
economic development policy. Blake recommended 'that lottery money be made
available to improve local economic development policy capacity. Little appears to
have come of this recommendation, however, for reasons which remain undetermined.
Given the above circumstances, the Association of Oregon counties gave HB
3011 only tepid support. In light of this, it as instructive to examine how the decision
to implement HB 3011 through the counties came about. This issue was addressed in
interviews conducted with Goldschmidt aides and advisers David Bragdon (October
31, 1989), Mike Wetter (November 2,1989) and Alan Webber (November II, 1989).
According to the above cited 1989 report by the Bureau of Governmental
Research and Service, Oregon's municipal governments had widespread economic
development responsibilities in 1986. Yet, it seems that the Goldschmidt team never
seriously considered implementing Regional Strategies through city government. The
reason was two-fold. First, much of Oregon's population lives in unincorporated
areas. This is especially true of many rural, timber dependent areas. It was towards
fostering economic renewal in these areas that Regional Strategies was primarily
aimed. A municipal implementation scheme would have excluded these areas. Also,
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the Goldschmidt team appears to have viewed cities as too fractious a level for
building the consensus over a restructuring strategy that Goldschmidt saw as
necessary. This latter factor ruled out implementing Regional Strategies under an
arrangement resembling that provided for under Oregon's system of land use
planning, for example, in which implementation responsibilities are shared between
cities and counties.
The question of implementing Regional Strategies through Oregon's
Councils of Government (COGs) arose in deliberations over HB 3011 by the
Legislatures T&E Committee. The COGs are multi·county entities. And according to
the above cited report by the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, in 1986,
most of Oregon's COGs had well established economic development responsibilities.
At least on the surface, these circumstances would appear to have made COGs well
suited to implementing an economic development program aimed at encouraging
extra-territorial collaboration, as did Regional Strategies. But Senator Joyce Cohen of
the T&E Committee said that she would '''resist the COG suggestion because of
misgivings about COGs." Her colleague on T&E, Representative Wayne Fawbush
called some COGs "atrocious" (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic
Development February 27, 1987). Fawbush and Cohen served as co-heads of the
T&E Committee. Given the derision implicit in their views of COGs, it is
unsurprising that the ideal of having COGs implement Regional Strategies gained
little currency. This is despite the relative merits that, from a technical perspective at
least, would appear to have argued for a COG implementation scheme.
Why did Cohen and Fawbush oppose the idea of using COGs to implement
Regional Strategies'! Some insight into this issue is provided by Leonard (1983). He
examined Oregon's experience in fashioning its system of comprehensive statewide
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land use planning during the 1970s. He concludes that many Oregonians viewed
COGs as "nonlocal intervention by non elected officials." It is true that policy
direction for COGs was provided by boards of directors comprised of elected officials.
However, many Oregonians saw their mandates to act collectively across traditional
jurisdictional boundaries as blurring the link between elected COG officials and the
constituencies that elected them. This led many Oregonians to view COGs as artificial
governments and COG leaders as largely unaccountable to local interests.
Section 6 [1] of HB 3011 provided thatthe governing board ofOregon's
counties could delegate responsibility for most phases of the Strategy process to third
parties. The main exception was the required public hearings. The origins of this
provision remain a mystery. One possibility is, however, that this provision was
aimed at compensating for the limited capacity of Oregon's counties for economic
development planning, since it can be seen as having allowed counties to delegate out
those administrative tasks associated with Regional Strategies for which they were
incapable. In any event, it is instructive to note that a key aim of Regional Strategies
was to enhance Oregon's capacity for economic development planning. However, the
consequence of rejecting COGs as vehicles for implementing Regional Strategies was
that this responsibility fell not upon those jurisdictions most capable of fulfilling this
role, but instead on Oregon's counties, little experience<t in the economic development
domain. This can be seen as a constraint upon the prospects that the Regional
Strategies arrangement would increase Oregon's capacity for economic development.
The T&E Committee deliberations pertaining to establishment· of multi-
county regions and the rejection of COGs for implementing Regional Strategies can be
seen as having been decided mainly around the issue of protecting local control. The
deliberations surrounding the question of the Governor's role in establishing regions
1O0
also comprised a manifestation of the local control issue. In effect, localism
engendered constraints upon Governor Goldschmidt's prospects for autonomous
action. Since Governor Goldschmidt viewed multi-lateral implementation as a
capacity building measure, localism can also be seen as having engendered a
prospective constraint upon the capacity building potential of the Regional Strategies
arrangement. Last here, by engendering a repudiation of Oregon's COGs as vehicles
for implementing Regional Strategies even though they appeared much more capable
to act in this role than Oregon~ s counties, localism again imposed a prospective
constraint upon the capacity building potential of the Regional Strategies arrangement.
SUMMARY
Discussion in this chapter highlights points to constraints upon the likelihood
that Regional Strategies would boost Oregon's capacity for economic development
planning and the autonomy of the governor's office. These constraints emerged as the
product of the division of power between the branches of Oregon government,
regionalism and localism. Also, discussion here indicates that the operational
arrangements embodied in Regional Strategies provided the opportunity for use in
building political support and that Oregon Governor Goldschmidt clearly aimed to use
Regional Strategies towards this end.
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NOTES
. 1. A final enrolled copy of HB 3011 appears in Appendix A. Since revisions
and amendments resulted in little change to the numbering of the bill's major sections,
the reader should have little problem using this copy of refer to those sections cited in
the text. .
2. Discussion throughout the balance of this chapter draws heavily upon the
minutes of the Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Development of the Oregon
legislature.
3. Also established during EDD's restructuring was a new work force section
which Bob Baugh, former Oregon AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer was hired to
manage. We can see this as a formal acknowledgement of Goldschmidt's campaign
promise to provide the unions a consultatory role in fashioning his economic
development policy.
CHAPTER VI
THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION: CENTRAL OREGON
The need to secure authorization of the Regional Strategies program in a
regionally divided legislature led the Goldschmidt Administration to implement a
Regional Strategies prototype in Central Oregon. The multi-county tourism strategy
implemented in Central Oregon was the product of an accommodation reached
between the Administration and a powerful local growth coalition. The
Administration encouraged the Central Oregon counties to adopt a tourism strategy
because it viewed tourism as a source of rapid job growth. It was likely to be job
growth built upon a marginalized, low wage work force, however, making it unlikely
that the Administration would secure a key industrial policy goal--generating family
wage jobs. Central Oregon's tourism strategy made little account of the type of
objective economic analysis called for in HB 3011. Success in securing Central
Oregon's highest priority strategy project required that the Administration resort to
highly personalized tactics to circumvent conventional channels of public authority.
THE POLITICS OF PROTOTYPE CHOICE
The three counties comprising the Central Oregon region were Deschutes,
Jefferson, and Crook (Fig 1). They are located east of the Cascade Mountains, the
natural barrier that has traditionally divided Oregon's most from least developed
regions. Together, they covered some 7,800 square miles of land with a diverse
topography ranging from the heavily forested alpine peaks of western Deschutes
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County to the high desert plateau of the region's central area. The region's 1985
population was 90,000. Deschutes County, geographically the largest of the three
counties was also the most populous, accounting for two-thirds of this total. The
balance was more or less split evenly between Jefferson and Crook counties
(Employment Division 1985).
In 1986, the wood products sector employed almost 21 percent of Central
Oregon's work force, a figure close to that of Oregon as a whole, if the three county
Portland area is excepted. Irrigated farming was also important to the region's
economy, especially in Jefferson County. So was ranching, especially in Crook
County, which supported a larger cattle population than any other county in Oregon.
Given the resource dependent nature of Central Oregon's economy, it is unsurprising
that the period leading up to ·1987 was, as with most of Oregon's lesser developed
areas, one of high unemployment. Crook County was probably the hardest hit. Fully
one-fourth of Crook County's labor force was unemployed during the winter of 1981-
82. The unemployment rate peaked at 20 percent in neighboring Deschutes and
Jefferson Counties during this same period (Employment Division 1982). By 1985,
economic conditions in Central Oregon had improved. Still, at about 11 percent, the
tri-county unemployment rate remained almost 3 percentage points higher than the
state-wide average. All three counties were listed as labor surplus areas by the U.S.
Labor Department 1986, a distinction they shared with almost all the other counties on
the east side of Oregon's Cascade Range.
In late 1986, only days after his victory at the polls in Oregon's November
1986 election, Governor-elect Goldschmidt telephoned Greg Cushman, publisher of
the Bend Bulletin, the largest local newspaper in the three county Central Oregon
region. According to Cushman (January 23, 1990), Goldschmidt asked him to
organize business and government leaders from throughout the region for the purpose
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of identifying a collective regional economic development goal. The goal was to
serve as the basis for lottery funded state assistance. The Governor-elect told
Cushman that Central Oregon would serve as an example upon which the
collaborative economic development efforts of other regions could be modeled.
Regional Strategies was unlike past economic development practices in Oregon. By
implementing a prototype strategy in Central Oregon, the Governor-elect aimed to
provide local officials a precedent upon which they could model their own Regional
Strategies.
There are thirty-six counties in Oregon. The selection of the three Central
Oregon counties for prototypic~ strategy planning appears to be explained by several,
primarily political, factors. These shed light on the tactics by which the Goldschmidt
Administration aimed to secure its industrial policy goals.
The Need for Regional Balancing
One factor that appears to have accounted for Central Oregon's selection as a
Strategy prototype was the need to secure authorization of Regional Strategies in a
regionally divided legislature (McCabe October 26, 1989; Wetter November 2, 1989;
Lohman November 21, 1989). Central Oregon was not in fact the only strategy
prototype implemented. A strategy prototype was also implemented in the three
county Portland metropolitan area the centerpiece of which was a downtown
Convention Center. David Lohman, the Goldschmidt campaign supporter who
subsequently became EDD Deputy Director made it clear that the Administration
envisaged the Convention Center as the centerpiece of a Portland area Regional
Strategies prototype in testimony he presented before the legislature's T&E
Committee in late January, 1987. He said the Convention Center enjoyed "enough
regional support" to be envisaged as a "prototype" strategy.
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Dwing the campaign, Goldschmidt had pledged that if elected, he would
provide state funding for Convention Center construction, which had emerged as a key
goal of Portland's business establishment and, commensurately, of the Portland area
legislative delegation. Linking funding for the Convention Center to Regional
Strategies appears to have allowed Goldschmidt to kill two birds with one stone,
enabling him to build support for Regional Strategies among Portland area lawmakers
while deliberating on his campaign promise to fund Convention Center construction.
Lawmakers from Oregon's less developed region's were much less enthusiastic about
funding the Convention center, however. State Senator Eugene Timms made this
point at a January 28, 1987 hearing of T&E Committee. Timms, who represented
largely rural areas of central and eastern Oregon objected to the idea of providing state
funding for the Convention center on the grounds that doing so favored "the.
economically healthiest areas of the state" (Oregonian January 29, 1987). Governor-
elect Goldschmidt appears to have believed that in order to secure authorization and
funding for regional strategies from a regionally divided legislature, he needed to
implement not just one prototype strategy in the Portland area but another as well, one
which would appeal to lawmakers like Senator Timms from Oregon's lesser
developed regions.
If Governor-elect Goldschmidt was seeking to implement a prototype
strategy which would appeal to rural lawmakers, he could hardly have selected a
region which was more likely to offer access to strategically positioned lawmakers
than Central Oregon. In 1987, most of the three county Central Oregon region fell
into legislative districts represented by one of two Oregon state Senators: Eugene
Timms and Ken Jernstedt Both sat on the all important T&E Committee during the
1987 session ofthe Oregon legislature. Timms and Jemstedt were well positioned to
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play key roles in getting HB 3011 out of Committee in a form amenable to the
Governor. They were conservative Republicans and might therefore be expected to be
among the most strident opponents of Goldschmidt's plan to refashion state economic
development policy in Oregon; Timm's objection to the selection of Portland's
Convention Center as a Regional Strategies prototype has already been noted.
Importantly, if metropolitan Portland is excepted, the writer was unable to identify
another multi-county Regional Strategy compact incorporating an area similarly
represented by more than a single lawmaker during the 1987 session of the Oregon
legislature.
It is in fact quite clear that the Goldschmidt Administration recognized the
instrumental role Timm's and lernstedt could play in authorizing and funding
Regional Strategies and sought deliberately to elicit their support for this purpose. As
will be seen later in this chapter, in March, 1987, in the midst of hearings on HB 3011
by the T&E Committee, Governor Goldschmidt visited the Central Oregon city of
Bend for a ceremonial unveiling of Central Oregon's prototype Regional Strategy.
Praising local officials for work he said deserved "something higher than an A,"
Goldschmidt said that the bill he had pending before the legislature was "very
compatible with what is being suggested here" (Bend Bulletin March 17, 1987).
Goldschmidt was clearly in bend to build support for his regional development
initiative amongst the region's representatives on the T&E Committee. This was the
point Mike Freeman, a reporter from the Bend Bulletin, aimed to make in his coverage
of the March 16 ceremony when he reported "both the Governor and local officials
must (now) become salesmen for the program" (Oregonian March 17, 1987). Shortly
thereafter the local government leaders responsible for putting the Central Oregon
Strategy together met with members of the region's legislative delegation, including
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Senators Jernstedt and Timms, and urged them to support the Governor's legislative
package (Prante, January 24, 1990; Allen January 25, 1990). Both Senators did in fact
did do so.
The Tourism Precedent
Another reason that appears to have explained Central Oregon's selection as
a prototypical Regional Strategy was the role tourism played in the areas economy.
Governor-elect Goldschmidt's had a strong predisposition towards the implementation
of tourism strategies. He made no secret of this, having indicated as much during his
campaign in comments reported by the Oregonian:
Oregon should bring tourism to the top of the state's economic
agenda in areas that choose to promote it, Neil Goldschmidt, a
Democratic gubernatorial candidate, said in Bend on Friday.
Goldschmidt said that of elected, he would make a personal commitment
to assuring that tourism stays at the top of the state's agenda in regions
that have made a choice to promote tourism. "That commitment will
be...the governor's personal involvement[he said]" (Oregonian February
1, 1986).
Four months later, the Oregonian (June 20, 1986) reported that "If elected,
Goldschmidt said the state should settle on two to four regions that could be developed
as major regional or national tourists destinations."
In Central Oregon, there existed a robust tourism sector which could only be
seen as providing a fIrm base upon which to implementing a tourism strategy, towards
which the Goldschmidt Administration was strongly predisposed. As Table III shows,
tourism played a greater role in Central Oregon's economy than in Oregon as a
whoie.1 At 11 percent, tourism's share of total 1986 employment in Central Oregon
exceeded its work force share in both the greater national and Oregon state economies.
Perhaps more instructive was the robustness of Central Oregon's tourism sector.
Between 1970 and 1986, the annual average rate of growth in Central Oregon's
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tourism sector was, at 15.6 percent, over twice the comparable rate for the greater U.S.
and Oregon state economies. By 1986, there existed in Central Oregon a well
developed tourism and recreational industry complex. The focal point was Mount
Bachelor. Since 1958, when the slopes of Bachelor Butte had fIrst been groomed and
ski lifts installed, "the Mountain," as it is commonly called by locals had emerged as
one of America's preeminent skiing areas. According to Mount Bachelor Inc., the
corporation that operated the Mountain's ski runs and lifts, over 1.5 million skiers
skied Mount Bachelor during the 1986-87 season. Surrounding Mount Bachelor was a
network of visitor attractions including resorts such as the Inn at the Seventh
Mountain, Sun River and Kah-Nee-Tah and a natural history museum, the High Desert
Museum. Visitors came to Central Oregon to climb, hike and camp the Cascades, fish
quiet sections of the Deschutes River, or raft less quiet sections, water ski on Lakes
Billy Chinook and Ochoco, climb Smith Rocks, and·peruse the rustic town of Sisters.
The role tourism played in Central Oregon's could be seen as providing a
strong foundation upon which to base a prototypical tourism Strategy,which
Goldschmidt was unequivocally in favor of. Goldschmidt himself hinted at this when
he first moved to inaugurate planning for Central Oregon's prototypical strategy.
According to Greg Cushman (January 23, 1990), the Central Oregon newspaper
publisher Goldschmidt contacted to begin Strategy planning in Central Oregon, the
Governor-elect recommended that Central Oregon make tourism the target of its
Regional Strategy activities when he first asked Cushman to inaugurate Central
Oregon's prototypical strategy planning process.
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Strong Local Planning Capacity
Central Oregon's strong local capacity for economic development planning
also appears to have contributed to its selection as a Regional Strategies prototype. By
1986, there had evolved in Central Oregon an established regional economic
development network. The nucleus of this network was the Central Oregon Economic
Development Association (COED), which had been jointly formed by the three
Central Oregon counties in 1981. A non-profit association funded by local businesses
and government, COED served as an industrial promotion agency and economic
development clearing-house for the three county area. COED lent cohesion and
coordination to local economic development activities in Central Oregon. The Central
Oregon Intergovernmental Council--the region's COG--was also active in economic
development activities. COIC administered a business loan program in which two of
the Central Oregon Counties--Jefferson and Deschutes--participated.
The Central Oregon Recreation Association (CORA) was also a key player in
the region's economic development network. CORA had been established as a
tourism industry trade association in the mid-l970s by Mount Bachelor and other key
industry businesses. It served mainly to market local recreation attractions. In 1986,
CORA did so to the tune of some $1.3 million year. It was funded both by private
businesses as well as the 20 percent share that CORA reaped of the Deschutes County
room tax (EDD 1987).
Perhaps nothing better epitomized Central Oregon's strong capacity for
economic development than its 1985 success in securing regularly scheduled airline
service for the region. Prior to 1985, the region had for about five years lacked regular
commercial air service, this being largely a consequence of federal airline
deregulation. COED, COIC and CORA joined with local governments in putting
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together a $500,000 package needed to secure service by Pacific Southwest Airways
for the region's major airport at Redmond, both Deschutes County's and the region's
second largest city.
The Council for Economic Development in Oregon (CEDO) is an association
of local and state economic development officials. CEDO's Director during the
period in which the Central Oregon Regional Strategy was implemented was Debbie
McCabe. Interviewed during the course of this research, McCabe (October 26, 1989)
described Central Oregon's experience with local economic development planning in
terms that led the writer to conclude that the region possessed a capacity for economic
development planning probably unmatched, with the exception of the Portland area, in
Oregon.
Goldschmidt envisaged the Central Oregon prototype as a model upon which
other areas of the state could base their strategy planning efforts. He also aimed to use
the his working prototypes as vehicles for lobbying legislative authorization of his
regional development program. To meet these aims, the prototype strategy had to be
up an running quickly, both so as to demonstrate progress within the constraints posed
by a short legislative session, scheduled from January through early June, 1987, and to
establish precedents upon which the collaborative strategy efforts of other areas could
indeed be modeled. A prototype couldn't get bogged down early on in organizational
difficulties if it was to serve its purpose. By all appearances, Central Oregon's strong
economic development network offered ex~ctly the type of institutional structure
necessary to meet this imperative.
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TOURISM AS AN EMERGING INDUSTRY
Governor Goldschmidt believed that Oregon's tourism sector could fueled
rapid job growth. Examining the reliability of this claim is important for two reasons.
First, because it sheds light on the degree to which the decisions that shaped the
Regional Strategies program were based upon objective economic analysis. Second,
because it sheds light on the degree to which the Regional Strategies program aimed to
promote growth in emerging industries. The Analysis offered suggests that Oregon's
tourism sector was indeed likely to serve as the source of rapid job growth. Still, if
tourism was an industry with prospects for rapid job growth, it was likely to be job
growth built, however, upon a marginalized, low wage work force.
Governor Goldschmidt viewed tourism promotion not only as a vehicle for
generating jobs within the tourism sector itself. He believed that promoting tourism
could expand employment in other industries as welL This view was based upon a
view of "tourism as a hook:" that to~sts attracted to an area while visiting might later
return permanently to live and work and set into motion the multiplier associated with
the full range of services the new resident might need. Goldschmidt Administration
officials saw toUrism as a vehicle for promoting economic diversification in timber
dependent areas and insulating these areas against a repeat of the dismal circumstances
they experienced during the first half of the 1980s (Wetter November 2, 1989;
Lohman November 21, 1989).
Materials published by the Goldschmidt campaign endorsed this view. For
example, the Goldschmidt campaign published a 60 page document titled "The
Oregon Comeback," intended to layout the candidate's economic recovery plan. It
stated that promoting tourism would produce "a high return for state investment" and
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that "tourism continues to create jobs whether other parts of the economy rise or fall"
(Goldschmidt Campaign nd). However, this campaign document contained no data to
substantiate the view of tourism as a anti-cyclical industry. In fact, it appears that the
Goldschmidt campaign's claims about the robustness of tourism were shaped not by
first-hand analysis but by rhetorical advice received from campaign advisers (Bragdon
October 31, 1989; Wetter November 2, 1989).2
I decided to independently assess the degree to which tourism is likely to
serve as the source of rapid job growth. The literature has typically defined emerging
industries in either of two terms. One is in terms of industries that produce high.value
added goods. The other is in terms of industries with prospects for high rates of
employment growth. As regards tourism, the latter definition appears most applicable,
. since it was in terms of job growth that the Goldschmidt Administration's preference
for tourism was couched. As Table ill shows, job growth in the tourism sector has
mostly outpaced overall job growth rates by significant margins, supporting a view of
tourism as an emerging industry. As regards the Administration's claim that tourism
employment is anti-cyclical, however, the picture is mixed. Nationwide, the tourism
sector added jobs during the recessionary period 1980-82 while the overall economy
contracted. But growth in tourism related employment was slow and the difference
between tourism sector and overall economic performance was not great.
Furthermore, in Oregon, tourism employment declined during this period. Granted,
the decline in tourism jobs was less precipitous than in overall employment. In
heavily tourist dependent Central Oregon, tourism sector employment declined more
precipitously than did overall employment, contravening the claim that tourism was
likely to act as an anti-recessionary buffer. The Oregon figures certainly provide little
support for the view of tourism as a job gainer during recession.
TABLE III
SELECTED EMPLOYMENT FIGURES FOR
THE UNITED STATES. OREGON
AND CENTRAL OREGON
Industry Share of
Total Employment Annual Average Employmenl Growlh Rate
1970-1986 1982-1986 1980-1982 Recession
USA
Oregon
Central Oregon
Noles:
Wood
Producls
0.8%
7.0%
20.9%
Tourism
8.3%
9.7%
11.0%
Overall
2.9%
3.7%
10.4%
Tourism
7.1%
7.3%
15.6%
Overall
2.3%
2.8%
7.4%
Tourism
4.9%
2.{)%
6.3%
Overall
-0.4%
-4.9%
-6.5%
Tourism
1.8%
-3.7%
-7.()%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns
Wood Products employment defined as SIC 24 (Lumber and Wood ProduclS)
Tourism employment defined as SIC 58 (Eating lmd Drinking Places) and SIC 7() (Holel and Lodging Places)
-
-w
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The Character of Private Investment as a Limit Upon State Autonomy
The Goldschmidt Administration embraced tourism strategies as a vehicle for
promoting economic restructuring and creating jobs. By and large, the tourism sector
appears to have been characterized by rapid job growth. Yet, it is clear that the
Goldschmidt Administration's industrial policy aimed not simply to generate job
growth but to generate jobs of a certain character. Language contained in HB 3011
makes this clear. It mandated that local strategy selection be guided by the goal of
creating "family wage jobs," a term defined with precision as "a full time equivalent
job with a wage greater than 80 percent of the median income for a family of two in
the county where the majority of employees reside" (EDD nd a). In light of this
provision, it is also worthwhile to look at tourism from a wage perspective. Doing so
points to the character of private capital investment as a probable limit upon the
likelihood that the Goldschmidt Administration would secure this key industrial policy
goals. For there is considerable evidence to support the view that promoting tourism
in Oregon was unlikely to generate the type of family wage jobs called for in the
Regional Strategies program's founding legislation.
As will be seen shortly, Central Oregon did implement a tourism strategy.
Subsequently, the Oregon Employment Division generated estimates of the income
likely to be derived by workers in jobs generated by the Strategy. The results were
communicated in an addressed memorandum from a certain T.L. of the Research and
Statistics section of the Oregon State Employment Division dated February 3, 1988. It
read in part:
Our analysis indicates that approximately fifteen percent of the
permanent jobs created by [implementing a tourism strategy in central
Oregon] would exceed the proposed $15,400 family wage standard
established for the three county region. Ifcustomer tips were to be
included for those occupations where tipping is customary (i.e., waiters
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and waitresses, bartenders, etc.) then their annual wages would increase
by approximately fifty percent. This would raise the wage base of many
of these pennanent jobs but would not cause a significant increase in the
number of jobs exceeding the $15,400 standard.
There is additional evidence with which to judge the wage levels affiliated with
promoting tourism in Central Oregon. In 1986, the annual average wage in Deschutes
County was $15,847; this compared unfavorably to both Crook ($17,698) and
Jefferson ($16,777) counties. By most accounts, the low position Deschutes County
occupied in the region's wage structure was attributable to the depressing effect of
tourism related jobs (BOD 1987). Most tourism industry jobs are concentrated in
either of two sectors: retail or services. Also, while as noted earlier, it is difficult to
define tourism per-say, most tourism-related jobs are concentrated in either of two
areas of economic activity, retail or services--the lowest wage sectors of business
activity. For example, in 1987, annual wages in Deschutes County's retail ($10,842)
and service ($13,37) sectors compared very poorly to wages in the County's
manufacturing ($19,430) and construction ($18,957) sectors.
In sum, most of the jobs likely to be created by promoting tourism in Central
Oregon would likely fail to meet the family wage standard. Several reasons are cited
in explaining why tourism likely to be the source of low wage employment. For one
thing, the tourism industry is associated predominantly with low wage sectors
demanding unskilled or only semi-skilled laborers. Also, much tourism industry
employment is part time. For example, in 1987, 49 percent of jobs in Oregon's
recreation and entertainment sectors were part time. The figure in retail was 31
percent. In contr~st, only 12 percent of Oregon's manufacturing sector job force
worked part time (EDD 1987). Many tourism related jobs are seasonal as well.
The issue of low wages in the does not appear to have been raised amid
deliberations over selecting tourism as Central Oregon's Strategy. This is not to say
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that architects of Central.Oregon's strategy were not oblivious to the fact that tourism
was likely to create low wage jobs. They were obviously aware of this, a point they
acknowledged in the Strategy document they put together after the decision on the
tourism strategy. had been reached. Central Oregon's Strategy document
acknowledged that "Low wages associated with most tourism related occupations is an
object of concern." Cons~quently, the question was posed: "Should the wage problem
constitute a barrier to the consideration of tourism as an economic development
strategy?" Central Oregon's response: "We think not." This finding was based upon
the following reasoning, which the writer has excerpted from the Central Oregon
Strategy document:
Currently, more than 60 percent of women and children under the
age of 18 are in the labor force. With the two earner family rapidly
becoming a national norm, the combined income resulting from one
family member, for example, holding a $9 per hour job in manufacturing
and the other holding a $4 per hour tourist related job will provide a
family income in excess of $27,000 annually. Logically, therefore any
future analysis of job creation must consider the reality of the two earner
family. Acceptance of this argument largely negates the low wage
barrier against tourism as an economic development strategy.
The reasoning articulated by the architects of Central Oregon's strategy suggests that
if implementing a tourism strategy in Central Oregon held forth the prospects of
potentially rapid job growth, it was likely to be job growth built upon a marginalized,
low wage work force. Perhaps more instructively, in light of that provision of HB
3011 that provided for strategy selection to be based upon the potential for generating
family wage jobs, it appears that in championing tourism as a regional development
strategy, the Goldschmidt Administration effectively cast favor upon an industry that
was by its very nature, unlikely to provide the type of jobs called for in its own
industrial policy guidelines.
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THE POLITICS OF TOURISM STRATEGY SELECTION
The process of implementing Regional Strategies in Central Oregon was
initiated by way of a November, 1987, telephone call from Governor-Goldschmidt to
Greg Cushman. Goldschmidt asked the publisher of Central Oregon's largest
newspaper to organize a meeting of local business and government leaders for the
purpose of identifying an economic development strategy for the three county Central
Oregon region. In closing, Goldschmidt asked that a statement outlining the region's
selected goal be ready for his review by December 15, 1987.
Responding to the Goldschmidt's overture, Cushman called together business
and government leaders from throughout the tri-county area~ They met at the
Redmond Golf Club on November 25, 1987. According to a report that appeared in
the November 26, 1986 edition of the Bend Bulletin (November 26, 1986), the
meeting was attended by about 60 people, who were:
clearly uneasy when they gathered in Redmond Tuesday to
identify regional needs that Goldschmnidt could help them achieve. The
potential conflicts were obvious: the various communities in Deschutes,
Crook, and Jefferson Counties do not all share the same goals or face the
same problems.
The November 26 edition of the Bend Bulletin continued to report that "the
recommendations from Tuesday's meeting will be written up by a subcommittee of
seven local leaders next week and presented to Goldschmidt's "transition team" by
December 15."
In the aftermath of the Redmond meeting, the Central Oregon leaders
prepared a memorandum. It was sent to Goldschmidt by the December 15 deadline he
had specified. The essential feature of the memorandum was captured in the Bend
Bulletin's January 7, 1987, edition. It reported that the memorandum:
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stressed developing tourism to sell Central Oregon. The economic
goal for the region is to develop a diversified economic base, the report
said. Tourism will bring people to the area, possibly convincing
business leaders from outside the region to locate here.
To help the region promote tourism, the memorandum sought state assistance in three
areas: construction of a tourism information center; cash grants to local agencies
which would use the money in promoting Central Oregon's tourist attractions and for
business recruitment; and selected highway improvements. The projects for which
Central Oregon sought state assistance under the aegis of Regional Strategies will be
examined later in this chapter. At this juncture, consider instead the following four
points.
First, the term "Regional Strategies" does not appear to have gained common
.usage in relation to Goldschmidt's economic policy initiative until January, 1987, a
month after the Central Oregon memorandum was sent to Goldschmidt's transition
team. For this reason, the words "Regional Strategy" were never used in connection
with the memorandum. Nonetheless, the practical effect of the memorandum was to
target tourism as Central Oregon's Regional Strategy.
Second, Governor-elect Goldschmidt emphasized expeditiousness in
inaugurating Central Oregon's Regional Strategy. Central Oregon had little more than
a month in which to select its target industry. Goldschmidt's timetable appears to
have been driven primarily by political concerns, specifically his desire to have an
incipien,t Strategy ready for the opening of the 1987 session of the Oregon legislature,
in January, 1987.
Third, fewer than three weeks passed between the time Governor-elect
Goldschmidt asked Greg Cushman to inaugurate a strategy process in Central Oregon
and the meeting at the Redmond Golf Club. Fewer than twenty more days passed
between this meeting and the December 15 deadline by which the memorandum
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identifying tourism as Central Oregon's Strategy was sent to the Goldschmidt team. It
should be clear that the time frame within which Central Oregon's target industry was
chosen left little time for conducting the type of economic analysis upon which
Strategy selection was supposed to be based. In fact, there is no evidence to indicate
that economic analysis played any role at all in the decision to target tourism as
Central Oregon's Regional Strategy or even that any such analysis was attempted prior
to Central Oregon's decision to target tourism.
That the selection of tourism as Central Oregon's Regional Strategy
eschewed any sort of economic analysis leads to the fourth point to be made at this
juncture. This is that the process by which decision was reached on targeting tourism
as Central Oregon's Strategy was wholly a function of political accommodation. It is
towards examining this argument that discussion now turns.
Bifurcated Support for Tourism
The memorandum that emerged from the November, 1987 meeting held at
the Redmond Golf Club established tourism as Central Oregon's Regional Strategy.
Enthusiasm for a tourism strategy varied widely within the region. While support for
a tourism strategy was strong among officials representing Deschutes County and the
city of Bend, elsewhere the tourism strategy was largely greeted with ambivalence or
in some cases, derision (Kozak. January 11, 1990; Uffleman January 24, 1990; Rick
Allen January 25, 1990; Prante January 24, 1990; (Riggs January 25, 1990; Comini
January 24, 1990; Cushman January 23, 1990; Hollern January 24, 1990; Dobert
January 11, 1990). The strong support tourism received from officials representing
Deschutes County and Bend is largely explained by the role this area played in the
region's tourism sector. Deschutes County dominated Central Oregon's tourism
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sector. It was in Deschutes County that Mount Bachelor, the centerpiece of Central
Oregon's tourism sector, was located. And it was in Bend, the seat of Deschutes
County government, that the tourism sector was headquartered.
Table IV depicts the extent to Deschutes County dominated Central Oregon's
tourism sector. In 1986, Deschutes County accounted for 87 percent of Central
Oregon's tourism related employment. Deschutes County also accounted for over 95
percent of total regional tourism sector employment growth betweel;1 1970 and 1986.
Located twenty miles from Mount Bachelor, Bend was home to most of the lodging,
dining and entertainment, shopping and ancillary facilities that served visitors to
Central Oregon. Fueleq by growth in the area's tourism industry, Bend had, by 1986,
grown to encompass within its city limits a population of 18,000. Almost as many
people lived in unincorporated communities surrounding the city giving the Bend
urban area a population of almost 36,000. This made Bend not only the largest
community in Central Oregon, but the largest in Oregon west of the Cascades
Mountains (Census for Population Research and Census 1985). By 1986, Bend had
emerged not only as the headquarters of Central Oregon's tourism network but in the
larger sense the regional business and consumer services center as well.
Areas.peripheral to the core tourist attractions surrounding Bel'\d also
attracted visitors to Central Oregon. But tourism in these areas differed from that
affiliated with the Bend area. The tourism attractions affiliated with Bend were highly
concentrated and depended upon high value added attractions: Mount Bachelor,
resorts such as Sun River and the Inn at the Seventh Mountain and restaurants, lodging
and entertainment facilities. Elsewhere, the tourism sector was highly diffuse and
revolved mainly around low value added outdoor activities--rafting and fishing,
TABLE IV'
DISTRIBUTION OF TOURISM RELATED EMPLOYMENT.
TRAVEL GENERATED PAYROLL PER-CAPITA
AND TOTAL TRAVEL EXPENDITURES IN
CENTRAL OREGON
% SHARE OF 1986
REGIONAL TOURISM
EMPLOYMENT
% SHARE REGIONAL
TOURISM JOB
GROWTH 1970-1986
TOTAL 1985
TRAVEL
EXPENDITURES
TRAVEL GENERATED
PAYROLL
PER-CAPITA 1985
Deschutes County 86.8% 95.9% $140.672.000
Jcffcrson Count~ 7.2% 2.1% $4.250.noo
Crook Cuunty 6.0'~, 2.(J'h, $7.95J.OOIl
Oregun Statewide $2.519.797.(JOIl
Nutcs:
$445
$65
$121
$199
Tourism empluymcll\ dcfincd as SIC 58 (Eating lUld Drinking Placcs) and SIC 70 (HotcllUld Lodging Placcs)
Source: U.S. Ccnsus Burcau; Oregon Economic Dcvelopmcnt Dcpartmcnt
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camping, water skiing in state parks or in the case of the town of Sisters, perusing a
rustic town set in the foothills of the Cascade Mountains.
Some sense of the bifurcated nature of Central Oregon's tourism sector is
conveyed in the figure on total travel expenditures presented in Table IV. In 1985, the
most recent years for which data was available at the time of this writing, total travel
expenditures in Deschutes County exceeded $140 million. This exceeded the
combined total for Crook and Jefferson Counties by over ten times. Another measure
of the bifurcated nature of Central Oregon's tourism sector lies in a comparison of
figures on travel generated payroll per-capita--total travel payroll divided by
population. While imperfect, figures on travel generated payroll per-capita do
nonetheless provide some measure of the intensiveness of an area's travel sector.
Higher travel generated payroll per-capita figures should correlate with areas
possessing more intensive tourism sectors and vice-versa. As Table IV shows, the
1985 figure for Deschutes County's territorially concentrated, high value added
attractions was $445. In other words, Deschutes County's tourism sector generated
$445 in payroll for each resident of the County, a figure 136 percent above the
statewide average ($199). The comparable figures for Crook and Jefferson Counties,
with their less value-added, capital intensive tourism industries, were $121 and $65
respectively, significantly less not only than the Deschutes County figure but well
below the statewide average as well.
Among local officials interviewed during the course of this research, there
was a widely shared perception that under a strategy which promoted Central
Oregon's tourism sector, the lion's share of Strategy funding and resulting benefits
were likely to be concentra~ed in Western Deschutes County and in and around the
City of Bend, the focal point of the region's tourism sector. Deschutes County's
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second city, Redmond, while possessing little in the way of a tourist attractions, might
also expect some benefit under a tourism Strategy. If industrialists decided to relocate
to the area after visiting as supposed, some might be expected to do so in Redmond,
which had emerged as something of an "industrial satellite" to Bend. But Jefferson
and Crook Counties, it was widely agreed, were likely to derive only marginal benefits
from promoting tourism. Excepting park lands, these areas possessed little in the way
of visitor destinations. Madras and Prineville, the two largest cities in these counties,
were each located a considerable distance from Bend vicinity recreation attractions
and were therefore considered unlikely to experience either direct expansion of local
tourism businesses or indirect growth due to relocations of the sort envisaged by
Goldschmidt Administration officials.
The Key Actors
One way to explain how Central Oregon decided to target tourism as its
Regional Strategy is to explore the role played by three individuals who, by all
accounts, played pivotal roles in the tourism strategy selection. One is Greg Cushman,
publisher the region's largest newspaper, the Bend Bulletin. Mike Hollern, President
of Brooks Resources, one of Central Oregon's largest property developers, is the
second. The third is Lois Bristow Prante, Chair of the Deschutes County Board of
County Commissioners. Together, they personified a local growth coalition which
mobilized to dominate implementation of Regional Strategies in Central Oregon.
Greg Cushman was not only publisher of Central Oregon's largest local
newspaper. He was also President of COED, the regional economic development
agency and an influential leader of the Bend area business community. He proved
himself a strong supporter of the tourism strategy. He made this point unequivocally
in an editorial his newspaper published endorsing the selection of a tourism Strategy
124
(EDD 1987); By all appearances, Cushman had an interest in seeing Central Oregon
adopt a tourism strategy. Tourism was likely to fuel growth in the Bend area, and if
past experience was any indicator, Cushman's newspaper was a likely beneficiary of
this growth: the period between 1970 and 1986 saw rapid growth in the Bend area's
population fuel rapid growth in the circulation of the Bend Bulletin, which doubled
from 10,000 to 20,000 during this period (Cushman January 23, 1990).
Like Greg Cushman, Mike Hollern, President of Brooks Resources was a
leader of the Bend area business community. Like Cushman, he sat on the COED
Board of Directors. Hollern was not only a prominent Bend area businessman. He
was also a close Goldschmidt associate. Documents provided by the Oregon
Secretary of State's office (nd) show that he personally contributed over $8,000 to
Goldschmidt's gubernatorial 'campaign. With Goldschmidt's victory at the polls, he
was rumored to be in line for appointment as Chairman of the Oregon Transporta~on
Commission, the body that oversaw state highway spending. Hollern was in fact
appointed Transportation Commission head in mid-1987.
By all accounts, Deschutes County Commissioner Lois Prante was the most
powerful politician in Central Oregon. As Chair of the Deschutes County Board of
County Commission, she presided over the largest local government entity in Central
Oregon and was the only full-time elected local government executive in the three
county region (Riggs January 25, 1990; Uffleman January 24, 1990; Allen January 25,
1990). Like Cushman and Hollern, she sat on the COED Board by Directors, by right
of the contribution Deschutes County made to funding the body. Prante also occupied
a seat on the governing body of CORA, the Central Oregon Recreation Association,
which she similarly warranted on account of the 20 percent share of the Deschutes
County room tax earmarked for CORA. Prante also pccupied a seat on the governing
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body of CORA, the Central Oregon Recreation Association, a position warranted by
the 20 percent share of the Deschutes County room tax earmarked for CORA. On
CORA's board, she joined representatives from Mount Bachelor Inc., the Inn at the
Seventh Mountain, and other key Bend area tourism businesses, all strong tourism
strategy supporters.
Both Cushman and Hollern were well positioned to influence the strategy
selection process. Both members of the public-private subcommittee that, in the wake
of the November 25 meeting at the Redmond Golf Club, decided to select tourism as
Central Oregon's Strategy. In part, Cushman's influence in the strategy selection
process stemmed from the fact that it was he who Governor Goldschmidt contacted to
inaugurate the Central Oregon Strategy process.· Cushman conveyed to the assembly
the Governor's recommendation that Centr~ Oregon consider tourism as its Regional
Strategy. The tone of Cushman's conveyance was such that officials from Jefferson
and Crook Counties interpreted Goldschmidt's recommendation as less a
recommendation than a dictum (Allen January 25,1990; Uffleman January 24, 1990;
Riggs January 25, 1990; Comini, January 24, 1990). The period leading up to 1986
had been one of economic duress for Jefferson and Crook Counties. Officials from
these areas believed that the Governor was intent upon delivering a Regional
Strategies prototype to the legislature on his own terms. Apprehensive as they might
have been over selection of a tourism strategy, these officials saw little reason to
oppose selection of a tourism strategy and risk antagonizing the incoming
Goldschmidt Administration. If nothing else, these officials apparently thought, by
acquiescing to a tourism strategy seemingly favored by Goldschmidt, they might
accumulate political capital for future dealings with the incoming administration.
Officials from Jefferson and Crook Counties clearly had this aim in mind
when, despite their misgivings, they agreed albeit unenthusiastically to back tourism
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as Central Oregon's Strategy. Madras Mayor Rick Allen (January 25, 1990) said,
when intelViewed, that.he aimed to use his acquiescence to a tourism Strategy to
leverage tangential benefits from the new administration in the form of funds with
which to enhance the city's industrial recruitment activities. Redmond Mayor Bob
Riggs (January 25, 1990) explained his decision to support tourism in similar terms.
Recall that the memorandum sent to Goldschmidt's transition team in December, 1986
contained a request for funding with which to conduct industrial recruitment. As will
be seen later in this chapter, the failure of the Goldschmidt Administration to produce
this money almost torpedoed the agreement among the Central Oregon counties to .
implement a tourism strategy.
Hollern also played an important role in the selection of a tourism strategy, if
one perhaps less conspicuous than Cushman's. Recall that the memorandum advising
Goldschmidt of the decision to target tourism as Central Oregon's strategy sought
highway improvements for the region. As shall be seen, support for the highway
improvements was widespread not only in Deschutes County but in Jefferson County
as well--the highway for which improvements were requested ran right through the
middle of Madras, the County seat. At least one official from Jefferson County
admitted to having been swayed from opposing a tourism strategy which he otherwise
saw as likely to yield only marginal benefits for the community he represented by the
likelihood that Hollern would become Transportation Commission head and thus be in
a position to deliver sought after highway improvements (Allen January 25, 1990). In
assessing the propriety of a tourism strategy, Alle~ appears to have figured that the
more responsive he was to Hollern's advocacy of a tourism strategy, the greater the
likelihood that the highway improvements would be constructed. His inclination in
this matter might have been shared by other officials from Jefferson and Crook
Counties as well.
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Greg Cushman and Mike Hollern notwithstanding, probably no local actor
exercised as peIVasive an influence upon Central Oregon's Regional Strategy as
Deschutes County Commissioner Lois Prante. She was also a member of the
subcommittee that drafted the December, 1986 memorandum to Goldschmidt that
identified tourism as Central Oregon's Regional Strategy. Above all, Prante's
influence stemmed from her role as Chairman of what came to be known as the Group
of Seven. The Group was fonned as a successor to the subcommittee that grew out of
the November 25 meeting at the Redmond Golf Club. With the appointment of the
Group of Seven, the sub-committee ceased to exist
There were two significant differences between the Group and the sub-
committee. First, the subcommittee's mission had been to select a strategy for Central
Oregon. The Group's purpose was to select projects for funding under the region's
allocation of lottery money. Second, whereas the subcommittee was an ad-hoc group
composed of local government and private industry leaders, the Group of Seven was
compoSed solely of local government leaders. The Group's composition is important.
It was composed of one county commissioner from each of the three Central Oregon
counties plus the mayors ofthe region's four largest cities--Bend and Redmond in
Deschutes County, Madras in Jefferson County and Prineville in Crook County.
There was an implicit balancing in this arrangement; it appears to have afforded
Jefferson and Crook Counties protection from being dominated by more populous
Deschutes County since ifofficials from the two former counties voted as a block,
they could carry or veto any decision they found disagreeable.
Prante's selection as Group chair reflected the fact that as head of Deschutes
County government, she was the only full-time elected local government executive in
the three county region (Riggs January 25, 1990; Uffleman January 24, 1990). Alone
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among the Committee members, Prante did not have other occupational demands upon
her time. Hence, she was the one with the most time to dedicate towards strategy
preparation. In the Deschutes County government apparatus, she also commanded
administrative resources well in excess of those commanded by the other committee
members. (Freeman January to, 1990; Kozak January 11, 1990; Uffleman January
24, 1990; Riggs January 25, 1990; Comini January 24, 1990). Subsequent to her
selection as Group of Seven Chair-person, Prante' s office would oversee most facets
of putting the final touches on Central Oregon's Regional Strategy including playing
host to all Group of Seven meetings and preparing Group meeting agendas and
drafting of the final Strategy document, including the region's project list.
Just days after his inauguration as Oregon's thirty-third Governor on January
4, 1987, Neil Goldschmidt called upon the Committee of Seven to meet with him in
Salem. He began the meeting by affmning his support for Central Oregon's decision
to select a tourism Strategy. He also voiced support for including highway
improvements in Central Oregon's Strategy. He then asked the officials to prepare a
detailed list of private sector and local government projects which, leveraged by an
expected $500,000 in state lottery money, could expand the area's tourism sector. He
asked the committee officials to have the project list completed by March 15. Last,
Governor Goldschmidt said that the lottery money would not be available unless
legislators adopted his regional development package. He asked the Committee to
assist him in securing legislative approval (Prante January 24, 1990; Allen January 25,
1990; Kozak January 11, 1990), as he would do again at the March 15 ceremony in
Bend at which Central Oregon's prototype strategy was first unveiled.
Shortly after meeting with Governor Goldschmidt in Salem, the Group of
Seven assembled in the Bend office of Deschutes County Commissioner Lois Prante.
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Several dimension of the role Prante played in the Group of Seven's deliberations are
instructive. One is the manner in which adispute over how the region's allotment of
lottery money would be spent was resolved. The dispute stemmed from a proposal by
officials from Jefferson and Crook County's that the region's lottery money be divided
up-front between the three counties on a per-capita basis. Officials from each county
would then have been responsible for selecting Strategy projects to fund with their
own respective shares. The driving force behind this proposal was the view, prevalent
among the Group's Jefferson and Crook County contingents, that under a tourism
strategy, any formula for dividing the 10,ttery money that was based upon competitive
criteria would inherently favor D~schutes County. Sponsoring officials viewed a per-
capita arrangement as ensuring the communities they represented a fair share of state
lottery dollars. To the apparent consternation of these officials, however, the per-
capita scheme was rejected at the behest of CommissionerPrante (Comini January 24,
1990; Allen January 25, 1990).
The rejection of the per-capita arrangement is interesting, especially in light
of the Group of Seven's composition. It would seemingly have invested officials from
Jefferson and Crook Counties .with the power to override Prante. Yet, no move to
override seems to have arisen. According to local officials, Commissioner Prante
cited the authority of the Governor in vetoing the per-capita scheme (Comini January
24, 1990; Riggs Ja.'1uary 25, 1990; Allen January 25, 1990). Goldschmidt was
certainly opposed to a per-capita division of lottery money--he wanted Strategy
submissions competitively evaluated. Operating under the belief that the Governor
had, in effect, mandated a tourism Strategy for Central Oregon and not wanting to risk
upsetting the Governor for fear of undermining the ancillary benefits they hoped to
derive, officials from Jefferson and Crook Counties did not seek to override
Commissioner Prante's veto of the per-capita scheme.
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The Growth Coalition
Not all parties involved in the Central Oregon stl'~.tegy were equal. Actors
affiliated with the Bend area exercised the critical initiative in making tourism the
region's Strategy. Officials from Jefferson and Crook Counties were relegated to a
subordinate role. The private and public actors that dominated strategy selection in
Central Oregon were linked by formal and informal ties. They shared an interest with
Governor Goldschmidt over adopting a tourism strategy as well. The network within
which these actors operated fits the classic depiction of a growth coalition.· Recall that
Logan and Molotch (19876:34-35) defined growth coalitions as coalitions "of interest,
recruited and organized along territoriallines...to attract scarce capital." In fact, it
would perhaps be hard to fmd a better personification of a growth coalition than that
represented by the three main actors who the writer has focused upon here: Cushman,
the newspaper publisher, Hollern, a developer and Prante, the County executive.
Logan and Molotch identify newspapers, developers and local politicians as key
players in growth coalition politics.
According to Bend Bulletin Reporter Mike Freeman (January 10, 1990), most
of the Group of Seven meetings were held surreptitiously--no advance public notice
was issued, the press was uninvited and no minutes were kept. Freeman said that
Commissioner Prante resisted his efforts to open the meetings up. Surreptitious
meetings were in fact a violation of Oregon's open meetings laws, which mandates
that meetings at which three or more elected officials discuss public business be open
to the public. According to Freeman, Prante complied with the law only after being
apprised of the need to do so by the Deschutes County Attorney. By then, however,
the essential work of putting together Central Oregon's Strategy project list appears to
have been over. Freeman's account of surreptitious meetings was corroborated in
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interviews with several Group of Seven members (Comini January 24, 1990; Riggs
January 25, 1990; Allen January 25, 1990).
Further corroborating Freeman's contention that the Group of Seven
meetings were, for the most part, surreptitious events were the public hearings the
Central Oregon counties held on their tourism strategy. HB 3011 was adopted by the
legislature in late May, 1987. Recall that the Act required counties to conduct formal
public hearings prior to final selection of a strategy. The Central Oregon counties had
not held such hearings. In fact,even the Strategy project list had been chosen prior to
the required hearing. The passage of HB 30II required that such hearings be held,
however, and they were, retroactively.
Jefferson County Commissioners scheduled a public hearing on the County's
Strategy for July I, 1988. A review of the hearing's minutes showed that fifteen
minutes lapsed between the time at which the hearing was convened and closed,
during which not a single person appeared to offer testimony. Nor did anyone testify
at the Strategy hearing held a week later at the Crook County courthouse in Prineville.
D~schutes County's hearing was only slightly better attended. Two witnesses
appeared before the County Board of Commissioners to offer testimony on the
propriety of making tourism central Oregon's Strategy. They were not there to
challenge the Strategy however but to endorse it, however. The two were Peter
Dobert and Meaghan Dobert. He was COED's executive director; she executive
director of CORA, the association of recreation industry interests. Each read a short
statement expressing their support for the tourism strategy.3 The lack of public
participation in the hearings held on the Central Oregon strategy can be seen as wholly
indicative of a process which was, as the Bend Bulletin's Freeman and others claimed,
essentially removed from public view.
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The surreptitiousness that surrounded the Central Oregon Strategy
interesting. It indicates that in its behavior, the Central Oregon growth coalition
mirrored the behavior of other growth coalitions depicted in the literature by a number
of authors. Included are Hartman (1984), Swanstrom (1985), and Fainstein et al.
(1986).
LESSONS FROM THE PROJECT LIST
The Group of Seven's primary job was to assemble a list of projects for
funding under Central Oregon's Regional Strategy. The January 23, 1987 edition of
the Bend Bulletin reported the criteria upon which the Group decided to judge projects
proposed for funding under the Strategy. Included were the relevance of the proposal
to tourism, matching funds, the number of people the project would reach, the year-
round impact of the proposed project and the tri-county impact of the project.
Interestingly, the number of jobs to be created, either directly in tourism or
downstream in terms of fIrm relocations, received no mention. This does not lend
itself well to the conclusion that in making decisions on selecting Strategy projects,
the Committee adhered rigorously to a setof objective principles.
Table V summarizes Central Oregon's final Strategy project list. Analysis of
the project list provides the opportunity to address a number of issues with which this
dissertation is concerned. Included are the extent to which Regional Strategies was
characterized by institutional cohesion and the avenues by which Governor
Goldschmidt sought to use the authority he was vested with to override sectional
interests and how the relative capacities of local governments for economic
development planning affected the Strategy process.
TABLE V
CENlRAL OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
PROJECT NAME
LOTTERY
FUNDING
OTHER STATE
FUNDING
LOCAL
FUNDS
TOTAL
VALUE
Highway Improvements $17,500,000
Widening of 26.7 miles ofstate highways 97 and 26. Other state funding provided by OOOT.
Welcome Center $200,000 $1,534,850
Construction and outfitting of Welcome Center in Bend. Included relocation of Chamber of Commerce,
. COED, ~d CORA. Local funds provided by increase in Deschutes County Room tax.
$17,500,000
$1,734,850
Redmond Satellite Welcome Center $35,000
Construction ofSatellite Welcome Center near Redmond Airport. Never built.
Regional Arts Council Modular Stage $40,000
Purchase of transportable stage for Bend-based regional arts council.
LaPine Rodeo Grounds $6,000
Renovation of Rodeo facility located in city of LaPine, south of Bend.
Culver Transfer Station $8,000
Construction of recreational vehicle and trailer refuse disposal station in the city ofCulver.
High Desert Museum $1,000
Expansion of visitor information center at High Desert Museum, located just sOuth of Bend.
$199,750'
$27,415
$44,500
$7~584
$44,000
$234,750
$67,415
$50,500
$15,584
$51,000
-w
w
TABLE V
CENTRAL OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continued)
PROJECf NAME
LOTTERY
FUNDING
OTHER STATE
FUNDING
LOCAL
FUNDS
TOTAL
VALUE
$30.000Prineville Theatre
Renovation of Prineville Theatre. Never completed.
Media Package . $45.000
Development of slide show and brocheure to market region's visitor allmctions.
Reservation Center $65.000
Computerized reservation center sponsored by Mount Bachelor.
$19.900
$75.000
$277.000
$49.900
$120.000
$342.000
Madras Highway Reader Sign
Electronic highway reader sign. Never Buill.
$35.000 $35.000
COED Industrial Development Campaign . $215.000
Development of hotel lobby displays. hotel room guest directories. and marketing brocheures.
Also paid for purchase ofcomputer hardware and software for COED. .
$135.000 $350.000
Total Funding: $686.000 $2.364.999 $3,050.999
-w
-I::>-
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Local Capacity for Economic Development Planning Revisited
Late January, 1987 saw the Group of Seven officials announce the process by
which they aimed to solicit projects proposed for funding under Central Oregon's
Strategy. Prospective sponsors were directed to submit proposals to the office of one
of the Group members by February 20. This gave interested parties about thirty days
to prepare and submit proposals. It's unclear as to exactly how many proposals were
submitted by the Febmary 20 deadline although it appears that there were at least
fifteen. What is clear is that most of the proposals for Strategy funding originated
from Deschutes County. On the day preceding the February 20 deadline, Deschutes
County Commissioner Lois Prante was quoted as saying they "hadn't (yet) received
(any) proposals from Jefferson and Crook Counties" (Bend Bulletin February 20.,
1987).
Table V lends additional testimony to' the preponderant role afforded
Deschutes County in Central Oregon's Strategy. Of the fourteen projects slated for
funding under the Strategy, five were sponsored either by two of the Central Oregon
Counties (the highway improvements) or by agencies ostensibly serving all three of
the counties (the Media Package; the COED projects; and Arts Stage). Of the money
allocated to the remaining eight projects, $278,000 accmed to Deschutes County,
$58,000 to Jefferson County and $ 30~000 to Crook County. In fact, as shall be seen
shortly, not all the projects listed in Table V came to fruition. If unrealized projects
are excluded, Deschutes County's lottery totaled $230,000 and Jefferson County's,
$23,000. In per-capita terms, Deschutes CountY benefited from the spending of about
$3.55 per-resident in lottery money. For Jefferson County, the figure was about $2.30.
For reasons to be explored presently, Crook County did not benefit from any of the
lottery money allocated to fund Central Oregon's Regional Strategy.
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Earlier, it was argued that the prevalent position Deschutes County assumed
in the Central Oregon Strategy was a function of the dominant role it played in the
region's tourism sector and the capacity advantages enjoyed and instruments
controlled by the Bend area's growth coalition; As a corollary, it appears that weak
local capacity for administering economic 'development planning acted against
Jefferson and Crook County's in efforts to secure funding under the aegis of the
region's Strategy. As evidence of this, consider two strategy projects--one each in
Jefferson and Crook County--that failed to come to fruition.
.First is the large electronic reader board that was supposed to be installed in
the Jefferson County seat of Madras along Highway 26, the principal highway
connecting Central Oregon with metropolitan Portland. The sign would have
announced area wide activities and local events to travelers, including ski conditions
at Mount Bachelor. Initially funded to the tune of $35,000, it accounted for 60 percent
of Jefferson County's total lottery allocation and was Jefferson County's most
prominent Strategy project. After the Strategy was adopted by the Governor, it was
discovered that federal highway regulations prohibited construction of such a sign.
Apparently, nobody had taken note of this. Consequently, the reader sign was never
built and the lottery money 'allocated for it, never spent (Allen, January 25, 1990; EDD
1987). That officials in Jefferson County allowed themselves to be deprived in this
manner is suggestive of a weak administrative capacity for economic development
planning. Jefferson County's low capacity for economic development caused it to
forego 60 percent of the lottery money it was initially allocated.
Next is the case of the Prineville Theater. This is the only Crook County
project appearing on Table V. By all accounts, local officials expected renovation of
the Prineville Theater to do little to expand tourism in Crook County. But the theater
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renovation was the only project submitted from Crook County, assuring it a place on
the Strategy project list. Later, after the Strategy agreement had been ratified by the
Governor, it was discovered that fire regulations required installation of an emergency
exit on the side of the 50 year old theater building. No accounting had been made of
the need for this exit The abutting property owner refused to grant an easement for
this exit. The Crook County Court, the County's governing body, demonstrated little
inclination to condemn any of the abutting property. In any event, County finances
were so constrained as to make this an implausible option anyway (Uffleman January
24, 1990; Comini January 24, 1990). The theater project was ultimately dropped and
in the end, alone among the three Central Oregon counties, Crook County failed to
avail itself of lottery money.
Circumventing the Established Order
Highway improvements were the centerpiece of Central Oregon's project list.
Through Regional Strategies, local officials sought to secure improvements to the
region's two main highways--Highway 26, the principal route connecting Central
Oregon with the Portland area and Highway 97, the region's principal north-south
route. More so than any other project, the highway improvements were the product of
regional consensus and promised to pay region-wide benefits. Securing improvement
to Highways 26 and 97 had in fact long been a priority for the region, not only to
tourism industry interests who believed that congestion impeded visitor travel but to
others in the region as well. Recall the mentioning of highway improvements in the
memorandum local officials sent to the Goldschmidt transition team in December,
1986. Consequently, seeing the highway improvements constructed emerged as a key
Goldschmidt Administration goal. Governor Goldschmidt signalled this in his first
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meeting with the Group of Seven when, to recall, he voiced support for including
highway improvements in Central Oregon's Strategy.
According to the December 3, 1986 edition of the Oregonian, at $17.5
inillion, "the highway improvements would be more expensive than anything that is
currently on the transportation drawing board for that stretch of road." Their cost also
far exceeded the amount of lottery money Goldschmidt had allocated the three Central
Oregon counties and indeed, equaled the entire sum lawmakers had appropriated for
Regional Strategies, once funds committed to the Convention Center were removed.
So it is clear that the highway improvements were not to be paid for with lottery
money. Instead, highway improvement construction depended upon their being
funded under the AOH (Access Oregon Highways) program, administered by the
Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AOH reserved surcharge state gas tax
revenues for select ~tate highway projects. Accordingly, the request for the highway
improvements was inserted into the Central Oregon Strategy under that provision of
HB 3011 which authorized counties to include in their Strategy lists request for "other
forms of state assistance."
According to Mike Hollern, the Deschutes County developer who
Goldschmidt appointed head of the Oregon Transportation Commission in January,
1987, including the improvements in the Central Oregon Regional Strategy was
"essential to getting them done." As the Bend Bulletin (October 23, 1987) reported:
Hollern said if the Governor approves the Strategy, he will urge the
Transportation Commission to make the projects a high priority. That
could lead to some highway improvements as early as next year.
)Vithout the regional strategy, Hollern said, it might take eight to ten
years for the commission to allocate funds for the project.
As it happened, Central Oregon did not have to wait ten years for its sought
after highway improvements. They were scheduled for AOH funding under ODOT's
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six year improvement program and construction on some were begun in the following
year. Hollern's role in this matter points to an important point, one made to the writer by
Dale Allen (January 23, 1990), ODOT's administrator for Central Oregon. He told the
writer in quite explicit terms that the success Central Oregon enjoyed with the highway
improvements had little to do with Regional Strategies. Instead, asserted Allen,
accelerated construction of the highway improvements was mainly attributable to the
influence Hollern was able to personally exert as Transportation Commission head.
Recall from the previous chapter that Governor Goldschmidt was unsuccessful
in extracting from the state legislature the extraordinary authority he sought over the
Transportati~n Commission as well as other of the state's quasi-autonomous
commissions. Subsequently, he tried another approach. Drawing upon his electoral
mandate, he demanded the resignation of the entire Transportation Commis~ion. He
succeeded in securing the entire Commission's resignation, although not without some
bitter recriminations. It was his success in this unconventional maneuver that allowed
him to install Central Oregon's Mike Hollern, a key campaign supporter and principal
force behind the construction of Central Ore~on' s highway improvements, as
Transportation Commission chief.
The conditions surrounding construction of the highway improvements sheds
light on the routines through which the Goldschmidt Administration secured its key
industrial policy goals. Highway improvement construction had little to do with
conventional channels of administrative authority. Instead, construction of the highway
improvements was largely attributable to the Goldschmidt Administration's ability to
resort to extraordinary, highly personalized routines outside the established order of
public authority.
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Subsidies
As with the highway improvements, the memorandum sent to Goldschmidt in
December, 1986 had requested state assistance for building a Visitor Center in Bend. In
fact, construction of the Visitor Center was paid for with $2 million raised through a
voter approved increase in the Deschutes County room tax. According to COED Director
Peter Dobert (January 11, 1990), lottery money provided under the aegis of Regional
Strategies was used only to install and furnish quarters within the Center to which as
noted in the August 23, 1990 edition of the Bend Bulletin, COED, the Bend Chamber of
Commerce, CORA, and other local agencies moved their offices. The Visitor Center, to
paraphrase Dobert and others (Kozak January 24, 1990; Riggs January 25, 1990) would
hav~ been built "Regional Strategies or no Regional Strategies."
The Reservations Center, for which $65,000 in lottery money was used to buy
computer and affiliated equipment, was the project of Mount Bachelor, Inc., which
committed $337,000 to fund the its ongoing operations (EDD 1987). In fact, it appears
that Mount Bachelor was prepared to appropriate funds for the Center prior to the advent
of the regional development initiative (Kozak January 11, 1990). Having it included in
the Central Oregon Strategy seems to have simply relieved the resort of two-thirds of the
project's start-up costs.
Lottery money provided under Regional Strategies does not appear to have been
instrumental in promoting capital investment which would have not otherwise occurred
in either the case of the Visitor Center or Reservations Center. In both cases, the lottery
money provided appears mainly to have comprised a subsidy, socializing the operational
activities of certain quasi- public (COED, CORA) or wholly private agencies (the
Chamber) and businesses (Mount Bachelor).
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THE POLmCS OF ACCOMMODATION CONFIRMED
The latter half of 1987 saw officials at the Oregon Economic Development
Department striving to bring the Central Oregon Strategy to a close. As will be seen in
the following chapters, EDD's efforts to bring the Strategy process to cloture extended
beyond Central Oregon to other regions as well. EDD drove for closure in order to
transform the various listed projects into reality. Only if these projects could be put
quickly into effect might they demonstrate material results by early 1989. It was
evidence of progress in building or otherwise effecting listed projects that the Governor
hoped to cite in efforts he would mount in seeking to reauthorize and refund Regional
Strategies during the 1989 legislative session. In Central Oregon, however, there
emerged an unexpected glitch which threatened to torpedo the whole Strategy effort.
Officials from areas expecting to derive little direct benefit from a tourism
strategy had nonetheless accommodated themselves to one because they aimed to derive
tangential benefits from doing so. In particular, they aimed to acquire state monies with
which to augment ongoing industrial recruitment activities. The December, 1986,
memorandum sent to Goldschmidt's'transition team had, in fact, requested money for this
purpose. A glitch in this arrangement arose in early September, 1987. Dick Reiten,
recently appointed by Governor Goldschmidt to replace departed EDD Director Roger
Smith, announced that Goldschmidt had decided to transfer $1.5 million from the state's
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) fund for use in other of EDD's
programs. In fact, two-thirds of the transferred CDBG money was destined to augment
lottery monies available for funding Regional Strategies.
The officials seeking money for industrial recruitment apparently expected this
money to be drawn from funds originally dedicated to the CDBG program. They read the
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decision to transfer the CDBG money as diminishing the amount of money that would be
available for funding their industrial recruitment efforts and thus, abrogating the
accommodation upon which their endorsement of a tourism strategy was based. Why
else would Redmond Mayor Bob Riggs have responded to Reiten's announcement that
the CDBG funds were being shifted by saying "We have to ascertain just what's
proposed (by the state), how it is different from what we thought we were buying into
and what's the appropriate response" (Bend Bulletin September 9, 1987). Riggs and
fellow dissident officials saw themselves as having accommodated themselves to a
tourism strategy from which they expected to gain little direct benefit. Now, with the
cutback in CDBG funds, they saw themselves being penalized. The result was a
rancorous challenge to the integrity of the Central Oregon Strategy agreement.
October 23, 1987, saw the Group of Seven meet to discuss the shifted CDBG
funds. At the insistence of dissident officials, the region's project list was amended to
include a request for an additional $200,000 in lottery money for use in business
recruitment Notice of this decision was sent to EDD. The officials request was not to
receive a favorable reception, however. Responding to the request, EDD official Bob
Schumaker said "I don't think...Mr. Reiten is in favor of this proposal" (Bend Bulletin
November 13, 1987). And indeed, the request for the additional money was rejected.
EDD's Dick Reiten (February 27, 1990) was asked about these events. Reiten
responded that the decision to reject the appended Central Oregon request was, as with
the decision to transfer the CDBG funds in the first place, made personally by Governor
Goldschmidt. Reiten said that the Governor was opposed to direct grants of money to
local governments for industrial recruitment purposes. In light of Reiten's comments,
Goldschrilidt's rejection of the appended Central Oregon request can be seen as evidence
of both his. seeming repudiation of industrial recruitment and his commitment to the
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implementation of multi-lateral strategies. In fact, the Goldschmidt Administration's
actions in this matter had implications beyond Central Oregon. In rejecting Central
Oregon's request for funds with which individual governments could conduct industrial
recruitment, Goldschmidt sought to serve notice that similar requests made by other
counties would also be refused. EDD official Bob Schumaker intimated this when,
hinting that Central Oregon's request for the $200,000 for industrial recruitment would
be rejected, he called it a "test case" (Oregonian November 13, 1987).
The transfer of the CDBG funds into the pot of money available for Regional
Strategies and concomitant curtailment of money available for local government
industrial recruitment activities appears to have been consistent with the Goldschmidt
Administration's goal of centralizing control over the state's economic development
activities. This view was certainly shared by Madras Mayor Rick Allen, who upon
learning of the CDBG funds transfer, remarked that the state was "trying to pull all the
economic development money into Salem" (Bend Bulletin September 10, 1987).
The Administration's refusal to countenance moneyfor industrial recruitment
vexed both Madras Mayor Allen and Redmond Mayor Bob Riggs, each of whom openly
questioned the propriety of pursuing a tourism strategy. They were joined by officials
from Crook County, with Dick Hoppes, head of the County Court remarking derisively
"It's not a regional strategies plan, it's a Deschutes County plan that puts out little carrots
to Crook and Jefferson counties if we go along with it." Hoppes also called the strategy a
"Mickey Mouse document that shouldn't be adopted" (Bend Bulletin December 20,
1987). Amid this sort of rancor, Central Oregon's tourism strategy, hitherto the product
of an albeit sometimes reluctant but nonetheless consensual accord, now threatened to
unravel.
To get the Central Oregon Strategy back on track, officials from EDD met with
their local counterparts. Negotiations produced an offer from the Goldschmidt
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Administration to make available, in lieu of the foregone CDBG money, an additional
$215,000 beyond what was originally requested in the region's project list to fund an
industrial marketing campaign belatedly proposed by COED. COED aimed to use the
money to add staff and purchase computer equipment for use in preparing materials for
use in marketing the region to outside investors. According to officials from Jefferson
and Crook Counties (Uffleman January 24, 1989; Comini January 24, 1989; Allen
January 25, 1989), some sort of unwritten agreement was also fashioned by which,
should Regional Strategies be reauthorized for the 1989 biennium, the second Central
Oregon Strategy would place greater emphasis upon directing lottery dollars to the
outlying areas, instead of to Bend and its environs.
Dissident Central Oregon officials were not wholly satisfied with the terms of
the Goldschmidt Administration's offer. Officials from Jefferson and Crook County
appear to have viewed COED, headquartered in Bend, as having favored the Bend area in
its activities to the detriment of their own communities. They clearly would have
preferred direct benefit of industrial recruitment monies. Still, if only grudgingly, they
acceded to the Administration's offer. They appear to have recognized few alternatives
to doing so. The Administration remained adamant in its opposition to providing funding
directly to the local governments for industrial recruitment purposes (Comini January 24,
1990; Uffleman January 24, 1990; Riggs January 25, .1990). Under these circumstances,
they viewed the materials to be produced by COED, if not as a substitute for the
industrial recruitment monies they had initially been seeking, contributing to their
industrial recruiting efforts nonetheless. The dissidents were also swayed in their
decision by the promise of future rewards in a second round of Strategy funding.
The offer to fund the COED project can be seen as something of a retreat for the
Goldschmidt Administration from its opposition to industrial recruitment. Still, it was
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not a total retreat; granting the funding to COED instead of to individual local
governments maintained a multilateral semblance in the Strategy. Also, by linking the
agreement to a second round of Strategy funding, there was created in Central Oregon a
constituency which could, in the same manner in which Governor Goldschmidt had
initially employed his prototype, be used to lobby lawmakers into reauthorizing the
program for the 1989 biennium. Agreement on the COED project paved the way for all
three of the counties to hold final hearings on and adopt the Strategy, which was then sent
to the Governor. He formally adopted the Strategy at a mid-January, 1988 ceremony at
the state capitol in Salem.
SUMMARY
Central Oregon's multi-county tourism strategy was the product of an
accommodation between the Goldschmidt Administration and local interests. At the
local level, this accommodation was dominated by private- and public sector interests
affiliated with a Bend area growth coalition. The instrument of their domination were the
capacity advantages they enjoyed in planning and mobilizing for economic development.
Objective economic analysis appears to have played little role in making policy
decisions. Instead, policy choice appears to have been guided primarily by political
considerations. Interests with a poor capacity for planning and mobilizing for economic
development planning were placed in the subordinate' position of accommodating
themselves to a tourism strategy in the hope of deriving tangential benefits.
The Goldschmidt Administration's preference for implementing tourism
strategies was founded upon the view of tourism as an industry with prospects for
generating rapid employment growth. If a tourism strategy might generate rapid
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employment growth, however, it was likely to be job growth built upon a marginalized,
low wage work force.
Success in securing Central Oregon's highest priority strategy project required
that the Administration resort to highly personalized tactics in circumventing
conventional channels of public authority.
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NOTES
1. Determining tourism related employment is an ine.xact science. Businesses
serving tourists tend to be diffused throughout a number of industrial classes. To
facilitate analysis in Table ill, the writer has defined tourism in tenns of employment of
two U.S. Commerce Department industrial classifications groups likely more so than
others to be tourist related--Food Service and Hotels and Lodging. Excluding other
groups probably lends understatement while including the food service category
[probably lends over statement· Still, the writer assumes that to the degree that
overstatement or understatement occurs, it will be consistent
2. One person who apparently advised Goldschmidt in this matter was Don
Maziotti. He had served as a Goldschmidt aide during the latter's tenure as Portland
mayor. Subsequently, he had worked in an economic development capacity for
Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh. Mr. Maziotti may have played a role in
shaping the Ben Franklin Partnership which, to recall, Osborne (1988) cjted as the
centerpiece of industrial policy in Pennsylvania. The writer sought to interview Mr.
Maziotti. Unfortunately, he could not be contacted for interview.
3. As regards the analysis the writer undertook oftourism job generating
prospects, several caveats are in order. First, due to an inability to contact those
individuals who advised Goldschmidt of the propriety of tourism as an economic
development strategy, it is unknown what data their fmdings might have been based
upon. The data upon which Goldschmidt's advisers may have based their conclusions
may well have differed with that employed here and therefore, supported different
findings. Next, Goldschmidt's predilection for tourism was based upon its prospects for
generating future job growth. Reliable data useful for projecting futurejob growth in the
tourism sector were, however, unavailable. Therefore, the analysis offered here is based
upon the assumption that the best predictor of future job generating performance is such
performance in the recent past
Also, Goldschmidt's predilection for tourism was based in part upon its prospects for
driving job creation in other industries. The writer could find no reliable data of use in
examining the link between tourism promotion or job growth in tourism sector and job
growth in other economic sectors. There is no way of examining the credibility of this
claim through data analysis and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, it is simply
assumed that to the degree that tourism is likely to fuel job growth in exogenous sectors,
this growth is likely to mirror that taking place in the tourism sector itself. Last,
determining tourism related employment is an inexact science. Businesses serving
tourists tend to be diffused throughout a number of industrial classes. Last, to facilitate
this analysis, the writer defined tourism in tenns of employment of two U.S. Commerce
Department industrial classifications groups likely more so than others to be tourist
related--Food Service and Hotels and Lodging. The qualifications presented above in
footnote 2 are therefore pertinent here as well.
The limitations these caveats place upon this analysis are recognized. Given the scope
of the present effort, however, these assumptions seem credible and this albeit imperfect
analysis as likely to offer insight into the prospect that tourism might fit the definition of
an emerging industry.
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4. There is a certain metaphorical dimension to the appearance of the two
Dobert's before the Deschutes County Commission. They were in fact, married. Their
marriage can be seen as a metaphor for the links that tied together COED and CORA and
the key public and private actors that mobilized on behalf of a tourism Strategy in Central
Oregon.
CHAPTER VII
IMPLEMENTING REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN SOUTHERN OREGON
Planning for the Southern Oregon strategy involved six counties at one time
or another.! Only four were party to Southern Oregon's final strategy accord--
Jackson, Josephine, Douglas and Curry Counties. These four are incorporated into the
depiction of Southern Oregon offered in Figure I. The two others involved in
planning the Southern Oregon Strategy but not party to its final product--Klamath and
Lake Counties--are excluded from this depiction.
Implementation of Southern Oregon's Regional Strategy saw the
Goldschmidt Administration override local preferences to impose a multi-county
tourism strategy upon a region divided by centrifugal forces and possessing a weak
capacity for economic development planning. Southern Oregon's Strategy points to
the Sunset and no-seconds clauses as legislatively-enforced limitations upon
gubernatorial success. The Administration proved able to use the Regional Strategies
arrangement to secure goals in circumstances in which goal attainment was contingent
upon lottery money under the Administration's control. Regional Strat~gies proved
less efficacious when goal attainment was contingent upon the cooperation of semi-
autonomous elements of the state apparatus. The failure of private capitalists to make
expected investments in a key strategy project points again to the character of private
investment as a limitation upon the state to use industrial policy to promote economic
development.
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BALKANIZATION IN OREGON
February, 1987 saw Governor Goldschmidt call representatives from three
Southern Oregon counties to meet with him in Salem. He used the meeting to ask the
officials to join together in developing a collective three county Southern Oregon
Regional Strategy, one to which neighboring counties might also be linked. The period
leading up to 1987 was one of widespread economic distress throughout Southern
Oregon. The aggregate unemployment rate for the three counties represented at the
February meeting--Jackson, Josephine, and Klamath--reached over 16 percent during the
winter of 1981-82. Klamath County's unemployment rate went over 20 percent. All
three counties were included among the twenty-six Oregon counties designated by the
U.S. Labor Department as labor surplus areas in November, 1985. Local government
revenues were significantly curtailed. Josephine County's general fund revenues
declined especially precipitously, from $17.2 million to $12.7 million between 1979 and
1984, a drop of over 25 percent (Oregonian January 1, 1986).
Unsurprisingly, given this state of affairs, the local officials agreed to take part
in Governor Goldschmidt's economic development initiative. But they resisted
committing themselves to collaboration on a collective strategy, at least in the initial
stages of strategy development. Instead, they wanted each county to be responsible for
identifying its own strategy. They would then see if the individual strategies could be
merged into one (Blake January 8, 1990; McGregor February 8, 1990; Reyneke February
8, 1991). Jane Reyneke, Mayor of Grants Pass, Josephine County's largest city and an
attendee at the February meeting at which Goldschmidt moved to inaugurate planning for
the S.outhern Oregon· strategy reiterated her reluctance to engage in multi-county strategy
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planning in the March 22, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail, Southern Oregon's largest
local newspaper. She said it was "premature to talk about regionalization" of Regional
Strategies. Jackson County Commissioner Stuart McCullom expressed a similar view,
being quoted in the same newspaper as saying that "Regionalization is not going to come
easy."
The Roots of Regional Divisiveness
In part at least, it may have been because Klamath County's representative at the
meeting with Goldschmidt, Dr. Larry Blake, was a key player in efforts to promote
construction of a power dam on the Klamath River. As shall be seen in the following
chapter, Blake sought to use Regional Strategies to promote the dam's construction.
Blake saw tying Klamath County to a multi-county collaborative as incompatible with
this goal. Still, it is clear that Southern Oregon lacked a strong tradition of the sort of
multi-lateral collaboration proposed by Governor Goldschmidt. Elazar (1972:97) depicts
Southern Oregon as being infused with strains of an individualistic political culture.
Atomism and insularity are key traits of the individualistic culture, traits prone to
disparage exogenous dependencies and unlikely to foster multi-lateral cooperation.
Economic development was a particular source of inter-communal antagonism
in Southern Oregon. There were at least two sources of these antagonisms. The fIrst
pertains to the relative equiponderance that characterized the region's spatial structure.
The second pertains to the diversity that characterized the region's industrial structure.
One way to make this point is to compare Southern Oregon to Central Oregon. Southern
Oregon was much more populous, more economically diversifIed and characterized by
less primacy than Central Oregon.
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In 1986, the total population of the three county Central Oregon region was
90,000. With a municipal population of over 18,000, the city of Bend accounted for
over 20 percent of the region's total population. None of Central Oregon's six other
incorporated communities contained as many as 7,000 people. With surrounding
unincorporated areas included, the Bend vicinity accounted for 40 percent of Central
Oregon's total population. With 256,550 people living in Jackson, Josephine, and
Klamath Counties at the time Goldschmidt moved to inaugurate Regional Strategies,
Southern Oregon was much more populous than Central Oregon. With a population
of 43,875, the city of Medford was the largest municipality in the three county
Southern Oregon area. Still, Medford accounted for only 15.6 percent of the three
county region's population. There were seventeen other incorporated communities in
the three county area however including three with municipal populations almost
equalling that of Bend alone: Klamath Falls (17,030), Grants Pass (16,200), and
Ashland (16,010). Furthermore, unlike Bend, ringed only by unincorporated
communities, Medford was surrounded by several incorporated cities. In terms of
urban structure, there was much more parity in Southern Oregon than in Central
Oregon, where Bend asserted a high degree of primacy.
As regards the diversity that characterized Southern Oregon's industrial
structure, in 1986, total wage and salary employment in the three Counties represented
at the February meeting at which Governor Goldschmidt moved to inaugurate a
Southern Oregon Regional Strategy was 62,101; the comparable figure for Central
Oregon was 27,059 (Employment Division 1986). All three Southern Oregon
counties were heavily dependent upon wood products manufacturing; it accounted for
15.4 percent of total wage and salary employment in the region in 1986. Still, wood
products played less of a role in the Southern Oregon region than in Central Oregon
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(20.9 percent). Whereas wood products accounted for 77 percent of Central Oregon's
manufacturing sector employment, it accounted for only 65 percent of manufacturing
sector employment in Southern Oregon. Electronic equipment and instruments, paper
products, transportation equipment, and fabricated metal products all played
significantly more important roles in Southern Oregon's manufacturing sector than in
Central Oregon's. Trade, both wholesale and retail, accounted for a significantly
larger share of total employment in Southern Oregon than in Central Oregon.
Transportation, including warehousing, health care and education also accounted for a
larger share of total employment in Southern Oregon than in Central Oregon. At 10.3
percent, the share of Southern Oregon employment accounted for by tourism was
below that of Central Oregon. The point here is that Southern Oregon's economy was
more diversified and balanced than that of Central Oregon.
The multi-polarity, both spatial and industrial, that characterized Southern
Oregon created conditions ripe for discord as place economies and industrial interests
pursued their own distinctive aims. One sign of these antagonism: the city of Grants
Pass, Josephine County's largest city and county seat, has twice joined and then
withdrawn from the Rogue Valley Council ofGovernments, the region's COG
(Reyneke February 8, 1990; Shaff February 7, 1990). A particular point of contention
during the period in which the Goldschmidt Administration moved to inaugurate
planning for Regional Strategies was the siting of a pulp mill by a company n,amed
Westbrook Wood Pl:'oducts. The mill was heavily recruited by officials from both
Medford and Klamath Falls. This not only strained relations between these two
communities. It also strained relations between officials from Medford and their
counterparts from the city of Ashland, located about twelve miles to the south.
Jackson County suffered from serious air pollution problems, which officials from
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Ashland, heavily dependent upon tourism-related activities, feared the new pulp mill
would exacerbate. Fearing more pollution would deter visitors, officials from the
Ashland Downtown Merchants Association and Ashland Visitors and Convention
Bureau joined with environmentalists in opposing locating the Westbrook pulp facility
in Medford (Keller January 8, 1990; Golden February 5, 1990; Leister February 6,
1990). In the event, Westbrook Wood Products decided against locating its pulp mill
in either Jackson or Klamath Counties.
Weak Planning Capacity
The elements of Southern Oregon's economic development apparatus were
highly fragmented and prone to conflict with each other. The Medford Mail Tribune
sought to make this point when it reported in its March 24, 1987 edition that in early
1987, there were in Jackson and Josephine Counties alone over 25 separate
organizations engaged in some sort of economic development activity. According to
the newspaper, these groups were highly fragmented along sector and territorial lines
and worked at "cross purposes." Again here, sornecomparison to Central Oregon is
instructive. Central Oregon possessed a relatively cohesive and capable economic
development apparatus. 1?is stands in stark contrast to Southern Oregon, a region
characterized by divisiveness and possessing a highly fragmented and relatively
incapable economic development apparatus.
The Jackson County Economic Development Association (JCEDC) was
probably the most important economic development agency in Jackson County in
1987. It's counterpart in Josephine County was the Josephine County Economic
Development Council (JEDA). Both were private, non-profit corporations jointly
funded by county and municipal governments and local businesses. In effect, JCEDC
and JEDA acted as the economic development arms of their constituent county and
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city governments. Neither JCEDC nor JEDA appears to have been particularly
effective, however. The March 24, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail Tribune
reported that JCEDC had an "unstable past." The same edition quoted Bob O'Niel,
former JCEDC Executive Director, as saying that local economic development efforts
were in a state of "chaos" and that JCEDC and JEDA "would be hard pressed to say
they've recruited directly, more than 25 jobs" to the region. According to the
newspaper, despite "public fund expenditures in the tens of thousands of dollars,"
local economic development efforts had "produced only a few new employers
providing only a handful of new jobs."
The first half of the 1980s had seen several attempts aimed at joining Jackson
and Josephine counties in a bi-county economic development district. JEDA and
JCEDC were envisaged as the core of this new entity. The aim was to boost Southern
Oregon's capacity for economic development by creating an organization eligible for
U.S. Department of Commerce economic planning assistance, which the individual
economic development organizations were ineligible for. Progress proved slow, being
impeded by conflicts among local officials over where the new agency would be
located and how and by who it would be staffed and led. In consequences, no such
district had yet been formed by the time Goldschmidt moved to inaugurate the
Southern Oregon Strategy (Mail Tribune March 24, 1987; August 14, 87; Reyneke
February 8, 1990; Golden February 5, 1990).
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF STRATEGY SELECTION
Efforts in Josephine and Jackson Counties to identify a Regional Strategy
produced somewhat different outcomes. Both cases stand in stark contrast to Central
Oregon, however. For unlike Central Oregon, where implementation of Regional
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Strategies was captured by a powerful Bend area growth coalition, in Josephine and
Jackson Counties, local efforts to identify a Regional Strategy were characterized by
broad based and widespread participation.
Inertia in Josephine County
Jane Reyneke was one of the local officials present at the February, 1987
meeting at which Governor Goldschmidt moved to inaugurate planning for the
Southern Or~gon Regional Strategy. The Mayor of Grants Pass, Josephine County's
largest city and county seat, she was a political ally of the Governor's, having gone as
far'as to switch her party affiliation, from Republican to Democrat, in order to endorse
him in his bid for the Governor's office (Mail Tribune June 23, 1987). Goldschmidt
did not fare well in Josephine County vote--he won only 44 percent of the County's
gubernatorial vote (Secretary of State 1987-88). Nonetheless, he rewarded Reyneke,
fIrst with an appointment to his transition team and later, with an appointment to the
state Board of Education. In moving to inaugurate planning for Josephine County's
Regional Strategy, Governor Goldschmidt called upon the assistance of political
loyalists who could be depended upon to adhere to his policy preferences.2
Shortly after the February, 1987 meeting at which Governor Goldschmidt
moved to inaugurate the Southern Oregon Regional Strategy, Mayor Reyneke met
with the Josephine County Board of County Commissioners. As an outcome of their
deliberations, a six person steering committee was established, its purpose to select a
target industry for Josephine County. The decision to form a steering Committee is
perhaps best explained as a function of risk aversion. According to Commission
Chairman Bruce McGregor (February 8, 1990), the County Commissioners were
themselves reluctant to incur direct responsibility for overseeing the strategy process,
a reluctance born of the novelty of the Regional Strategies arrangement The
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commissioners saw the Regional Strategies process as bearing little semblance to the
type of industrial recruiting schemes with which the they had traditionally been
accustomed. They also viewed the task of selecting a Regional Strategy as a
potentially divisive process which might embroil them in controversy. By delegating
responsibility for overseeing the strategy process to the Steering Committee, the
Commissioners sought relief from a risk-prone responsibility they were themselves
reluctant to accept.
Mayor Reyneke assumed the position of Chair-person of the Committee. The
. Committee's other members were Bruce McGregor, Chairman of the Josephine
County Board of County Commissioners; Art Jackson, a local businessman and
President of JEDA, the Josephine County Economic Development Association;
Claudell King, a local realtor and President of the Grants Pass Chamber of Commerce;
Dr. Harvey Bennett, President of the Rogue Valley Community College, located in
Grants Pass; and Joe Kauzlarich, head of the Grants Pass regional office of the Pacific
Power and Light Company. During March, 1987, the Committee held what the
Medford Mail Tribune (March 22, 1987) described as "a series of town hall type
meetings in Grants Pass." They were widely advertised and by all accounts, well
attended; a roster of participants listed over 75 names (St~ering Committee 1987).
The Committee's meetings appear to have opened the strategy process to a range of
local interests. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the three options that, as an
outcome of the workshops, the Steering Committee agreed to consider as candidate
target industries: tourism, retirement services, and secondary wood products. Each
had its supporters in the local polity. None of the three, however, could muster the
level of local support necessary to being selected as Josephine County's Strategy,
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Tourism: The Exogenous Strategy Grants Pass Mayor Jane Reyneke was a
leading proponent of implementing a tourism strategy in Josephine County. She
evinced her enthusiasm for a tourism in something of a prescient manner. Interviewed
in late March, 1987, before the Steering Committee had concluded its public outreach
effort, she was asked how she thought the strategy selection process would turn out.
The Mail Tribune (March 22, 1987) reported "Reyneke says she is certain what
Josephine County's choice will be." According to the newspaper, Reyneke said, "It
[the strategy] will surely come out tourism." Seen within the context of Mayor
Reyneke's relationship with Governor Goldschmidt, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that in endorsing a tourism strategy, Mayor Reyneke was taking her cue
from the Governor.
Tourism was not an inconsequential industry in Josephine County. As Table
VI shows, in 1985, the year closest to 1987 for which figures were available, travel
expenditures in Josephine County totalled just under $35 million, ranking Josephine
County fifteenth among Oregon's thirty-six counties in this category. Taken together,
total travel expenditures for Jackson, Josephine, and Klamath counties exceeded the
total for the three county Central Oregon region by almost 35 percent. Still, there is a
critical difference to be noted between the structure of Central Oregon's and Southern
Oregon's tourism sectors. In contrast, visitors are most attracted to Southern Oregon
by publicly owned natural areas, especially Crater Lake National Park, the Oregon
Caves National Monument and the Rogue River, a favorite spot for rafting enthusiasts,
or periodic artistic events, the principal example being Ashland's Shakespeare
Festival, the annual summer long schedule of theater. The effect has been to define
Southern Oregon's tourism sector primarily in terms of small, territorially diffuse
business enterprises--restaurants, lodging establishments, retail shops, gas stations,
TABLE VI
SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN TOURISM,
TOTAL TRAVEL EXPENDlnJRES AND TRAVEL
GENERATED PAYROLL PER-CAPITA
IN SOUTHERN OREGON
Southern Oregon
.Jackson County
Josephine County
Klamath Counly
Central Oregon
Deschutes County
Oregon
Noles:
% SHARE OFTOTAL
EMPLOYMENT IN
TOURISM 1986
10.3%
10.3%
11.2%
9.7%
11.2%
12.4%
9.6%
TOTAL 1985
TRAVEL
EXPENDI11JRES
$205,350
$113,246
$35,939
$56,165
$152,875
$140,672
$2,519,797
TRAVEL GENERATED
PAYROLL
PER-CAPITA 1985
. $165
$172
$116
. $199
$333
$445
$199
SotD'ce of employment dara: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Palterns
Tourism employment defined as SIC 58 (Eating and Drinking Places) and SIC 70 (Hotel and Lodging Places)
Source of payroll dara: Oregon Economic Development Department. nd.
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and outdoor outfitters There was little in Southern Oregon akin to Mount Bachelor
and the other high-value added, territorially concentrated privately owned visitor
facilities affiliated with the Bend area in Deschutes County.
Figures on travel generated payroll per-capita--total travel payroll divided by
population--help convey the essential differences between tourism in Southern Oregon
and Central Oregon. In 1985, Central Oregon's tourism sector generated $333 in
payroll for each resident of the three county area, a figure 67 percent above the
statewide average. For Southern Oregon's more pedestrian tourism sector, the
comparable figure was only $165. For Josephine County, perhaps the least tourism
intensive of the Southern Oregon counties, the figure was only $116, a mere 58
percent of the statewide average.
Southern Oregon's tourism sector was territorially diffuse, fragmented and
composed of low value added enterprises, characteristics unlikely to give rise to strong
industrial elites and a strong sense of industrial cohesion. Indeed, neither Josephine
County or for that matter, the greater Southern Oregon region evinced the sort of
concerted and organized mobilization by business elites that characterized the Central
Oregon Strategy. There existed nothing in Josephine County akin to CORA, the
Central Oregon Recreation Association nor did a local newspaper with strong business
connections forcefully endorse a tourism strategy, again as in the case of the Bend
Bulletin. It was not, in contrast to Central Oregon, a function of locally mobilized
interests. Tourism related businesses played only a subordinate role in lobbying on
behalf of a tourism strategy in Josephine County. More so than anything, the impulse
to Josephine County's consideration oftourism as a Regional Strategy appears to have
been exogenous, being attributable to the role Goldschmidt ally MayorJane Reyneke
played in the strategy selection process.
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Retirement Services: The Endogenous Strategy Drawn by affordable housing
costs and the area's environmental and recreational amenities, Josephine County
experienced a large influx of retirees during the 1970s. The influx continued through
the first half of the 1980s, when a failing local economy led many of working age to
leave in search of work elsewhere. Seniors emerged as the fastest growing component
of Josephine County's population, with those age 65 and over increasing their
numbers by 28 percent between 1980 and 1986. By 1985, 17.6 percent of the
County's population was age 65 or older. The comparable figure for Oregon as a
whole was 13 percent, 11.9 percent for the nation as a whole. The influx of retirees
appears to be the principal reason why Josephine County was one of only four Oregon
counties that experienced a net population ,increase between 1980 and 1986 (Center
for Population Research and Census nd).
As their share of the population increased, the retirees, whose propensity for
voting out of proportion to their numbers is well established, became a force in local
politics. By Jane Reyneke's (February 8, 1990) own admission, her election as mayor
could be seen as an expression of the political influence of Josephine County's
retirees; the former schoolteacher admitted to having been elected largely on the basis
of strong support from the area's senior citizens. Claudell King (February 6, 1990),
the realtor who headed the Grants Pass Chamber of Commerce, depicted her election
as Mayor as a repudiation of the business-centered power structure that had
traditionally governed the city in the period leading up the 1980s. In the Steering
Committees meetings, the retirees weighted in by placing retirement services on the
County's strategy agenda (Kauzlarich February 6, 1990; King February 6, 1990;
McGregor February 8, 1990; Bradbeer February 8,1990; Clark February 7, 1990). By
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retirement services, backers meant using Strategy money to enhance facilities serving
Josephine County's large retirement community.
If Josephine County's retirement community placed retirement services on
the County's Regional Strategies agenda, it's important to note that the support for a
retirement services strategy among this important element of Josephine County's
polity was not monolithic. Take the case of Mayor Reyneke, the retired school teacher
whose election was largely attributable to the votes of the retirees. The extent of her
commitment to a tourism strategy needs little elaboration. According to Michael
Clark of Senior Views (February 7, 1990), an seniors' advO(~acy organization, Mayor
Reyneke actively sought to enlist retiree support for a tourism strategy and that her
efforts were, in many cases, favorably received. Mr. Clark cited two factors in
explaining the basis of tourism's appeal to the retirees. First, many of the retirees had
moved to Josephine County to take advantage ofthe area's natural and recreational
amenities. The retiree community appears to have been attracted to a tourism strategy
because they viewed the projects likely to arise from a tourism strategy as likely to
enhance these amenities. Second, the retirees appear to have cast tourism as a
prospectively unobtrusive strategy, one dependent upon transitory visitors unlikely to
burden the them with increased public service costs.
Secondary Wood Products: The Establishment Strategy Josephine County's
Steering Committee also came to consider secondary wood products as a strategy
option. Secondary wood products referred to the fabrication of products ranging from
industrial pallets to structural housing members to window moldings, doors, and
furniture. The position secondary .wood products came to occupy in the Steering
Committee's deliberations was an outgrowth of a 1986 target industry study
conducted by the Pacific Power and Light Company. The study concluded that
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promoting development of a secondary wood products sector could help add value to
the primary wood stock products turned out by local mills (Pacific Power and Light
Company 1986).
Among the three Strategy options, secondary wood products appears to have
been the one most favored by Josephine County's traditional business establishment.
It was favored, for example, by Joe Kauzlarich (February 6, 1990), the PP&L official
who sat on the Steering Committee, perhaps unsurprisingly given the origins of this
strategy idea, and Claudell King (February 6, 1990), the Chamber of Commerce
President who sat on the Steering Committee as well as by JEDA's Steering
Committee representative, Art Jackson. Corky Leister (February 6, 1990), JEDA's
Executive Director, explained why secondary wood products was popular with
Josephine County's' business establishment. It saw secondary wood products strategy
as consistent with the area's long mill working tradition. Leister made this point
himself when he testified at a hearing the Josephine County Commissioners held in
October, 1987. Testifying on behalf of a secondary wood products strategy, Leister
argued that with "no port, research facilities, or major population center, [Josephine
County] doesn't have any innate attraction for other industry", (Mail Tribune October
28, 1987). If Josephine County's business establishment favored secondary wood
products, however, is seems to have lacked the capacity to transform its policy
preferences into authoritative decisions. Claudell King, the Grants pass realtor and
Chamber of Commerce head sought to make this point when he described a local
business establishment whose traditional role as a leader in local affairs had been
eroded by decline in the mill sector, its inability to resuscitate the local economy
battered by six years of recession through traditional means and changed
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demographics, specifically the infusion of retirees. King pointed to the election of
Mayor Reyneke as one sign of di~nished business sector influence.3
Indecision When interviewed, Bruce McGregor (February 8, 1990), the
Josephine County Board of Commissioners Chairman and Steering Committee
member described the Committee's deliberations as having comprised an exercise in
finding "something everyone could agree on." The Committee's deliberations were
universally depicted as a wholly political exercise aimed at reconciling the aims of the
various strategy option proponents. But with a polity divided over strategy choice,
weak technical capacity for economic development planning, a business establishment
whose capacity for leadership had been badly eroded and, Mayor Reyneke aside, a
political leadership reluctant to assume a leadership positio~, cloture proved evasive.
The Klamath Falls Herald and News made this point in its September 18, 1987 edition
when it reported, fully six months after strategy selection began, that "Josephine
County has not selected a prime topic but is investigating retirement, secondary wood
products and tourism as strategies." Josephine County would not fmally resolve its
efforts to select a Regional Strategy until November, 1987, a full eight months after it
had initiated its strategy effort, and only after Governor Goldschmidt had issues a
threat to veto any Strategy in Southern Oregon that did not stress tourism, as shall be
seen.
Jackson County: Strategy by Consensus
Jackson County shares many similarities with Josephine County. The two
counties share the Rogue'River Valley. Like Josephine County, Jackson County was
one of only four Oregon counties to experience net population increase between 1980
and 1986. Most of the Jackson County's population growth during this period was, as
in Josephine County, attributable to retirees. Between 1980 and 1986, the number of
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Jackson County residents age 65 or over expanded to 20,720 from 7,168, an increase
of 189 percent. This compares to an overall addition to the County's population of
5,944 during this period, equivalent to an increase of 4.5 percent. At 14.9 percent, the
share of Jackson County's population age 65 and older in 1985 was above the
comparable figures for both the state (13%) and nation (11.9%) as a whole, if below
the Josephine County figure (17.6%) (Center for Population Research and Census nd).
As in Josephine County, the demographic changes experienced by Jackson'
County in the period leading up to 1987 were described as having contributed to a
realignment in local politics (Shelby February 5, 1990; Ford February 6, 1990; Shaff
February 7,1990). One sign was the election of Jeff Golden to the Jackson County
Board of County Commissioners. The Harvard educated environmentalist and former
Ashland City Councilman was elected to the County Commission with strong senior
citizen support in the same November, 1986 election that installed Neil Goldschmidt
as Oregon's Governor. Golden's election was described as having shaken up a
County Commission long dominated by minions of the region's timber interests.
As with Josephine County, the Jackson County's economy has
traditionally been rooted in loggirig and mill.working. Wood products remained the
largest single employer in Jackson County in 1987. Still, wood products accounted
for a significantly smaller share of total County employment than in Josephine
County. The former was in fact significantly more economically diversified than the
latter (Oregon Employment Division 1987). Trade, the manufacturing of
transportation equipment, particularly boats and prefabricated housing, business and
fmancial services, and warehousing and transportation all played significantly larger
roles in Jackson County than in Josephine County. So did the cultivation of
vegetables and fruits, which provided stock for the County's young but growing
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vintner industry. Education also played a significant role in the Jackson County
economy; Ashland was home to the four year Southern Oregon State College.
Tourism was also important in Jackson County. The County ranked eighth
among Oregon's thirty-six counties in terms oftota! travel expenditures in 1985 (EDD
1985). According to the Medford/Jackson County Visitors and Convention Bureau,
Jackson County's most popular visitor attraction was Crater Lake National Park.
Actually, the park is situated not in Jackson County but within neighboring Klamath
County. However, Jackson County offers the principal entrance to the Park from
Interstate-5, the west coast's main north-south highway corridor, leading the
Medford/Jackson County Visitors and Convention Bureau to herald the County as the
"Gateway" to Crater Lake. As in Josephine County, Jackson County's tourism
industry was composed primarily of small, low value added, territorially diffused
establishments. Table VI help make this point At $172, Jackson County's travel
generated payroll per-capita was, while greater than the figure for Josephine County,
lower than the statewide average and, instructively, only 39 percent of the Deschutes
County figure. There was something of a concentrated component to Jackson
County's tourism sector revolving around Ashland's Shakespeare Festival, the
summer.:.long theater event. But this was a seasonal event falling far short of the high
value added, capital intensive attractions associated with the Bend area.
Jackson County was larger than Josephine County. Home to almost 140,000
in 1987, Jackson County was over twice as populous as Josephine County, with just
under 62,000 residents. Jackson County's population was also much more territorially
and jurisdictionally diffuse than Josephine County's. In 1987, there were eleven
incorporated communities in Jackson County. Medford, the largest with 44,000
residents, accounted for about for about 31 percent of Jackson County's total
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population and was home to 2.7 times as many people as Ashland, Jackson County's
next most populous city. In contrast,Josephine County contained only two
incorporated communities. At 16,200, the population of Grants Pass, the county seat,
exceeded the population of Cave Junction (1,175), located to the west, by almost 13
times (Center for Population Research and Census 1988). These differences may
explain the somewhat different outcome that emerged from a strategy identification
effort in Jackson County that was otherwise not markedly different from that
undertaken in Josephine County.
Access and Participation Planningfor implementation of Regional Strategies
in Jackson County began with the February, 1987 meeting hosted in Salem by
Governor Goldschmidt. Representing Jackson County at the meeting was Lynn
Newbry. A senior Vice-President of the Medford Corporation, one of Southern
Oregon's largest wood products concerns and President of JCEDC, the Jackson
County Economic Development Council, Newbry was a highly respected leader of
Jackson County's business community. He was also a longtime Republican party
loyalist and former Republican state legislator who had headed Vic Atiyeh's
successful 1979 gubernatorial campaign and subsequently, served as Governor
Atiyeh's first Executive Department Director. Yet, Oregon's 1987 gubernatorial
election saw Newbry depart from his traditional Republican allegiance and endorse
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Neil Goldschmidt (Oregonian September 16,
1986).
Returning to Medford from the meeting at which Governor Goldschmidt
moved to inaugurate Southern Oregon's Regional Strategy, Mr. Newbry met with the
Jackson County Board of County Commissioners. Subsequently, a decision was made
to appoint a twelve member body and make it responsible for overseeing selection of
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Jackson County's target industry. This body ultimately came to be known as the
Jackson County Regional Economic Development Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC). At the time Governor Goldschmidt moved to initiate planning for Southern
Oregon's Regional Strategies, primary responsibility for local economic development
activities in Jackson County lay with JCEDC, the local economic development
council. Acknowledging this, the Jackson County Commissioners asked JCEDC, of
which Newbry. was President, to oversee the Strategy effort. According to Liz Shelby
(February 5, 1990), the JCEDC Executive Director at the time who therefore worked
closely with Newbry, the decision to appoint the TAC was a product of bitter
controversy which ranged over efforts to recruit a pulp mill to Medford. This was the
Westbrook Wood Products mill described earlier. JCEDC's efforts to recruit the mill
to Medford had evoked opposition from several quarters, most notably among the
area's tourism related interests, environmentalist constituency and, unsurprisingly
perhaps, senior citizens who, due to their age, were especially prone to respiratory
disease (Shaff February 7, 1990). According to Shelby, JCEDC President Newbry
seized upon appointment of a broadly representative TAC as a means of offering pulp
mill critics an interest in local economic development planning activities and in doing
so, perhaps defusing, diverting, or otherwise expunging their criticism of JCEDC's
role in the pulp mill controversy.
The TAC held its fIrst meeting in April, 1987. The twelve member 'panel
included representatives from a broad spectrum of Jackson County's polity. Instead of
having but a single chair-person, the TAC had two co-chairs. According to the
September 27, 1987 edition of the Mail Tribune, the TAC convened "more than 60
meetings in communities throughout the county and put in more than 1,000 hours of
work." The TAC meetings appear to. have been well attended and offered widespread
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access to the strategy selection process and to have opened up the County's Strategy
deliberations to a broad range of participants. One indicator of this is suggested in the
diversity that characterized the list of potential strategies considered by the TAC.
These ranged from promoting tourism, small business development, retirement
services and air-shed improvement to secondary wood products manufacturing,
enhancing the area's educational facilities and helping to develop the area's wine
industry.
The Festival Proposal: The Status Quo Embellished The TAC released its
Strategy proposal in September, 1987. Entitled "Jackson County-A Festival Strategy:
A Regional Strategy For the Oregon Comeback With Events, Products, and People,"
the proposal can best be described as a plan for organizing a series of symposiums to
be held in conjunction with some of the artistic and industrial trade festivals hosted
each year in Jackson County. The proposal was largely devoid of specifics; its
architects envisaged it as a blueprint, to be defined further. To lend some sense of
how the Festival arrangement might work in practice, an example was provided. This
example cited the symposium officials at Southern Oregon State College, located in
Ashland, had organized in conjunction with the preceding year's Shakespeare Festival.
The symposium is reputed to have attracted teachers and scholars from around the
nation to Jackson County. By organizing other festiVal/symposiums along similar
lines--a symposium on viniculture research and development in conjunction with the
County's Wine Festivals, to cite another example contained in the proposal--the TAC
envisioned the Festival Strategy as a vehicle for show casing the area to visitors,
perhaps attracting investment and entrepreneurial talent to Jackson County.
Two featUres of the Festival proposal are particularly instructive. First, the
clear intent of the Festival proposal architects was to.avoid favoring any particular
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faction of Josephine County's polity. TheTAC acknowledged this in the Festival
proposal, writing:
Five sectors of the economy--agriculture, education/human
development, health care/retirement, timber/wood products, tourism, and
manufacturing--are ofequal importance to the health· and vitality of
Jackson County. The TAC believes all should be given equal
consideration in the economic development strategy under the unifying
Festivals theme (Technical Advisory Committee 1987).
In concluding that there were five sectors of equal importance to the Jackson
County economy, the TAC appears to have consulted information from a variety of
sources in its deliberations. Included were economic and industrial statistics provided
by EDD,'the state Employment Division, Portland State University's Center for
Population Research and Census and the U.S. Census Bureau (Wehinger February 6,
1990; Densmore FebruarY 7, 1990). Still it is clear that the TAC's strategy decision
had less to do with empirical analysis than with the need to reach consensus amongst
the diverse interests involved in the strategy process. For as the TAC itself essentially
admitted, in choosing to target five economic sectors, the TAC essentially aimed to
perpetuate, through the Festival proposal, Jackson County's existing industrial
structure. Given the difficulties that had beset Jackson County's economy in the
period leading up to 1987, maintenance of the status quo was an unlikely avenue to
economic renewal.
As regards the Festival proposal, the second important feature was the TAC's
acknowledgement of Governor Goldschmidt's predilection for tourism Strategies. In
fact, the TAC viewed the Festival proposal as consistent with the Governor's
preference, so much so that the November 3, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail
Tribune reported that its backers had come to refer to it as "Jackson--A Festival
County, A Tourism Plus Strategy for the Oregon Comeback." Nonetheless, the
proposal's architects did no aim solely to target tourism as the County's target
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industry. This came out in comments made by Patti Bills, Director of the
Medford/Jackson County Visitors and Convention Bureau and reported in the same
November Mail Tribune edition. Characterized in the newspaper as "One of the
County's pronunent tourism promoters," Bills complained that she had been "the lone
voice" in calling upon the TAC to make an explicit commitment to pursuing a tourism
promotion strategy, which the TAC had declined to do.
OVERRIDING LOCAL PREFERENCES
September, 1987 found Josephine County still undecided on exactly what its
strategy would be. Jackson County was "fairly well set on festivals and designation of
the county as Oregon's festival county" (Herald and News September 18, 1987).
Curry County occupies Oregon's so~thwestern-most corner, between Josephine
County and the Pacific Ocean. The September 18, 1987 edition of the Herald and
News reported that Curry County had selected "Fish Enhancement as its top economic
development strategy." As a practical matter, this amounted to a plan to use lottery
dollars to renovate docks that had fallen into disrepair in Brookings, the County's
largest town.
Carrot and Stick Tactics
The latter half of 1987 saw the Goldschmidt Administration make it
increasingly clear that it would countenance no strategy in Southern Oregon that did
not embrace tourism as its focus. So unmistakable was this message that the
November 4, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail Tribune reported that it was "evident"
that any Southern Oregon Strategy that did not target tourism "would be doomed."
Commensurate with its edict that the Southern Oregon counties adopt tourism
strategies, the Goldschmidt Administration made it clear that it intended to see the
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Southern Oregon counties implement their tourism strategies through a common
multi-county Strategy block. Again, this message was unmistakable, as the November
4, 1987 edition of the Mail Tribune again made clear. The newspaper reported that:
Goldschmidt and state Economic Development Department
officials have made it clear that they will look most favorably on larger,
multi-county regions in deciding on the eventual disbursement of Lottery
revenues.
Also, the last quarter of 1987 saw Goldschmidt Administration officials exert
increasing pressure upon the Southern Oregon counties to accede to a multi-county
tourism forinat as expeditiously as possible. Lise Glancy, the EDD staffer responsible
for overseeing the Southern Oregon Strategy made this point when she was quoted in
the October 23, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail as saying "There comes a point
where participants in the process want to come to closure." The upshot of these
circumstances was the decision, reported in the December 20, 1987, edition of the
Oregonian, that the Southern Oregon counties had "agreed to work as one in
developing a regional tourism development strategy."
The decision by the Southern Oregon counties to acceded to a multi-county
tourism strategy was uniformly attributed to the "carrot and stick" tactics employed by
the Goldschmidt Administration. Perhaps nobody offered a better explanation of why
the Southern Oregon counties agreed to join together in implementing a common
tourism strategy than Curry County Commissioner Rocky McVay. Asked in
December, 1987 why he was agreeing to jettison Curry County's favored fish
enhancement strategy to adjoin Curry County to a multi-county tourism strategy, he
replied "We don't have a lot of choice" (Oregonian December 20,1987).
Commissioner McVay and his fellow Southern Oregon officials believed that any
strategy outcome not resulting in implementation of a multi-county tourism strategy
would, at a minimum, have penalized them in terms of their lottery allocations and
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most probably, been vetoed outright by the governor. This is despite EDD Deputy
Director David Lohman's promise, made during legislative hearings on HB 3011, that
lithe Governor would not be imposing his own ideas of what regions should bell (Joint
Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development February 18, 1987).
Strategy Membership Update
January, 1987 saw Jackson, Josephine and Curry Counties pledged to
implement a multi-county tourism strategy. January, 1987 also saw Klamath County
pledged to implement a multi-county Southern Oregon tourism strategy. Its
participation in the strategy compact proved tenuous, however, as Klamath County
broke with the other counties in April, 1988 to unilaterally implement a strategy of its
own choosing. Lake County has hitherto received little attention. Encompassing an
area of 8,359 square miles, Lake County is Oregon's second largest county. With a
population of only 7,600, it was also Oregon's third least densely populated county in
1986 (Secretary of State 1987-88). Of all the county's involved in the Southern
Oregon Strategy, Lake County appears to have most lacked the capacity for economic
development planning. It appears less to have mounted any indigenous effort to select
a Regional Strategy than to have simply sought to piggy-back upon the strategy efforts
of surrounding counties. This led Lake County to also pledge itself to implementation
of a multi-county tourism strategy in late 1987. As Figure I shows, Lake County's
only contiguous link with the other counties involved in implementing the Southern
Oregon strategy was through Klamath County. Klamath County's April, 1988
departure from the group severed this link. Subsequently, Lake County was joined in
implementing a common strategy with Harney County, its equally sparsely populated
neighboring county to the east
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Initially, officials in Douglas County hoped to use Regional Strategies money
to augment local industrial recruitment efforts. Subsequently, Douglas County
decided to opt for a tourism strategy under Administration pressure (Robertson
February 14, 1990; Gershon February 14, 1990; Graff February 14, 1990). However,
Douglas County wanted to implement its tourism strategy not in conjunction with
neighboring counties but alone. This led EDD's Bob Schumaker to rejoin that
Douglas County would have to "prove that its [tourism] plan is different enough [from
the others] to justify receiving separate funding (Oregonian December 20, 1987). It
became clear that the Governor would not accept any Douglas County strategy not
submitted as part of a greater multi-co.unty strategy. Ultimately, Douglas County
agreed to join the other counties in a multi-county tourism strategy compact, although
not until the spring of 1988, after a long but unsuccessful battle with the
Administration.
The Sunset Clause as Determinant of Gubernatorial Behavior
The Goldschmidt Administration believed it would take several successive
rounds of industrial targeting to promote economic ·restructuring in Oregon's less
developed areas. It also viewed the Regional Strategies program as a vehicle for
recruiting support for future electoral aspirations. For these reasons, it had sought
ongoing authorization for Regional Strategies, Lawmakers inserted the Sunset Clause
into HB 3011. Furthermore, the Administration knew of one test it would have to
pass if it were to convince lawmakers to reauthorize Regional Strategies during the
following legislative session. This was to see Regional Strategies implemented
through multi-county regions. Trade and Economic Development Committee head
Wayne Fawbush made this point when he said, during hearings on HB 3011, that he
would consider Regional Strategies a "failure if it were not implemented through
multi-county regions" (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic
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Development February 27, 1987).
The effect of the Sunset Clause was to transform reauthorization of Regional
Strategies into a key Administration priority. Furthermore, the Administration
envisaged implementation of a multi-county strategy in Southern Oregon as a vehicle
for building support for program reauthorization. Governor Goldschmidt
acknowledged these points himself. Appearing in Grants Pass made shortly after he
had granted final approval to the Southern Oregon strategy, the Governor presented
local officials with an oversized check symbolic of the assistance they were to receive
under the aegis of their Regional Strategy, he praised the multi-county Southern
Oregon Strategy effort as an example of "unprecedented cooperation." He went on to
express his "hope that the 1989 legislature would again approve spending Oregon
Lottery proceeds for regional development projects" (Mail Tribune August 23, 1988).
By all indications, the forcefulness with which the Administration acted to ensure
implementation of a multi-county tourism strategy in Southern Oregon was driven by
its desire to see the program reauthorized. For cooperation amongst the Southern
Oregon counties was more cursory than genuine and above all not innate but the
product of gubernatorial intervention.
The No-Seconds Rule as a Limit Upon Gubernatorial Success
January 27, 1988, saw officials from the five counties pledged at the time to
i~plement a multi-county tourism strategy--Jackson, Josephine, Klamath, Curry, and
Lake--meet with staff from the Economic Development Department. They met to
decide how to apportion the $2.08 million in lottery money the Administration had
announced it would make available for implementation of their regional strategy.
Deliberations over the division of the lottery money point to the no-seconds clause as
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a legislatively-enforced constraint upon the Administration's ability to secure a key
industrial policy goal.
The Administration argued for a collective pooling of the region's lottery
allocation. Under this scheme, projects proposed for funding with the region's
strategy money would have been competitively evaluated based upon their "regional
significance"--the promise for promoting development of the region's tourism
industry. This position was consistent with the Administration's goal, articulated by
EDD's David Lohman in opposing the no-seconds clause before the legislature's T&E
Committee--that lottery funded projects be competitively evaluated. However, local
officials favored an arrangement by which the region's strategy allocation would be
divided amongst the counties on a per-capita basis. Each county would then be
responsible for apportioning its respective share among local development projects as
it saw fit (Brown October 30, 1989; Hamilton January 8, 1990; McGregor February 8,
1990; Wyatt February 13, 1990). In the end, it was on a per-capita basis that the
region's strategy allocation was divided.
During legislative hearings on HB 3011, the Administration went on record
as being opposed to per-capita division of Regional Strategies money. The outcome in
Southern Oregon represented a retreat for the Administration, especially when
contrasted to the Central Oregon case, where moves to adopt a per-capita lottery
division scheme were defeated. The key variable explaining these divergent outcomes
appears to be the no-seconds clause, which expressed the legislature's intention of
ensuring a comparatively equal distribution of state lottery money and which, not yet
adopted at the time Central Oregon's project list was composed was law ahnost a year
later when the Southern Oregon officials set out to compile their project lists
(Campbell November 4, 1989; Lohman November 21, 1989; Reiten February 27,
177
1990). In Southern Oregon, the effect of the no-seconds clause was to subordinate
competitive evaluation of strategy proposals, initially a key Administration aim, to
equity as a criteria for allocating state lottery money.
THE PROJECT LIST
Southern Oregon's project list is presented in Table VIT. The list is divided
into five separate components. There is one for each of the counties party to the final
strategy compact, containing the projects they chose to fund with their respective
shares of the region's lottery allocation. The list also contained a regional component,
containing projects collectively sponsored, on which more will be said shortly.
Southern Oregon's project list is long. It contained a total of forty-two
projects, three times the number of projects in Central Oregon's strategy. Therefore,
only certain select projects are referred to in the discussion below, selected because
they demonstrate the limit to the Administration's ability to use the Regional
Strategies arrangement to leverage private sector investment and to overcome the
institutional fragmentation characteristic of Oregon state government.
The Vicissitudes of Private Capital
Changes in the membership of the Southern Oregon Strategy group during
the first half of 1988 resulted in a small increase in the amount of lottery money
available to Southern Oregon for per-capita division, to $2.3 million from the $2.08
million first announced by the Administration. Josephine County's diffused and
fragmented private tourism sector failed to nominate enough projects to exhaust
Josephine County's lottery allocation, however. This created a void into which local
governments stepped. From the heads of local government agencies, Josephine
County's Commissioners collected a list of high priority public works and public
TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
PROJECT NAME
REGIONAL COMPONENT:
LOTTERY OTHERSTATE LOCAL . FEDERAL
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
Regional Tourism Marketing Campaign $740,000 ? $100,000 $840,000
Media buys to advertiseSouthern Oregon's visitor attractions. Managed by Portland frrm of Weiden and Kennedy'over local objections.
Regional Highway Improvements
Scale and timing of improvements. if any, to be detennined by ODOT. Appears to have been a placeholder.
. .
Crater Lake Lodge Renovation $1,800,000 $1,800,000
Renovation of historic lodge in Crater Lake Park. Congressionally funded, renovation would be made regardless of Regional Strategies.
. .
Interactive Video $215,000
T~uch response teleVision screens provide i.nfonnation at user request A favorite project of Governor Goldschmidt.
S2I5,000
Highway Signage
ODOT to install new highway signeage to region's visitor attractions.
Regional Tour Loop Theme $50,000
Funding to retain consultant to develop theme for scenic highway loop.
?
$50,000
Total Regional Component Funding: S1,005,OOO Sloo,Ooo SI,8oo,OOO $2,905,000
-
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continued)
PROJECf NAME
JOSEPHINE COUNTY COMPONENT:
LOTTERY OTHERSTATE LOCAL
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
Grants Pass Third Bridge ? 5500,000
Grants Pass Visitor Center 582,500 5112,000 550,000 . 5244,500
Construction of new visitor center in Grants Pass which Chamber of Commerce will also occupy. U.S. Forest Service paying for
installation of iiltemctive video facilities.
Illinois River Information Center. 575,000
Construction'of visitor center near Oregon Caves National Monument.
550,000 550.000 5175.000
Pamdise Ranch Airport Improvements . 548,000 57,056,000 57,104,000
Was to be used for fencing improvements to county airport abutting mnch. LOCal funds included 57,000.000 to be privately invested by resort
developer. Developer pulled out and lottery money was ultimalely used to pave airport parking 101. .
Josephine County Fairgrounds Master Plan 530,000
Development ofa master plan for renovating Josephine County Fairgrounds.
550,000 580,000
Indian Mary Park Entry Road
Resurfacing of entry road at county park.
519,000 510,000· 529,000
Hog Creek Boat Landing 519,000 58,300 540.700 568.000
Improvements to Rogue River boat landing. 519,000 in lottery money used to install restrooms; 58,3000 in other state assistance was
from State Marine Board for renovation of boat landing dock.
-.....,J
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continued)
PROJECT NAME
LOTTERY OTHER STATE LOCAL
.FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
(Josephine County continued)
Lake Selmac Park Improvements $49.000 $4.500 $70.700
Various improvements to Josephine County parle including renovated restrooms and road paving.
$124.200
Merlin-Rogue River Kiosk $5,140
Construction of kiosk in Josephine County hamlet of Merlin.
Pierce Parle Handicapped Ramp $2,500
Installation of handicapped access ramp at Josephine County parle.
"S500
Sl,ooo
S5,640·
S3.500
Manzanita Kiosk
Local access provided to existing kiosk operated by ODOT. No cost involved.
Lathrop Boat Ramp Improvements $7I.000 S8.ooo $79.000
State Marine Board to install new boat ramp at Josephine County parle. Improvements were already in Marine Board capital improvement plan.
S8,Ol6,840SI00,ooo$7,406,900$179,800$330,140
Lake Selmac Boat Ramp Improvements $96,000 $8,000 $104,000
State Marine Board to install new boat ramp at Josephine County parle. Improvements were already in Marine Board capital improvement plan.
Total Josephine County
Component Funding:
-00
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continued)
PROJECT NAME
JACKSON COUNTY COMPONENT:
LOTIERY OTHERSTATE LOCAL
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
Crater Lake Highay Improvements S2,720,000 S2,100,000
To accelerate construction of improvements already in OOOT capital improvement plan. Federal funds for improving
roadways within Crater Lake Park appropriated by Congress regardless 'of Regional Strategies. .
$4,820,000
Bear Creek Greenway
Construction of linear park.
S124,439 S180,000 S2,259,013 $85,700 $2,649,152
S17,000Gold Hill depot
Renovation of historic train depot in City of Gold Hill.
Clean Air Campaign $200,000 $485,000
Subsidize installation of efficient wood burning stoves in low income households.
$41,300
$300,000
$58,300
$985,000
Exposition Park Improvements S45,000
Improvements to Exposition Hall at County Fairgrounds.
S53,646 S2,6oo
Eagle point Street Landscaping
Landscaping of main street in city of Eagle Point.
$56,000 $32,000 $28,430 $116,430
.Upper Rogue Park $240,000 $393,900 $633,900
Purchase ofadditional land to expand county park. 5185,000 of local funding in form of in-kind, tax deductable private donat
Medford Visitor Information Center 525,000 558,184 $83.184
Construction of "log cabin" visitor center in Medford to which Chamber of Commerce will move offices.
.....
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(conlinued)
PROJECT NAME
LOTTERY OTHERSTATE LOCAL
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
(Jackson CouOly Conlinued)
Brill Feslival Parking $36,000
Resurfacing parking 101 used for music festival in city ofJacksonville.
$3,000 $27,000 $66,000
Ashland Parking $100,000
Expanding parking in cily of Ashland, home of Shakespeare Feslival.
$55,000 $155,000
McKee Bridge Resloralion
Renovalion ofold covered bridge.
$50!000 $55,000 $105,000
$1,681,435
$11,353,401$2,185,700$4,714,962$3,564,546$989,439
Pacific Inslilule of Nalural Sciences $96,000 $90,900 $1,494,535
Expansion of nalural sciences museum localed on campus of Soulhern Oregon Slale College. Stralegy funding provided
only afler inlcession by Oregon's Iwo u.s. Senalors.
Tolal Jackson Counly
Componenl Funding:
00
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continUed)
PROJECT NAME
CURRY COUNTY COMPONENT:
LOTTERY OTHER STATE LOCAL
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
Brooking Right of Way
ODOT grants right of way for use as Chamber ofCommerce parking lot Administrative action, no funding involved.
Reforestation/Fish Rehabilitation
Replant burned state forestland.
Sweet Hall Fairgrounds Improvements
Renovation of Curry County Fairg(ounds exhibit hall.
$50,000
$10,000
$184,000
$87,000 $50,400
$234,000
$147,400
Brookings Chamber of Commerce Parking Lot $5,000
Pave parking lot of Brookings Chamber of Commerce provided right of way by ODOT.
$2,000 $7,000
Port Orford Kiosk
Construction of Kiosk in Port Orford.
Brookings Dock Replacement
Renovate docks in city of Brookings.
Total Curry County Component
Component Funding:
$6,650
$100,000
$171,650 $271,000
$1,350
$50,000
$103,750
$8,000
$150,000
$546,400
-00
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TABLE VII
SOUTHERN OREGON REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
(continued)
LOTTERY OTHER STATE LOCAL FEDERAL TOTAL
PROJECT NAME FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
DOUGLASCOUNTYCOMPONENn
Wildlife Safari $365,000 $1,185,320 $1,550,320
Improvements to Wildlife Safari located outside of Roseburg.
Reedsport Sewer Replacement $152,41S . $S2,OOO $100,000 $304,415
Replace sections of sewer system in city ofReedsport
South Umpqua Historical Museum $50,~ $175,300 $225,300
Improvements to Douglas County historical museum.
Sawyer Rapid Boat Ramp . $35,000 $110,000 $14S,OOO
State Marine Board to install new boat ramp at Josephine County park. Improvements were already in Marine Board capital improvement plan.
$20S,OOO
. $2,430,035$I,S70,620$292,000$567,415
Dean Creek Elk Viewing Area $205,000
Improvements to parking lot at elk viewing area by state department of fish and game.
Total Douglas County
C~mponent Funding:
AGGREGATE STRATEGY FUNDING: $3,063,644 $4,307,346 $13,896,232 $4,08S,700 $2S,25 1,676
Source: Oregon Economic Development Department, nd.
-00
~
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service projects. The Commissioners then brokered amongst themselves a list of those
projects to be funded under the Strategy. Josephine County does not appear to have
been along in encountering a deficit in privately sponsored strategy projects. Similar
circumstances prevailed in Jackson County as well (Golden February 5, 1990; Leister
February 6, 1990; Bartow February 8,1990; McGregor February 8, 1990).
Josephine County Fairgrounds Master Plan is a good example of the type of
projects that emerged from this process. By law, the plan had to be completed before
funds from a local improvement district could be tapped to replace the exhibition hall
roof and make other improvements to the fairgrounds in Grants Pass, which is used for
events such as the Josephine County fair, rodeos, livestock shows, almost all of which
appealed almost wholly to local residents. Cash short officials in Josephine County
had been seeking funds for Master Plan preparation. In Regional Strategies, they
found the funding they were looking for (Bradbeer February 8, 1990). In Jackson
County, this process produced $124,439 in lottery funding to construct the Bear Creek
Greenway recreational trail. The trail was listed at the behest of Medford's municipal
parks department (Korbulic February 6, 1990). In fact, the city had already purchased
property for the Greenway and had intended. to pay most of the cost of trail
construction itself through a bond issue. Lottery money allowed the Parks Department
to install additional improvements.4
Jackson County's air quality campaign points to another example of lottery
. money being used to meet local public service goals. Officials in Jackson County
were under order by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality to reduce
particulate counts in the local air-shed. Towards this end, local officials planned a
program to replace inefficient wood burning stoves used by many of the county's low
income residents with more efficient models. Wood Stove replacement had been
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under way since 1986, paid for mainly with CDBG and other funds, which were
running out. According to Gary Shaff (February 7, 1990), a local air quality planner,
Jackson County officials saw Regional Strategies as a way of augmenting the CDBG
funds and bringing the air-shed into air quality compliance.
. The Paradise Ranch project is of special interest. It not only shows lottery
money being used to augment local public works projects. More instructively, it
highlights the fact that success in promoting economic transformation in Southern
Oregon was contingent upon the vicissitudes of private market capital flows, upon
which Goldschmidt Administration officials had little control and consequently, it
demonstrates the limits to which public money could be used to induce private
investment. Local officials sought to use Regional Strategies money to leverage West
German investment in a plan to tum the dude ranch, located north of Grants Pass,
into a major destination resort replete with an 18 hole golf course:
Because of the short term investment of $7,006,900 and the long
term commitment of an additional $18,023,100 it is extremely important
to the developers that the surrounding and pervading ambience reflect
the high quality and luxuriances of the resort itself. Therefore, highway
access improvements, to include a scenic corridor and airport access
improvements, security fencing and additional airport parking facilities
have been identified as high priority projects. The $250,000 ODOT and
$48,000 [lottery] funds present a tremendous leveraging opportunity that
will ensure. investors are favorably convinced to see the project through
(EDD nd b).
Subsequent to approval of Southern Oregon's strategy, the West German
investors withdrew their Ranch expansion plans. The reasons are not entirely clear,
but were apparently related to financing problems and other business commitments.
According to Bruce Bartow (February 8, 1990), the County's Planning Director, EDD
subsequently permitted the County to use the lottery money to pave the airport's
parking lot, maintenance of which had been severely curtailed during the preceding
years of economic crisis.
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Overcoming Institutional Barriers
The project list's regional component was created to encompass two projects,
regional tourism marketing, and highway improvements. In each case, goal
attainment required that barriers to institutional cohesion be overcome. The
discretionary authority the Administration possessed under Regional Strategies over
lottery spending enabled it to circumvent institutional barriers and boost funding for
and centralize control over tourism marketing activities. In the case of the highway
improvements, which was not contingent upon lottery funding but instead upon
funding from the state's highly autonomous transportation department, the Regional
Strategies arrangement proved less efficacious.
Selling Oregon in a New Way The impulse for funding a regional tourism
marketing campaign under the Southern Oregon strategy arose with the Goldschmidt
Administration. The projects prime proponent was Debbie Kennedy, who assumed
office as the new head of EDD's tourism marketing division in August, 1987. Earlier,
Kennedy had managed apparel marketing for the Canadian operations of Nike Inc.,
where she had earned a reputation as an aggressive marketing strategist. Introduced as
EDD's new tourism chief at a press conference, she anno~nced plans to remake the
"Tourism Division as the marketing department of the state. Joining Kennedy at the
news conference was her boss, EDD Director Dick Reiten. He echoed her remarks,
announcing "We're going to sell Oregon in a new way (Oregonian August 19, 1987).
The EDD officials clearly had a gubernatorial mandate to establish EDD as a vehicle
for "selling Oregon.." The fonner head of the Portland office of the business
consulting finn Anderson and Company who, Reiten had only recently been appointed
EDD Director by Governor Goldschmidt. Perhaps more telling, Kennedy appears to
have been personally picked for the EDD role by Governor Goldschmidt. He was
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familiar with Kennedy's work since, prior to running for the Governor's office, he had
worked as a Nike executive, where he had been Kennedy's boss.
Upon joining EDD, Debbie Kennedy inherited a tourism division budget of
$4.5 million. This was up almost $2 million from the preceding 1985-87 biennium
(Executive Department 1987). The Administration apparently did not view this sum
as sufficient, for Kennedy went to great lengths to seek out other funding sources. For
example, in late 1987, Kennedy proposed selling advertising in the state's official
travel guide to raise an additional $500,000 for EDD's tourism marketing activities
(Oregonian November 5, 1987). While it's unclear exactly what became of
Kennedy's proposal to sell advertising in the state's official travel guide, it is clear that
the Goldschmidt Administration embraced the expansion of state tourism marketing
efforts as a key goal and was actively seeking to secure funding for this purpose.
When the Southern Oregon officials first agreed to endorse a regional tourism
marketing campaign as part of their Strategy, they believed that they themselves
would be responsible for its administration. In particular, they believed that they
would themselves select an advertising agency to manage the marketing campaign.
They intended to select a local concern. However in early June, 1987, not long before
the Strategy was finalized, the Goldschmidt Administration announced that it would
require the Portland advertising firm of Wieden and Kennedy (no relation to Debbie
Kennedy) to develop and manage media buys for the Southern Oregon campaign. The
Administration defended its decision to have Weiden and Kennedy manage Southern
Oregon's tourism marketing in terms of the need to ensure consistency in Oregon's
tourism marketing activities (Medford Mail Tribune June 6, 1988; Wyatt February'l3,
1990). Earlier, in November, 1987, EDD had given the firm exclusive responsibility
for developing and managing media buys for EDD's own mainstay tourism marketing
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initiatives.5 The Administration wanted to ensure that marketing materials developed
under the terms of the Southern Oregon Strategy were consistent with the materials
Weiden and Kennedy developed for BDD's mainstream effort.
The announcement that Weiden and Kennedy would direct Southern
Oregon's tourism marketing campaign evoked sharp protest. One of the most
vociferous critics was Patti Bills, director of the Greater Medford Visitors and
Conventions. The Mail Tribune (June 6, 1988) quoted Bills as saying "We would like
to make our own decisions and not have a Portland agency shoved down our throats. "
"County Commissioners from Jackson, Josephine, and Curry Counties met in Grants
Pass and passed a resolution supporting local autonomy in choosing an ad agency. A
copy of the resolution was sent to Governor Goldschmidt" (Mail Tribune June 6,
1988). In the event, these protests proved to be of no avail. Portland's Weiden and
Kennedy did indeed wind up overseeing development and media buys for the
Southern Oregon Strategy's tourism marketing campaign.
The tourism marketing campaign again shows the Administration using the
extraordinary authority it possessed under the Regional Strategies program to impose
its own policy preferences on local officials. The Administration secured two key
goals in doing so. It boosted by $740,000 the amount of money available to the
Administration for "selling Oregon" and, by making Weiden and Kennedy responsible
for administering Southern Oregon Strategy's tourism marketing activities, centralized
Oregon's economic development marketing efforts.
The Personalization of Regional Strategies The Goldschmidt Administration
envisaged Regional Strategies as a vehicle for coordinating Oregon's state government
agencies. Regional Strategies did prove efficacious in getting ODOT officials to grant
Josephine County access to a highway kiosk and in the Curry County land transfer.
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But according to ODOT administrator Jim Gix (February 14, 1990), these were
relatively minor administrative matters involving neither capital improvement
planning nor the expenditure of ODOT's fiscal resources, and so were easily
accommodated.6 Regional Strategies proved less efficacious when it came to more
substantive highway projects, as is shown by Southern Oregon's failure to use
Regional Strategies to secure improvements to Highway 140, the region's major east-
west route.
Southern Oregon had for several years been attempting to secure
improvements to Highway 140. Late 1987 found Southern Oregon seeking to secure
these improvements by having Highway 140 listed under the Access Oregon
Highways (AOH) program which, to recall, funded improvements from state gas tax
surcharge revenues. The region valued the highway improvements highly, as a report
in the February 24, 1988 edition of the Mail Tribune noted:
Southern Oregon's Highway 140 east-west route should be added to
the list of "Access Oregon" projects included in the state's preliminary
six-year highway improvement program, according to representatives of
the five Southern Oregon counties. The east-west highway corridor
stretches from Lake County in the east to Curry County at the coast. It
was given the "highest regional priority" in a recommendations to the
state Department of Transportation adopted Tuesday by the region's
representatives.
The five counties--Josephine, Jackson, Curry, Lake, and Klamath, all of which were
served by the Highway 140 corridor and which had, in January, 1988, agreed to join in
implementing a common tourism strategy. Subsequently, they decided to follow
Central Oregon's example and petition AOH listing of Highway 140 under the terms
of their Regional Strategy. The question of using Regional Strategies to secure AOH
listing of Highway 140 arose in a meeting between officials from the Southern Oregon
counties, EDD and Jim Gix, manager of the transportation department's Southern
Oregon region office. Recall how Administration attempts to subordinate the
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Commission to Gubernatorial authority had been defeated by the legislature. Funded
largely through dedicated gas tax receipts and presided over by the quasi-independent
Transportation Commission, ODOT was one of the most autonomous of Oregon's
state government agencies. The local officials were told that ODOT did not view
Highway 140 of sufficient importance to \yarrant AOH designation and therefore,
Regional Strategies was unlikely to produce AOH listing for Highway 140. Instead,
were told that regardless of whether or not Highway 140 received Strategy listing,
requests for AOH listing of the 140 corridor would nonetheless have to work its way
through the agency's well institutionalized six year capital programming process
(Bartow February 8, 1990; McGregor February 8, 1990; Gix October 9, 1990).
Regional Strategies does not in fact appear to have proved efficacious in securing
Southern Oregon's highway improvements. For as Table VII shows, AOH listing for
Highway 140, mentioned only six months earlier as the "highest regional priority."
received no mention in the final Southern Oregon Strategy. Although the Southern
Oregon strategy contained no explicit reference to granting AOH status for Highway
140, the Strategy did request outright other, unidentified, highway improvements.
Local officials later cited this provision of their Strategy when lobbying ODOT, again
unsuccessfully, for AOH listing of Highway 140. Exactly how this provision came to
be included in the Southern Oregon Strategy is unclear. It has not resulted in AOH
listing of Highway 140, however. As late as January, 1991, by which time
construction of Central Oregon's highway improvements was well underway,
Highway 140 had still not been incorporated into OOOT's AOH listing.
In seeking to use Regional Strategies to secure construction of its sought after
highway improvements, Southern Oregon was following in the footsteps of Central
Oregon. Yet, where Central Oregon succeeded, Southern Oregon failed. One factor
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that appears to explain these divergent outcomes is the extent of involvement by the
state'5 transportation commissioners. Transportation Commission membership is
divided along regional lines. Mike Hollern, Central Oregon's transportation
commissioner, Transportation Commission head and close Goldschmidt associate
personally intervened to secure the Centra! Oregon improvements. There is little
evidence of similar mobilization by Southern Oregon's transportation commissioner,
Cynthia Ford. This may have been due to her preoccupation with the newly
established Pacific Institute of Natural Science (PINS), affiliated with the Southern
Oregon State College in Ashland. A college official, Ford was responsible for
overseeing PINS fund raising. One way she sought to raise money was to seek lottery
funding under Regional Strategies. This consumed a lot of Ford's energy. For
reasons unclear, the Goldschmidt Administration opposed lottery funding for PINS
(Ford February 6, 1990; Wyatt Interview February 13, 1990). It was only after Ford
elicited the help of Oregon's two U.S. Senators, Mark O. Hatfield, after whom a PINS
facility was named, and Bob Backwood, who in a letter dated May 13, 1988,
supported "this important project for Oregon and for the nation" (Letter to Dr. Ron
Lamb from Senator Bob Packwood dated May 13, 1988), that the Administration
relented and allowed the PINS request to be inserted into Southern Oregon's strategy.
As a corollary, PINS points to a strategy project which clearly came to be funded nit
as a matter of objective analysis but due to the personal intervention of two of
Oregon's most powerful politicians.
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SUMMARY
Implementation of Regional Strategies in Southern Oregon saw the
Goldschmidt Administration override local preferences in a region afflicted with
centrifugal forces and weak in local planning capacity to implement a multi-county
tourism strategy. In the absence a private tourism sector capable of sponsoring
strategy projects, local governments capture lottery money for' use in funding local
public works and public service projects. While in the regional marketing campaign,
the Administration succeeded in consolidating control over tourism marketing and
boosting funding for tourism marketing, the Administration proved less successful
when dealing with OnOT, an autonomous'agency. The failure of the Paradise Ranch
project to materialize points to the limitations of the Regional Strategies arrangement
to overcome the vicissitudes and induce private capital investment.
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NOTES
1. That so many counties were involved in implementing the Southern
Oregon strategy and undertook their Strategy activities largely exclusive of each other
made presenting an analysis of the Southern Oregon Strategy a significantly more
complex task than that posed in Central Oregon. To best capture the complexities of
the Southern Oregon Strategy within a manageable framework, I have focused my
attention upon the two counties at the core of the Southern Oregon Strategy effort--
Jackson and Josephine Counties. The other counties involved in the Southern Oregon
Strategy are brought into the discussion only occasionally, mainly to add emphasis to
points made within the context of the Jackson and Jefferson County strategy
experiences. Little of substance is lost with this approach since, for the most part, the
dynamics of the Strategy process in those counties which are not the center of
attention here differed little from those upon which attention is focused.
2. Goldschmidt may also have entwined the Strategy process with Mayor
Reyneke's personal political ambitions. According to Mayor Reyneke (February 8,
1990), Goldschmidt also encouraged her to seek higher office. His recommendation
played a key role in her decision, announced in 1988, as Josephine County's strategy
effort was winding down, to run for a seat in the state House of Representatives.
Mayor Reyneke's bid for a seat in the Oregon House of Representatives proved
unsuccessful. She attributed her failure to her decision to switch parties.,
3. The nomination of secondary wood productS as a strategy option in
Josephine County raised the question of what role local mill work and logging
interests played in the strategy selection process. This issue was addressed with Mike
Burrill (February 7, 1990), President of Burrill Lumber, perhaps Southern Oregon's
largest independent manufacturer of primary processed lumber products. According
to Burrill, Oregon's wood products producers saw little reason to involve themselves
in Regional Strategies. As Burrill explained it, Oregon's mill owners and logging
interests have traditionally targeted their political interventions not at the statehouse
but at the federal government. The reason can be appreciated in noting that together,
the U.S. Forest Service and U.S. Bureau of Land Management control over half of the
state's total land area (Secretary of State 1986-87). Much of this is land from which
the timber supply that feeds Oregon's mill works is drawn. In contrast, state forests
provide only a small share of harvested timber.
Also, it is construction activity, especially housing, which consumes most of
the mill's production. Housing construction is highly sensitive to interest rates which
are largely determined by federal policy action. Again then, the fortunes of logging
and mill working interests appears to have been primarily dependent upon federal
policy and, not unimportantly, how federal policy influences exogenous markets, not
upon the state apparatus and state policy choices.
Apart from their long standing dependence upon federal timber supplies,
Oregon's mill work and logging interests faced a particularly urgent issue during the
winter of 1986-87. Environmentalists had inaugurated a campaign to have the
Northern Spotted Owl designated an endangered species by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service. Designation would have necessitated creation of protective habitats which
would curtail logging of the state's diminishing supply of old growth forest. Loggers
and mill owners saw this as a direct threat to their interests, one demanding that their
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political resources be focused upon influencing federal action and not state
development initiatives. In sum, the absence of Oregon's mill works and logging
interests from Regional Strategies activities appears to have been largely explained by
the fact that their fortunes were largely determined by an exogenous federal
bureaucracy and hence, saw little reason to expend scarce political capital on a state
initiative in which they recognized little prospective benefit.
4. The balance of the cost for constructing the trail was to be paid for by
AT&T, in return for rights to install fiber optic cables underneath, a contribution
which was recorded as the private sector contribution to this project (EDD nd c).
5. Discussion in this section highlights something of a Nike connection
running through the Goldschmidt Administration. Governor Goldschmidt himself
worked for Nike prior to running for Governor. So did EDD's Debbie Kennedy.
Weiden and Kennedy, chosen to manage Oregon's tourism marketing campaign,
handled Nike's advertising.
6. Evidence relating to the efficacy of Regional Strategies in bringing other
projects petitioned from ODOT is largely inconclusive. For example, Jackson
County's Crater Lake Highway improvements had been listed at the behest of local
officials who feared that these improvements would be delayed beyond 1988, when
their construction was originally scheduled in ODOT's six year plan. As it happened,
there was no delay in the construction of these improvements. But ODOT's Jim Gix
(February 14, 1990) claimed this had little to do with Regional Strategies and was
instead attributable to the availability of necessary funding. In fact, Gix suggested that
EDD may have urged inclusion of the Crater Lake improvements in the strategy
knowing that they would indeed be initiated on time so as to give the appearance that
they were attributable to Regional Strategies.
CHAPTER VIII
IMPLEMENTING REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN KLAMATH COUNTY
Recall from the preceding chapter that Klamath County was for some time
involved in the Southern Oregon Regional Strategy but ultimately departed to pursue
its own unilateral strategy. The circumstances under which Klamath County did so
warrant an in-depth analysis in their own right, apart from the references to Klamath
County contained in the preceding chapter.
Discussion in this chapter point to limitations upon the Goldschmidt
Administration's ability to wield the discretionary authority it enjoyed over state
lottery spending to secure key industrial policy goals. In Klamath County, a powerful
growth coalition captured control of the Regional Strategies implementation process.
The coalition aimed to use the Regional Strategies program as a vehicle for pursuing
an economic development agenda revolving around construction of a controversial
power dam and in contravention of the Goldschmidt Administration's prefef.ence for
joining Klamath County to the larger multi-county tourism strategy. In the end,
Klamath County's Regional Strategy embodied not the Administration's goals but
those of the local growth coalition. Local success in defying gubernatorial authority
was attributable to the capacity advantages coalition forces possessed for planning and
mobilizing for economic development which allowed it to dominate other factions of
the local polity and the coalition's fiscal independence from state revenues.
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ECONOMIC CRISIS IN KLAMATH COUNTY
Klamath County occupies a large basin on the eastern edge of the Cascade
Mountains in Southern Oregon (Figure I). The Mountains cast a rain shadow on the
basin making Klamath County much more arid than, for example, Jackson and
Josephine Counties to the west. The dry conditions make the area ideal habitat for
Ponderosa Pine trees, one of the more valuable of the timber species harvested in the
Pacific Northwest. Not coincidentally, wood products, as with so much of Oregon,
has traditionally dominated the local Klamath County economy.
As the downturn of the 1980s set in, wood products employment dropped
precipitously in Klamath County, from over 4,900 to 3,000 between 1979 and 1985, a
decline of almost 40 percent (Employment Division 1979; 1985). At the same time,
there were other shocks afflicting the Klamath County economy. Klamath Falls, the
County's largest city, accounting for almost two-thirds of the County's total 1980
population of 58,000, has traditionally served as a communications and transportation
center for much of central and southeastern Oregon (Department of Commerce 1980).
But during the early 1980's, the regional telephone company that succeeded the
breakup of the Bell network decided to transfer its Klamath Falls operations to
Medford while the Southern Pacific Railroad transferred many of its Klamath Falls'
operations to Eugene. Also during this period, the Pentagon decided to close down the
air station at Kingsley Field, located on the outskirts of Klamath Falls. These moves
only cut more jobs out of the local economy.
Klamath County's unemployment rate reached 20 percent during the winter
of 1981-82 and remained well above the statewide average through 1986
(Employment Division 1986). There was a commensurate decline in the County's
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population--by 2500 or 4 percent of the total in just the six years between 1980 and
1986 (Secretary of State 1987-1988)--as people left to search for work elsewhere. So
stilled did the local real estate market become that the County's largest banks
withdrew their realty loan officers to Medford. Recall from an earlier chapter that the
Ministerial Association in Klamath Falls reported that counseling for drug, alcohol,
and child abuse increased tenfold during the first half of the 1980s. Placed in
perspective, the distress Klamath County experienced during this period must have
rivaled any other county in the state.
THE SALT CAVES DAM
The Pacific Power and Light Company (PP&L) first announced plans to
construct the 80 megawatt Salt Caves Dam in February, 1980.1 PP&L planned to
buildthe dam on a stretch of the Klamath River prized for its wild and scenic
attributes, evoking vehement opposition from environmentalists nationwide. Others
questioned the need for a new power dam at a time of regional electricity surplus.
Faced with environmentalist opposition and questions over whether or not there was a
market for the dam's power, PP&L was unable to win licensing for the dam. In 1984,
PP&L announced that it was abandoning its plans to build Salt Caves. It was only
shortly thereafter that the city of Klamath Falls announced plans to pick up the Salt
Caves project where PP&L had left off.
The city decided to build the dam as a remedy to the area's declining
economic fqrtunes. According to city officials, Salt Caves would be a cure for local
economic ills. Power sale revenues would be used to develop industrial parks in
Klamath Falls and to subsidize the relocation of industry to these facilities, creating
jobs and generating tax revenues. City officials also planned to tap power revenues to
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reduce municipal property taxes by as much as 50 percent (Keller January 8, 1990;
Spencer January 8, 1990). With these lofty goals in mind, the city of Klamath Falls
issued $250 million in revenue bonds in May, 1985, the proceeds from which were
placed in a trust account to be drawn upon for use in promoting, planning, and
constructing the dam.
Operation Bootstrap
Prior to assuming the office of President of the Oregon Institute of
Technology in Klamath Falls, Dr. Larry Blake had worked in the North Carolina
community college system, where he been involved in implementing a statewide
economic development initiative. Based upon this experience, Blake had offered to
assist both Neil Goldschmidt and Norma Paulus in fashioning a statewide economic
development strategy during the 1986 gubernatorial campaign. Goldschmidt alone
had responded to this overture, inviting Blake to a~end a retreat held during the
Summer of 1986. According to Blake (January 8, 1990), Goldschmidt largely ignored
his suggestions.2 But Blake was still one of the three local officials Goldschmidt
invited to inaugurate Regional Strategies in Southern Oregon.
Meeting with the Klamath County Board of Commissioners, Blake
recommended that responsibility for identifying the County's Strategy be delegated to
Team Klamath. Team Klamath had been formed in October, 1985 by the Klamath
Falls Chamber of Commerce, and was composed of five local officials: Blake, who
chaired the group, the President of the Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce, the
Klamath Falls City Manager, the chairman of the Klamath County Board of
Commissioners, and the Executive Director of the Klamath County Economic
Development Association, a quasi-public agency that functioned largely as the
industrial promotions arm of Klamath Falls City government. According to the
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Klamath Falls Herald and News (January 29, 1986), the group was supposed to act as
a local economic development coordinating council, defining "the roles and
responsibilities of agencies, organizations and individuals involved in [local]
economic development and funding." But it is instructive to note that all of those
appointed to Team Klamath supported construction of the Salt Caves dam (Plummer
January 12, 1990). As shall be seen, it appears that more than anything, Team
Klamath had been created as a vehicle for mobilizing local support for building Salt
Caves.
It was but a matter of weeks after Team Klamath assumed responsibility for
identifying Klamath County's Regional Strategy that the panel was ready with a
strategy proposal. The proposal was divided into two parts. The first was referred to
as the proposal's "small business" component and listed three projects for which state
ass~stance was requested. The second part of the proposal, the "tourism" component,
listed two projects (Team Klamath 1987c).
The first project listed in the small business component petitioned the
Governor to order all state agencies with regulatory authority over the Salt Caves Dam
to expedite any required licensing review. This request was aimed primarily at the
state's Department of Environmental Quality and Public Utility Commission: both
agencies had expressed reservations over the dam project Second was a venture
capital fund to be used in recruiting new industry to the area. No state money was
requested for the venture capital fund. Instead it was to be fully funded with revenues
from the Salt Caves Dam. Project number three was development of a small business
incubator at an industrial park located next to the OIT campus. For this, $50,000 in
state lottery money was requested. Again, the balance of the incubator costs were to
be paid for by Salt Caves revenues.
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As regards the tourism component's two projects, the fIrst petitioned the
Governor to use the powers of his offIce in expediting review of the application the
City of Klamath Falls had pending before the U.S. Forest Service for development of a
ski complex on Pelican Butte, located about 25 miles north of the city itself.
Development of the Pelican Butte complex was to be paid for with revenues from the
Salt Caves Dam so no lottery money was sought for this purpose. But like the dam,
the Pelican Butte project had proved quite controversial--the Butte's slopes were
considered by many to be ill-suited to such development-- and the Forest Service had
been slow to act on, the City's development application. The second project listed in
the tourism component was a request for $400,000 in lottery money to build a
Welcome Center in the Klamath Falls area.
With the exception of the Welcome Center, all of the projects listed in the
Team Klamath proposal had been drawn from a plan prepared for the City of Klamath
Falls by the prominent Boston consultant Belden Daniels. The plan's purpose was to
guide use of the revenues generated by Salt Caves Dam and Daniels had been paid for
his efforts with arbitrage funds drawn from the interest being earned by the City from
its Salt Caves bond trust fund.3 The Daniel's plan had been entitled "Operation
Bootstrap" and it was as the Bootstrap proposal that this Strategy scheme came to be
known. It would be hard to argue that the main aim of the Bootstrap proposal was to
capture state lottery dollars for local use. Most of the lottery money requested in the
Bootstrap proposal was for building the Welcome Center, which would have been
modeled upon the one planned for Central Oregon. But unlike Central Oregon, where
the Welcome Center was the Strategy centerpiece, it was wholly peripheral to Team
Klamath's proposal. In fact, the Welcome Center appears to have been included in the'
proposal only to make it more palatable to the Governor who, as Team Klamath knew,
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had expressed his preference for regional tourism strategies. As Klamath Falls City
Manager Jim Keller, one of the key architects of the Bootstrap proposal, admitted
(January 8, 1990), Team Klamath would have been willing to forego Klamath
County's entire lottery allocation for the Governor's endorsement of Salt Caves. In
Keller's view, ifthe Governor approved the Bootstrap proposal, he would effectively
be sanctioning construction of the controversial dam. The Bootstrap proposal had but
one purpose: to engender the Governor's endorsement of Salt Caves.
The Salt Caves Opponents
The dismal state of the local economy not withstanding, there were those in
Klamath County who opposed construction ofthe Salt Caves Dam.4 The stretch of
river upon which the City planned to construct the dam was prized by local fisherman
and rafting enthusiasts. Dam construction would end these uses, ensuring strong
opposition to the dam among the area's outdoorsmen and outfitting businesses. As
with Jackson and Josephine Counties, Klamath County had a large retiree population
and many of the retirees fished the river, giving them reason to oppose Salt Caves.
Many of the retirees also feared that growth spawned by constructing the dam would
undermine the amenities that had attracted them to the area in the first place. There
was also opposition to the dam among faculty and staff at OIT. School faculty and
staff were better insulated from the downturn than the County population in general
and like the retirees, feared the impact dam- induced growth might have upon local
amenities. Retirees, OIT faculty and staffers, outdoors-oriented business owners, and
local environmentalists formed the core of local opposition to the Salt Caves Dam.
The Salt Caves opponents do not appear to have been organized in any
formal manner. But if one were searching to identify the leaders of the dam
opposition, they would have to include Roger Hamilton, rancher, environmentalist and
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rafting enthusiast from eastern Klamath County. So staunch an opponent was
Hamilton that back when PP&L had been sponsoring the dam, he had flown to
Washington D.C., at his own expense, to register his objections at licensing hearings
conducted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Hamilton was also an
elected Klamath County Commissioner, and his opposition to the dam placed him at
odds with the rest of the local political establishment, including his two colleagues on
the County Board of Commissioners, Jim Rogers, who, as Board Chairman, sat on
Team Klamath, and Ted Lindow, both of whom supported building the Salt Caves
Dam (Hamilton January 8, 1990; Lindow January 9, 1990).
Operation Bootstrap Repudiated
Since the Bootstrap proposal was largely adopted from the Belden Daniel's
plan, Team Klamath was able to have it ready for presentation to the Governor when
he visited Klamath Falls in early May, 1987. As shall be demonstrated shortly,
Goldschmidt recognized the Bootstrap proposal for what it was--an attempt to warm
his support for Salt Caves.
Like Goldschmidt, Roger Hamilton recognized the Bootstrap proposal as a
vehicle for promoting the Salt Caves. In a letter to the Governor dated May 7, 1987,
he objected to Team Klamath's plans to found Klamath County's Strategy upon the
proposal. Introducing his letter as a "minority report"--a dissent from Team Klamath's
proposal-- Hamilton argued that the Bootstrap proposal did not represent the views of
"a large portion of Klamath County residents." This was his veiled way of protesting
the closed process by which, as we will see, Team Klamath conducted its proceedings.
Less allusively, Hamilton argued that the timeframe implied in constructing a dam, the
centerpiece of the Bootstrap proposal from which revenues to support the other
proposal projects would be drawn, exceeded the time frame targeted for the Regional
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Strategies. Furthermore, he claimed that construction of the dam would destroy
existing rafting and fisheries industries that depended upon the untamed river, harming
the local economy. Last, Hamilton protested that the Bootstrap proposal was
incompatible with the type of multi- county strategy the Governor was known to favor
(Letter to Governor Neil Goldschmidt from Roger Hamilton dated May, 7, 1987).
In correspondence dated July 9, 1987, Goldschmidt responded to Hamilton's
concerns:
I appreciate your providing me with a copy of your "minority"
report on the Klamath County Strategy. As you mayor may not be
aware, I voiced some of the same concerns at an early May meeting.
Specifically, my concerns centered around the fact that the Salt Caves
project and the revenues emanating from it were the "sine qua non" of
the Klamath County Strategy. Given the permit and construction
requirements for the project, all indications are that the project would be
10 years in the making and, therefore, that the revenues and ability to
parlay the revenues for Operation Bootstrap and the Pelican Butte
development would not be available until even further down the line.
As a member of the Klamath County Commission, you have an
opportunity to ensure that these concerns are addressed prior to the
county's adoption of the Strategy, and I encourage you to use this
opportunity. For my part, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy
of your letter to...Lise Glancy in the Economic Development Department
to ensure that the "minority" report receives consideration in the regional
strategy arena (Letter to Commissioner Roger Hamilton from Governor
Neil Goldschmidt dated July, 9, 1987).
Team Klamath withdrew the Bootstrap proposal shortly after Goldschmidt's
letter was mailed. While interviews failed to discern a concrete explanation for the
withdrawal, it appears certain that the proposal's demise was prompted by the
Governor's letter, which can be seen only as repudiating the proposal. This seems
especially clear in light of the fact that later in the summer, Goldschmidt formally
announced his opposition to the Salt Caves dam.
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The Light Industry Proposal
Team Klamath did not wait long to develop a replacement in the wake of the
Bootstrap proposal's demise. As it happened, the replacement, which came to be
known as the Light Industry proposal, was largely complete by July, 1987.
The Light Industry proposal sought state assistance for six projects. First, the
Governor's assistance was sought in getting the Oregon State Board of Higher
Education to fund a Masters of Science program at OIT. Next, $300,000 in lottery
money was requested to establish a small business incubator on land adjacent to the
OIT campus. Third was a request for $270,000 in lottery money for use in an
industrial marketing program. Fourth was a request for $153,000 in lottery money to
establish a user fee customs station--a customs station which, unlike typical customs
facilities which are paid for by the federal government, is paid for by local
authorities--at Kingsley Field, the air station abandoned by the Pentagon. Fifth was a
request for a grant of $1,000,000 from the state's special public works fund, to be used
for making infrastructure improvements to land adjacent to the airfield, where the city
planned to build an industrial park.5 Sixth and last were improvements to Highway
62, which connected Klamath Falls to Interstate 5 at Medford (Team Klamath 1987a).
The Light Industry proposal is an excellent vehicle for examining the
character of the Team Klamath coalition from which it emerged. This being so, it is to
this end that attention now turns.
Institution Building at OIT
The Oregon Institute of Technology is one of the eight colleges and
universities that comprise the Oregon State System of Higher Education. Although
the school grants four year bachelor's degrees in engineering, business and medical
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technology, the school's curriculum is primarily vocational in nature. Most OIT
graduates take two year associate degrees with them, either transferring to another
college or university or more often, directly into professional practice. In fact,
accordingto John Ward (January 9, 1990), OIT Professor of Industrial Management,
more than anything, the school is renowned for graduating a large share of the nation's
land surveyors. orr has never offered graduate level courses.
Clearly, OIT is not the type of"research oriented polytechnic that one might
intuitively associate with its name. One of the objectives of Dr. Larry Blake, OIT's
President, appears to have been to upgrade the school into a four year and graduate
degree granting institution and a major component of Oregon's higher education
system. His strategy for doing so appears to have been based largely upon efforts to
recreate, on a much smaller scale, the type of business-education consortium that had
produced the so- called "Research Triangle" in North Carolina where Blake had
worked before coming to alT.
In 1973, Blake convinced the City of Klamath Falls to construct the College
Industrial Park on land abutting the OITcampus. Blake hoped that the park's
proximity to OIT would attract high technology fIrms. Concomitantly, Blake hoped
that the park's success would help him in his effort to obtain permission and funding
from the Oregon State Board of Higher Education to establish a Masters program at
alT.
The College Industrial Park appeared devoid of major tenants when visited
by the writer in January, 1990. With the fIerce battle which has traditionally raged in
Oregon over the distribution of higher education dollars--this battle was especially
fIerce amid the fiscal crisis of the fIrst half ofthe 1980s--Blake was unsuccessful in
obtaining approval and funding for his graduate program.
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Kingsley Field
Kingsley Field, located just south of the City of Klamath Falls, had been built
as an Army Air Corps base during the Second World War. Subsequently improved, it
was, at the time of this writing, the second longest air strip on the west coast of the
United States. Being located in the rain shadow of the Cascade mountains, Kingsley
Field also records more days of sunshine in an average year than other west coast
airstrips (Business Facilities 1988). Air traffic at Kingsley Field is rarely curtailed on
account of weather. These factors have led to Kinglsey Field being designated as an
alternative landing strip for NASA's Space Shuttles.
Local officials had long sought a plan for commercializing the airfield's
attributes. The closing of the air base injected some urgency into these efforts and by
early 1987, a scheme had emerged under which the city planned to develop Kingsley
field as a air-freight center. Concurrently, land adjacent to the air field would be
developed into an industrial park. It was hoped that this arrangement would transform
the airfield and its environs into a center of light manufacturing and goods
warehousing and distribution.
The Klamath Falls' Chamber of Commerce was a key proponent of the
Kingsley Field plan. The Chamber represented Klamath County's business elites. Its
Board of Directors included Dick Wendt, President of Jel-Wendt Corp., whose
holdings included Southwest Valley Bank, the County's only locally owned bank and
local millworks. Also on the Board was Jim Stillwell, perhaps the County's most
prominent realtor and the owner of much of the land adjacent to the airport that was
slated for industrial park development (Ward January 9, 1990).
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Klamath County's Growth Coalition
It was the Chamber of Commerce which had appointed Team Klamath and
designated OIT's Blake as the panel's chairman. Blake believed that any success he
had in upgrading OIT would enhance the local economy or more to the point, believed
that an upgraded OIT could be the engine that drove local economic restructuring.
Blake's view in this matter and how OIT fit into the Light Industry proposal is perhaps
summed up in the following passage:
[OIT's] facilities will provide the expertise required by companies
locating here. A masters program will allow entry level engineers of
those companies to expand their education, thereby providing an
additional incentive for the company to locate all of its operations in
Klamath County. The Small Business Incubator...to be located
adjacent to OIT...will provide a support environment for starting
companies. Overhead costs are reduced during their initial start-up
period. Locating the incubator next to OIT will allow it to take
advantage of the college's technology library, its computer systems, its
labor force of students for part-time and its professors for consulting
work. Likewise locating there will allow students and professors alike to
start their own high technology businesses in the sheltered environment
(EDD ndc).
The Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce and the other proponents of the
Kingsley Field plan were not oblivious to the fact that their aspirations to turn
Klamath Falls into a manufacturing and distribution center were shared by other
localities up and down the west coast. Many of these communities were similarly
engaged in developing industrial parks with which to lure business. Many of these
other communities had better highway connections than Klamath Falls was ever likely
to have. Klamath Falls was not even alone in being able to tie a retired military
airfield to its industrial development scheme. The city of Sacramento, located only
300 miles to the South, was reputed to be planning a similar arrangement for Maher
Air Force Base, which was also slated for closure by the Pentagon. In the eyes of the
airport plan proponents then, any success Blake might have in upgrading OIT could
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only serve to imbue the area with an advantage relative to these competitors,
increasing the are~'s attraction to the types of firms they hoped to lure to Klamath
Falls:
In evaluating the assets of the Klamath Basin, every recent
technical economic analysis has cited OIT as the major comparative
advantage over similar communities in Oregon and northern California
(EDD ndc).
The convergence of interest that bound the local government, business, and
education elites toget~er behind the Light Industry proposal is as follows. In the
proposal, Blake got to pursue the incubator project which he hoped, in conjunction
with the Masters program he was also seeking, would increase his school's prestige
and revitalize the College industrial park, impressing legislator's to further focus more
of the state's higher education resources upon OIT and fuel local economic
restructuring. At the same time, the Kingsley Field boosters got to petition support for
the customs station, marketing program, infrastructure improvements, and highway
improvements that they saw as necessary to the airfield development project
Then there was the Salt Caves Dam. To recall, all of the Team Klamath
members supported the dam's construction. In fact, the Kinglsey Field scheme was a
spinoff of Salt Caves: the city planned to use revenues made available from Salt Caves
to develop the airfield industrial park and subsidize the recruitment of industries. As
Klamath Falls' City Manager Jim Keller (January 8, 1990) admitted, Team Klamath
saw the Light Industry proposal as a "stepping stone" to Salt Caves.
Capacity Advantage in Klamath County
. The Light Industry proposal also provides some measure of Team Klamath's
capacity for economic development planning. We can see this capacity as being
manifest in terms of human and technical capacity, for example, in the contribution
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Blake, experienced in economic development planning in North Carolina, was able to
contribute to the proposal. Likewise in the Light Industry proposal, we can see
manifestation of the fiscal, as well again as the technical capacity available to Team
Klamath. For example, in preparing the proposal, Team Klamath drew upon reports
such as the "Industrial ProfIle for Klamath County, Oregon," prepared by SRI
International, one of the nation's most prominent economic consulting firms (BOD nd
c). The SRI study had been commissioned by the city of Klamath Falls and paid for
with Salt Caves arbitrage funds of which the city would spend an estimated $50
million on other studies and projects between 1986 and 1991 (Satchell February 28,
1991). Team Klamath also used a report drawn up by the Salem, Oregon consulting
fmn of VBB Allen in preparing the Light Industry proposal. The report was part of a
package of services for which the city of Klamath Falls was to pay VBB Allen in
excess of $800,000 in Salt Caves arbitrage funds.(VBB Allen 1987).
The conclusion warranted here is clear. In laboring to develop a Regional
Strategy for Klamath County, Team Klamath possessed considerably greater human,
fiscal, and technical capacity for economic development planning than, for example,
their counterparts in their neighboring Southern Oregon counties.
THE TOURISM COALITION
In the spring of 1987, OIT Professor of Industrial Management John Ward
began work on a proposal to target tourism as Klamath County's regional strategy.
His interests in doing so could be seen as an outgrowth of his position as director of
OIT's Small Business Development Center where, in 1986, he had received a grant for
developing a plan for expanding tourism in Klamath County. But Ward was also an
opponent of the Salt caves Dam and like County Commissioner Roger Hamilton, with
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whom he was well acquainted, saw development of a tourism proposal as the most
likely way of undermining Team Klamath's plan to use Regional Strategies as a
precursor to Salt Caves (J. Ward January 9, 1990). Ward was to become, with
Hamilton, the leader of a Klamath County tourism strategy coalition.
By late July, 1987, Ward had developed a draft proposal which listed more
than twenty projects which he believed could enhance Klamath County's tourism
industry. A sampling of these projects could read as follows: construction of a snow
park in north Klamath County; construction of an ice skating rink in Klamath Falls;
funding an eligibility study of granting protected status to three rivers under the state's
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act--the Sycan, Sprague,' and the Lower Williamson; and
construction of low cost worker housing near lodges located in the County's
northwestern quarter. As this brief account suggests, Ward's proposal reflected the
input of the County's tourism and environmental interests, the essence of the coalition
opposed to the Salt Caves Dam. But while the coalition behind Ward's proposal did
not lack ideas for projects that might expand tourism, the proposal did lack a
committed list of sponsors for most of the projects mentioned.
Tourism Proposal Denied Matching Funds
Even more than in neighboring Jackson and Josephine Counties, the main
visitor attractions in Klamath County are natural resources: Lake Klamath and the
Klamath River which attract fisherman and the latter, rafters, and Crater Lake National
Park, the ancient volcano sporting in its now extinct cinder cone the deepest lake in
North America. The types of businesses supported by these attractions are small
lodging establishments and sporting goods and outdoors outfitters, convenience stores
and gas stations, catering primarily either to wayfarers or outdoorsmen. Klamath
County is the third largest County in Oregon (6,135 square miles) and far from being
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geographically concentrated, the County's visitor industries are territorially dispersed
(Secretary of State 1987-89). In consequence, Klamath County's tourism sector was,
not unlike those of Jackson and Josephine Counties, diffuse and highly fragmented, so
much so that it was only in 1986 that an effort was made to establish an umbrella
group to represent tourism interests countywide (Herald and News April 5, 1986).
Earlier, local tourism interests were represented by at least four different and poorly
coordinated organizations (:'Nard January 9, 1990).6
Like their counterparts in Jackson and Josephine Counties, the businesses that
comprised Klamath County's diffuse and fragmented tourism sector largely lacked the
fiscal resources necessary for underwriting Strategy projects. Nor did the
environmentalist and retiree constituencies from which the tourism proposal also drew
support possess such resources. So instead of identifying sources of matching funds,
Ward's proposal simply identified a list of government agencies and private
foundations from which he planned to seek, through grants arid other avenues,
matching funding.
Ward's tourism proposal went through several transformations as a contest
unfolded over selection of Klamath County's Regional Strategy. But the tourism
proposal boosters never secured matching funds (:'Nard January 9, 1990; Various
Unpublished Tourism Proposal Drafts). Recall that matching funds for many of the
Jackson and Josephine County projects were provided by local government. But
proponents of Klamath County's tourism proposal were denied similar local
government backing since with the exception of Roger Hamilton, the County's local
political establishment squarely supported the Light In~ustry proposal against which
the tourism proposal would be competing.
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Subterfuge and Coercion
On July 24, 1987, John Ward addressed a letter to Jim Rogers, Chainnan of
the Klamath County Board of Commissioners. In his letter, Ward protested "an
apparent Klamath County policy of discouraging citizen involvement and participation
in developing an economic development strategy." The cause of Ward's consternation
was the hearing Rogers had scheduled for July 29, to which Rogers had invited Team
Klamath to present its Light Industry proposal. It appears that Rogers, in conjunction
with fellow Commissioner Ted Lindow, planned this as the fIrst of the two public
hearings required under the terms of HB 3011, the 'one at which they would target the
Light Industry proposal as Klamath County's Strategy (Letter to Jim Rogers from
John Ward dated July 24, 1987).
Ward (January 9, 1990; Herald and News August 2, 1987) saw the July 29
meeting as an attempted "fait accompli" by which Team Klamath and its supporters
intended to adopt the Light Industry proposal in circumvention of those provisions of
HB 3011 that fIrst required evaluation of alternative strategies. Particularly vexing to
Ward was the fact that with the exception of the legally required public notice placed
in the Herald and News, the Klamath Falls' newspaper, no other announcement was
made regarding plans to convene the July 29 meeting as the County's fIrst Strategy
hearing.
Continuing to register his concerns over Rogers' plans for the July 29 County
Commission meeting, Ward concluded his letter by stating that he would "appreciate
receiving notice that "the July 29 hearing Rogers had scheduled was not in fact. ..the
fIrst hearing of Governor Goldschmidt's Regional Economic Development
Strategies." A copy of this letter was also sent to EDD. While the circumstances
surrounding his decision to do so are not entirely certain, on the very night of the July
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29 meeting, Rogers changed the meeting's purpose from a fIrst Strategy hearing, as he
had originally intended, to an "information gathering" <Herald and News August 2,
1987).
In a letter dated August 25, 1987, from the Klamath County Board of
Commissioners, John Ward was advised as follows:
It has been brought to the attention of this board that the proposal
that you submitted to the Commissioners contains material that is not
true and accurate and was reprinted and copied out of context without the
express written permission of the author. Therefore, it is the duty of the
board to withdraw your proposal on tourism as a Klamath County
Regional Strategy (Letter to John Ward from the Klamath County Board
of Commissioners dated August 25, 1987).
Importantly, the letter was signed only by Rogers and Lindow, the two Light Industry
proposal supporters on the County Commission, and not by Hamilton, Ward's ally in
the tourism coalition, hinting at the polarization that would beset the Commission in
the coming months.
After the "fait accompli" incident, Ward had been invited to present his
tourism proposal at the Commissioner's meeting of August 19, 1987. In his
presentation, he had used materials excerpted from a recent study conducted by the
Pacific Power and Light Company. It was materials from this study to which the letter
alluded. As it happened, PP&L had authorized EOO to use the disputed material and
it was EOO that in turn had provided the material to Ward. EDD's I;ls~ ofthe material
made it public record, making the accusations against Ward groundless. Other
charges against Ward were demonstrated to be groundless as well. Commissioners
Rogers and Lindow were consequently forced to acknowledge as much in
correspondence dated September 8, 1987, in which they retracted their earlier letter,
negating their prior withdrawal of the tourism proposal.
Also instructive is the series of letters OIT President and Team Klamath
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Chairman Larry Blake addressed to Ward warning him, in increasingly reproachful
terms, against using college time to work on the tourism proposal. For example, in a
letter dated October 12, 1987 Blake warned Ward:
you should stop immediately and make certain that any
discussions, activities, or speeches in which you are involved regarding
such tourism activities be totally on your own time, without use of
college facilities or resources, and that you are clearly represented as an
individual citizen and not as a representative of Oregon Institute of .
Technology (Letter to John Ward from Dr. Larry Blake dated October
12, 1987).
As Ward's involvement with the toUrism proposal increased, Blake's
reproaches intensified, culminating in the winter of 1987, about the time when as we
shall see, the tourism propos~ appeared to have emerged ascendant over that proposed
by Team Klamath. Blake, who had already relieved Ward of his responsibilities as
Director of the Small Business Development Center, issued an official reprimand of
Ward for "default of academic integrity" and denied Ward a merit pay increase (Letter
from John H. Smith to Thomas C. Howser, February 11, 1988). Responding to
Blake's investigation, Ward's attorney inquired "President Blake has rather clearly
violated the administrative rule relative to political activity...by speaking on behalf of
the college, in favor of a purely local political matter. We are curious if any action is
pending against President Blake?," before concluding "It is apparent that this is a
political matter engendered by the opposing views of President Blake and Mr. Ward
(Letter from Thomas C. Howser to John H. Smith, February 9, 1988). Ward's work
on the tourism proposal was later vindicated when the grievance he filed with the state
Board of Higher Education was upheld. Blake's reprimand being rescinded and the
merit increase, reinstated.
In light of the seemingly groundless nature of the attacks Rogers, Lindow,
and Blake pressed against Ward, these incidents can best be seen as attempts by Team
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Klamath's supporters to employ the powers of their offices to undermine Ward's work
on a tourism proposal. Why would they have done so? Interviews in this matter
proved inconclusive, but the most reasonable answer is that supporters of the Light
Industry proposal viewed Ward's tourism proposal as a threat. Given the Governor's
predilection for tourism strategies, Ward's proposal appeared likely to win his favor
and thus preclude their effort to use Regional Strategies as a "stepping stone to Salt
Caves." As the writer sees it, It was in an effort to preclude exactly such an
eventuality that Rogers had attempted his aborted "fait accompli." Likewise, it was in
an effort to undermine the competing tourism proposal that these officials launched
their attacks on Ward. These attacks can be seen as an expression of the resolve with
which Team Klamath intended to see its Light Industry proposal adopted as Klamath
County's strategy.
Tourism in Ascendancy
When flIst asked to do so by the Governor, officials from Jackson, Josephine,
and Klamath Counties had declined to commit themselves to implementation of a
collective Strategy. Instead, each county set off to identify its own strategy with the
understanding that when and ifpossible, the respective county strategies would be
merged. However, it had become increasingly clear that the Governor would settle for
nothing less than a collective tourism strategy in Southern Oregon. Recognizing this,
officials from the above three counties as well as their counterparts in Curry and Lake
counties had begun to meet informally as a group to lay the groundwork for a multi-
county strategy compact. One such meeting was on September 16, 1987 in the coastal
Curry County town of Brookings.
Almost universally, the Brookings meeting was described as something of a
debacle. While not all the details are clear, this much is. Blake had assumed the role
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of chairman in the group's meetings. He traveled to Brookings by first flying into the
airport in Cresent City, about twenty miles to the south, and then motoring to the
meeting site in a limousine. His traveling partner was Bill Miller of Resource
Management International (RMI), the Sacramento consulting firm-that had been
retained by the City of Klamath Falls to manage the Salt Caves project. It was RMI
that chartered the flight and limousine which brought Blake to Brookings. Almost
certainly, this means that his trip was financed by Salt Caves arbitrage funds (Ward
January 9, 1990; Golden February 5, 1989).
Blake's travel plans seem to have evoked resentment from the other local
officials, most of whom had endured a long and arduous drive to Brookings, which
lies isolated from the rest of the state along a stretch of the southern Oregon coast.
That he appears to have sought to use the meeting to promote Salt Caves seems to
have further antagonized the other officials, so much that they subsequently voted to
replace him as group chairman (Golden February 5, 1990; McGregor February 8,
1990).
At its September, 1987 meeting in Brookings, the group of local officials
examining merger of the county strategies met under-largely informal circumstances.
In the meeting's aftermath, an effort was made to place the group's deliberations
within a more formal framework. The result was formation of the Southern Oregon
Regional Economic Development Strategies Steering Committee (SORS), composed
of one commissioner from each of the constituent counties. It's unclear as to where
the suggestion to arrange SORS in this manner originated, although EDD was almost
certainly instrumental in this matter.
As the commiss~oner responsible for the County's economic development
portfolio, it fell upon Roger Hamilton to represent Klamath County on the SORS
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steering committee. Appearing at the October 30, 1987 meeting of the SORS panel,
Hamilton announced that "he and the other Klamath County Commissioners had met
and agreed that "tourism would be the strategy for Klamath County" and that Klamath
County would join in implementing a common strategy with the other Southern
Oregon Counties (Herald and News November 8, 1987).
Hamilton's pronouncement received the unequivocal endorsement of EOO,
as illustrated in a letter written by George Wyatt, appointed head of the agency's
Regional Strategies unit in August, 1987:
On Friday, October 30, 1987, one commissioner from each of the
six counties [including Klamath County] participating in the Southern
Oregon Regional Strategy Committee met in Medford to discuss the
regional strategies program and its applications in southern Oregon. It is
the understanding of the Regional Strategies Unit that at this meeting the
six commissioners present agreed to support a tourism strategy for the
region. The Unit supports the concept of a regional tourism strategy
(Letter to Southern Oregon Regional Strategy Committee Members from
George Wyatt dated November 3, 1987). .
Given the endorsement bestowed by EOD, Hamilton's announcement that
Klamath County would be adopting a tourism strategy was treated as authoritative. So
credible was Hamilton's pronouncement treated that Klamath Falls Herald and News
reported as late as January 31, 1988, that "tourism has been selected by Southern
Oregon county commissioners, including Klamath's, as the region's economic
strategy."
Revolt By Team Klamath
Despite the certitude with which Hamilton's pronouncement was received,
his fellow County Commissioners were not, as Hamilton had stated, "unanimous" in
their support ~or a tourism strategy. Commissioner Rogers intimated as much when he
said, in the aftermath of the October 31, 1987 SORS meeting, that "We [the board]
have not adopted any kind of regional strategy at this time (Herald and News
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November 11, 1987). Accordingly Rogers, Lindow, and the other Team Kla~ath
supporters were, as the November 5, 1987 edition of the Medford Mail Tribune
described it, "confused" by Hamilton's pronouncement. In reality, Team Klamath
remained as committed to making its Light Industry proposal Klamath County's
strategy as it had been at the time of the aborted "fait accompli." Hamilton clearly
knew this, for at the same time that he announced Klamath County's support for a
tourism strategy, he conceded that the County's leaders "couldn't be more divided"
over the issue and called the divisions "a legacy of Salt Caves" (Mail Tribune
November 5, 1987).
In Team Klamath's view, the ascendancy tourism had seemingly come to
e~joy as Klamath County's Strategy was largely attributable to the support bestowed
by EDD. Consequently, during the autumn and winter of 1987, as tourism gained
currency as Klamath County's Strategy, relations between Team Klamath and EDD
deteriorated (Blake January 8, 1990; Lindow January 9, 1990).
Tensions between Team Klamath and EDD came to a head in December,
1987. Glancy traveled to Klamath Falls in an attempt to sway Team Klamath in
support of the tourism proposal. She was unsuccessful in doing so. The meeting
turned acrimonious, being marked by an especially heated exchange between
Commissioner Lindow and Glancy, with the former accusing EDD of attempting to
foist its will upon the community and the latter apparently telling the Team Klamath
officials in no uncertain terms that she would approve no strategy for Klamath County
other than one which adjoined the County to a multi-county tourism compact (Blake
January 8, 1990; Lindow January 9, 1990; Wyatt February 13, 1990).
Recall that legislation passed during the spring of 1987 resulted in a
significant expansion in EDD's responsibilities as well as in the size of the agency's
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staff. Lise Glancy was one of the newly hired staffers. Exactly what her professional
background was is unclear, but she appears to have had little experience in either
economic development planning or intergovernmental relations prior to her hiring.
She was one of the former Goldschmidt campaign workers hired on during EDD's
restructuring (Wetter November 2, 1989; Delman January 29, 1990).
Recall from the preceding chapter that in October, 1987, Glancy was quoted
as saying ...Southern Oregon clearly is on the road to developing a coherent,
apparently tourism-oriented strategy that will be ready-for the Oregon Legislature
when it convenes in 1989" (Mail Tribune October 23, 1987). Clearly, she recognized
the Governor's plans to showcase the mul.ti- county Southern Oregon region when
attempting to sell legislators upon reauthorizing Regional Strategies. By all accounts,
she demonstrated a strong commitment to forging a multi-county tourism strategy in
Southern Oregon, which included Klamath County. Her forcefulness in doing so
fueled many of the tensions that prevailed between EDD and Team Klamath (Blake
January 8, 1990; Lindow Janaury 8, 1990; Keller January 8, 1990).
THELOCALEUTESPREVML
Early 1988 found Hamilton and Ward collaborating with officials from the
other SORS counties in planning a multi-county tourism compact. But both Rogers
and Lindow remained inexorably opposed to a tourism strategy. While it would seem
that between them, they had the votes to commit Klamath County to their favored
Light Industry strateg~, they did not do so, almost certainly in the knowledge that such
a move would be blocked by the Governor. A stalemate prevailed and would continue
to do so through at least April 6, 1988, when the Medford Mail Tribune reported that
Klamath County's strategy was "still uncertain."
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It's unclear as to exactly when EDD decided to relent in its efforts to tie
Klamath County into the multi-county Southern Oregon tourism compact and
acquiesce to adoption of the Light Industry proposal as Klamath County's unilateral
strategy. But a January 13, 1988 letter sent to EDD Director Reiten and endorsed by
Commissioners Rogers and Lindow seems to mark a turning point. The letter
requested that Klamath County be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Southern
Oregon Regional Strategies coordinator to the agency's Coordinator for Eastern
Oregon. The letter had been triggered by Team Klamath's disaffection with Glancy,
which had reached the point at which she was no longer speaking to either Blake or
Lindow (Blake January 8, 1990; Lindow January 9, 1990). But the letter can be seen
as signalling a deeper purpose: it signalled Team Klamath's determination to sever the
organizational tie which bound Klamath County to the other SORS counties. In
effect, the letter served notice that under no circumstances would Klamath County's
local government and business elites acquiesce in committing Klamath County to the
Southern Oregon tourism compact.
In the af~rmath of the letter, Glancy was replaced as Regional Strategies
coord~nator for Klamath County. Also in the letter's aftermath, EDD Director Reiten
traveled to Klamath Falls where he met with Team Klamath. He was accompanied by
Greg Satchell, who had replaced Glancy as Regional Strategies coordinator for
Klamath County. According to Satchell (February 28, 1991), Reiten came away from
his visit viewing OIT as the area's major economic development asset thus convinced
of the propriety of a strategy which focused upon OIT as a "magnet" to attract industry
to the area. Therefore he agreed to accept the Team Klamath proposal. But Team
Klamath had been proposing its Light Industry concept since the summer, 1987;
surely Reiten had plenty of time in the interim to recognize its propriety had he been
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so inclined. Instead, throughout this period, EDD had strongly backed a tourism
strategy. For his part, Satchell tacitly admitted "The things they were doing were not
the things a city the size of Klamath Falls should be doing," intimating that despite its
having agreed to adoption of the Light Industry proposal, EDD was not really
convinced of its propriety.
A more compelling explanation of EDD's change of heart is that Reiten
returned from his visit to Klamath Falls convinced of the intractability of Team
Klamath and its supporters including Lindow and especially Rogers, who had taken to
calling a tourism strategy "a lot of hot air" (Mail Tribune April 6, 1988). Their
intransigence appears to have paid off for on April 28, 1988, the Klamath County
Board of Commissioners formally voted to adopt the Light Industry proposal as the
County's Strategy, which was later officially approved by the Governor in February,
1988.
Explaining Team Klamath's Success
We've already seen how Goldschmidt wielded the discretionary authority
provided him under the terms of HB 3011 to mold the other Southern Oregon counties
into a collective tourism strategy compact. What explains the success with which
officials in Klamath County were able to subvert his will?
Recall that participati~n in the Regional Strategies program was not
mandatory. Instead Goldschmidt was counting upon the availability of lottery money
to induce local participation. But Team Klamath had demonstrated a readiness to
forego the lure of lottery money in the Bootstrap proposal. Their willingness to do so
was brought on by their plans to spend the $50 million in Salt Caves arbitrage funds, a
figure that could o~ly make the $550,000 in lottery money they could expect from the
Strategies look paltry by comparison. Viewed in this light, we can see Team Klamath
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as being insulated from the "carrot" element in the "'carrot and stick" tactics
characterized in the preceding chapter.
On the surface it would appear that Goldschmidt could have refused outright
to approve any strategy that did not coincide with his wishes, as he seemingly
threatened to do in Southern Oregon. As a practical matter however, he probably
could not have done so without jeopardizing the likelihood that Regional Strategies
would be reauthorized, since legislators had made clear, when inserting the "no
seconds" rule into HB 3011, that they expected every county in the state to receive a
share of the program's lottery allocation.
There was also State Senator Bernie Agrons intervention on behalf of Team
Klamath. Agrons met wi~ Reiten on the latter's visit to Klamath Falls. His position
on Klamath County's strategy is perhaps best captured in a the following passage:
[The Light Industry proposal] is a far superior strategy to one that
is based on tourism with the faint hope that tourists would turn into
residents and employment creating entrepreneurs (Letter from Bernie
Agrons to Klamath County Board of County Commissioners dated
August 22, 1988).
Agrons sat on the legislature's T&E committee and had been a prime backer
of the "no seconds" rule, having said that no one could receive "seconds [of lottery
funds] until everyone has had fIrsts" (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and
Economic Development February 18, 1987) and that every county had to have a "fair
chance" at the lottery money (Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic
Development February 27, 1987). In addition, as a Democrat elected in a Senate
District in which registered Republicans represented a majority of the electorate,
Agrons was reputed to wield a lot of influence with other rural, as well as Republican
legislators. It could not have been lost on Reiten and the Governor that an Agrons
displeased with the outcome of Klamath County's strategy would be well positioned
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to threaten reauthorization of Regional Strategies.
Above we saw Team Klamath as being insulated from Goldschmidt's
"carrot" tactics. We can see Agrons' intervention and the "no seconds" rule as
circumventing the Governor's ability to use the threat of a strategy veto-- the "stick" in
the parlance of the preceding chapter--to force Team Klamath to acquiesce to his will.
Then there was the question of timing. In October, 1987, EDD's Glancy had
been quoted as saying "There comes a point where participants in the process want to
come to closure" (Mail Tribune October 23, 1987). She seems to have been speaking
as much for EDD as the local officials for although HB 3011 established July, 1989 as
the deadline for approving strategies, the Governor almost certainly wanted all
strategies approved by January, 1989, so they would, to again quote Glancy, "be ready
for the legislature when it convenes" (Mail Tribune October 23, 1988), at which time
the push to reauthorize the program would begin. Extending the dispute over Klamath
County's Strategy not only threatened the likelihood that Klamath County would meet
this deadline; it threatened to delay progress on the multi-county tourism strategy that
had successfully been fashioned for the other counties since they could not properly
proceed until Klamath County's status was settled.
THE STATUS QUO STRATEGY
Team Klamath's original Strategy proposal underwent something of a
rhetorical transformation by the time it was presented in final form in December,
1988. Originally ~haracterized as a Light Industry Strategy, it emerged in the end as a
technology transfer strategy.7 The change appears intended to highlight the
instrumental role OIT was supposed to play in the strategy which, rhetoric aside, was
otherwise little changed from· when it was fIrst unveiled during the summer of 1987.
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OIT was still to be the strategy's "magnet," attracting industry to the area while land
surrounding the airport would be improved as an industrial park to accommodate
relocating industries (EDD nd c).
As listed on Table vm, the Strategy petitioned the Oregon State System of
Higher Education (OSSHE) to establish, at a cost of $1.4 million over four years, a
Master of Science program at OIT. OSSHE had yet to do so at the time of this writing
(June 1991), three years after the Klamath County strategy was adopted by the
Governor, suggesting little efficacy in the Regional Strategies arrangement in this
matter. Nor does it appear that OIT is likely to inaugurate a Masters program in the
foreseeable future. In fact, voter approval of a statewide tax limitation measure in
November, 1990 is certain to result in a severe reduction in OIT's budget, curtailment
in the school's program offerings and hence, a reduction in OIT's capacity to serve in
its envisioned "magnet" role.
The local match for construction of the building that would house the Oregon
Technology Center--the small business incubator--was to be provided under the terms
of a $500,000 grant the city of Klamath Falls was seeking from the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA). However, subsequent
to approval of the strategy, the City decided to redirect the grant to subsidize location
of a pulp mill to Klamath Falls; scuttling the incubator project.8 Later-it was learned
that the pulp mill would not be locating in Klamath Falls after all. EDA prohibited
directing grant monies back to the incubator and in the end Klamath County neither
availed itself of the EDA grant money nor built the incubator. However, EDD did
allow Klamath County to use the lottery money initially allocatedfor the incubator to
instead be used for improvements to OIT's Small Business Development Center
(Satchell February 28, 1991; Keller January 8, 1990; Spencer January 8, 1990).
TABLE VIII
KLAMATH COUNTY REGIONAL STRATEGY PROJECT LIST
OIT Masters in Engineering $1.080.000 $350.000
OIT petitioning the slate Board of Higher Education to establish a Masters program in Engineering Technology. Never funded.
PROJECT NAME
LOTTERY
FUNDING
OTHER STATE
FUNDING
LOCAL
FUNDING
FEDERAL
FUNDING
TOTAL
FUNDING
$1.430.000
Small Business Incubator. . $250.000
To construct and outfit a small business incubator on land adjacent to OIT. Local officials later
decided to redirect funding in an attempt to recruit pulp mill. incubator project never funded.
$201.000 $500,000 $951.000
Industrial Marketing
Production of industrial marketing materials.
User Fee Airport
To establish customs station at Kingsley Field.
$150.000
$158,462
$80.000
$34,000
$230.000
$192.462
Infrastructure Improvements $1,000,000 $5.688.016
To install new sewer pipe on land adjacent to Kingsley Field slated for industrial park development. Other state
funding was to be drawn from EDD's Special Public Works Fund. local match in form of tax increment district. .
Special Fund money never allocated due to inability to secure job creation guarantees.
$6,688,016
Total Klamath County
Strategy Funding
Source: Oregon Economic Development Department. nd.
$558,462 $2,0~O,ooO $6,353,016 $500,000 $9,491,478
tv
tv
0\
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The Klamath County strategy also petitioned a $1,000,000 grant from EDD's
Special Public Works Fund (SPWF), a lottery funded program established at the same
time as Regional Strategies, for use in making infrastructure improvements on the land
that the city planned to develop as the airfield industrial park. Guidelines required
evidence that at least one job would be created for every $20,000 spent before any
SPWF money could be dispensed. Lacking the private sector commitments necessary
to create such jobs, local officials were unable to satisfy this criteria, nor have they
been able to since. So at the time of this writing, none of the SPWF money requested
in connection with the strategy had been released. According to EDD's Satchell
(February 28, 1991), Klamath County is, however, free to cite this strategy provision
in requesting SPWF monies should circumstances warrant such a request in the future.
Lottery dollars ($158,462) requested under the aegis of Regional strategies
were used to pay for the cost of providing a user fee customs station for two years at
Kingsley Field. Local officials hoped that the availability of customs service, coupled
with OIT and other incentives they planned to offer, would attract industry to the
airfield park. These other incentives included property tax abatements offered under
the aegis of the city's enterprise zone, which overlayed the industrial park area,
industrial revenue bonds, and membership in a Shared Foreign Sales Corporation,
which provided a sort of duty free status for certain types of industrial assembly
operations. To promote the availability of these incentives and attract investment to
Klamath ~alls, the strategy directed $150,000 in lottery money towards an industrial
marketing campaign to be managed, interestingly enough, by local officials. Thus,
officials in Klamath County, in contrast to their counterparts in the other southern
Oregon counties, appear to have succeeded in gaining direct discretionary control over
state monies made available under the terms of Regional Strategies.
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Stripped away of rhetoric and aborted projects, what is left of the Klamath
County Strategy'! The Strategy appears to be little more than a conventional industrial
recruitment scheme. Interestingly enough, this Regional Strategies product appears as
exactly the type of arrangement that characterized economic development policy
under Governor Atiyeh, of which Goldschmidt had been so critical.
SUMMARY
Implementation of Regional Strategies in Klamath County became embroiled
in conflict raging over plans to build the controversial Salt Caves dam. A growth
coalition composed of local business and government elites sought to capture the
Regional Strategies process as a vehicle for securing gubernatorial countenance of the
dam. This mobilized a rival coalition composed of Salt Caves opponents behind a
proposal to tie Klamath County to the multi-county tourism strategy being developed
by neighboring Counties and favored by the Goldschmidt Administration.
In the end, it was a non-tourism proposal favored by the local growth
coalition that emerged as Klamath County's Regional Strategy. The ability of the
growth coalition to surmount the Administration's authority was attributable to the
strong administrative capacity and fiscal and technical resources at its disposal,
resources clearly in excess of those possessed by both neighboring Southern Oregon
counties and the rival pro-tourism coalition, and the will of the growth coalition to
assertively employ its capacity and resource advantages.
OIT's failure to receive authorization and funding for its sought after
Master's program suggests limits upon·the efficacy of the Regional Strategies
arrangement to transform local demands into a policy response by the state apparatus
and, commensurately, evidence of the failure of the Regional Strategies arrangement
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to coordinate the activities of the state apparatus. That abandonment of the small
business incubator in an unsuccessful effort to recruit a pulp mill and failure to qualify
for sought after Special Public Works Funds demonstrates the degree to which in a
market economy, local economic development depends upon the vicissitudes of
capital markets and the willingness of capitalists to invest in the local community. In
the final analysis, Klamath County's strategy can be seen as the type of industrial
recruiting arrangement that had fueled so much conflict when made the centerpiece of
economic development policy under the Atiyeh Administration, and which Governor
Goldschmidt had intended regional strategies to serve as an alternative to.
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NOTES
1. This is a small hydro-power dam as dams go. For comparison, the
Columbia River's Bonneville Dam has a rated capacity of over 1,000 megawatts.
2. Mention of Blake's recommendation was made in an earlier chapter. It
amounted to using lottery money to establish local economic development offices
responsible for developing local economic development plans.
3. Under federal law, the city could spend these arbitrage funds for a period
of five years after which time these funds needed to be earmarked to retire the
principal and interest on the bonds. Welcome Center appears to have been included in
the proposal only to make it more palatable to the Governor who, as Team Klamath
knew, had expressed his preference for
4. There do not appear to be any polls available with which to gauge the
degree of local support for the dam so an exact assessment of how pervasive this
opposition was is not available. One local source (who was admittedly opposed to the
dam) put the figure at 80 percent favoring dam construction and 20 percent opposed.
5. The Special Public Works Fund was a new program established by
Goldschmidt in 1987 concomitant with Regional Strategies and his reorganization of
the state Economic Development Department. It reserved lottery money for public
facilities improvements linked to new industrial development.
6. These were the Klamath Visitors and Convention Bureau, the Klamath
County Lodging Industry Association, the Oregon 58 Cascade Summit Recreation
Association, and the Visitor Industry Association of Klamath Rivers.
7.The exact title of the Klamath County Strategy was "Technology Transfer:
Jobs for the 90's...and Beyond."
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This dissertation set out to identify the variables that detennined the amount
of autonomy state leaders possessed in formulating and implementing the Regional
Strategies program, centerpiece of industrial policy in Oregon during the latter half of
the 1980s under the Administration of Governor Neil Goldschmidt. In this chapter, I
present my conclusions.
RECAPITULATION ON STATE AUTONOMY
The concept of state autonomy is founded upon the theory that state leaders
have interests apart from those of non-state groups and that state leaders embody their
interests in the programmatic arrangements that define their public policy
interventions. The literature on state autonomy points principally to two such
interests: the provision of public goods and the desire to m~mize tenure in public
office.
Because state autonomy is subject to constraints, state leaders never act
wholly autonomously; instead, they possess relative autonomy. Four key constraints
upon autonomy are hypothesized: the control private capitalists possess over the
investment capital upon which the provision of public goods depends, limitations upon
the ability of state leaders to acquire and process information, limitations on the ability
of state leaders to get individuals and the complex bureaucratic organizations to act as·
state leaders want them to act, and limitations originating in the division of powers
between different branches of government. Theory also posits that state autonomy is
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likely to be enhanced under crisis conditions, when existing policy arrangements break
down.
The degree to which state leaders can act autonomously in pursuit of their
interests is largely contingent upon the fiscal and administrative capacity of the
bureaucratic apparatus over which they preside. State leaders are more likely to
transform their interests into authoritative actions if they are able to exercise discretion
over available fiscal resources, as opposed to having their control limited by their
dedication for specific uses. Similarly, state leaders are more likely to be able to
secure their goals if the groups whose behavior they are hoping to influence through
their policy interventions are fiscally dependent upon state revenues under their
control. To the degree that state leaders control of the complex organizations involved
in policy delivery, they are likewise more likely to translate their policy preferences
into authoritative actions.
EVALUATING THE POSTULATES
At the outset of this dissertation, I posited six indicators of state autonomy. I
now examine each of these propositions to evaluate the degree to which the events that
characterized formulation and implementation of Regional Strategies are indicative of
state autonomy.
The Initial Impulse to Industrial Policy will be Provided by Forces Arising Within
State Government-and not Private Groups
Theory posits that autonomous state leaders can initiate policy activity
independent of private non-state groups. The analysis offered here offers only
conditional support for this postulate. In Oregon, the precepts of industrial policy
were first articulated not by political leaders but by private labor and business groups.
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The role state actors played in bring industrial policy to Oregon was less one of
originator of new policy ideas than one of seizing upon and mobilizing political
support for principles ftrst articulated by private sector constituencies and then
molding these principles into a set of programmatic guidelines.
The ftrst half of the 1980s was a period of economic crisis in Oregon.
Restructuring in the wood products sector, aggravating economic bifurcation between
the diversifted economy of Oregon's most highly developed area; the Portland
metropolitan region, and Oregon's less developed, heavily wood products dependent
and largely rural regions. The Atiyeh Administration's attempt to deal with Oregon's
economic crisis through a program of industrial recruitment failed because of its
failure to reconcile regionally divergent economic development policy aims.
Disaffection with industrial recruitment fueled calls for state economic development
reform. Reform proposals incorporating important industrial policy principles,
including sectoral targeting and the elimination of fragmentation in state government
were articulated by non-state constituencies. These were Oregon's AFL-CIO, strongly
rooted in Oregon's lesser developed timber dependent regions, and Portland City
Club, which articulated in large part the views of the Portland area's business
establishment. The AFL-CIO articulated its proposal for state economic development
reform in mid-1982. The City Club's proposal was articulated in late 1983. Yet,
Oregon's badly divided political leadership proved unable to translate these calls for
economic development policy reform into practice.
It was not until 1987, with the inception of the Regional Strategies program,
that the industrial policy principles articulated in Oregon by the AFL-CIO and City
Club assumed a prominent position on the state's economic development agenda. The
Goldschmidt Administration embraced industrial policy as a vehicle for promoting
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economic restructuirng in Oregon's less developed regions and ending the conflicts
that surrounded the Atiyeh Administration's industrial recruitment effort. More
immediately, however, the Goldschmidt Administration embraced industrial policy as
a vehicle for fashioning an electoral coalition between groups which, divided by other
differences, nonetheless shared a common interest in industrial policy refonn and thus,
securing the electoral support necessary to assuming public office. Subsequently, the
Goldschmidt Administration seized upon its electoral mandate to install the Regional
Strategies program as the centerpiece of state economic development policy in
Oregon.
State Industrial Policy will Embody Goals Peculiar to State Leaders and Apart from
those of Private Non-state Groups
Theory posits that leaders of the autonomous state will embody in their
policy initiatives goals independent of those of private groups. Two principal goals
are theorized. These are the provision of public goods and the maximization of tenure
in public office. This analysis depicts the Goldschmidt Administration as having
embodied within its Regional Strategies intervention both of these key interests which,
when embodied in public policy interventions, are indicative of state autonomy.
The Goldschmidt Administration behaved in a manner consistent with this
postulate. The Administration's embrace of industrial policy was driven by two
principal objectives. One was to induce economic restructuring in those lesser
developed regions of Oregon lacking intrinsic attractions for capital. Through its
economic restructuring efforts, the Goldschmidt administration aimed to create jobs,
boosting the vitality of declining communities and generating tax revenues necessary
for the provision of public services. Put another way, through industrial policy, the
Administration aimed specifically to provide one public good--economic
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development, a socially beneficial service which the private sector was unwilling to
provide of its own accord--while commensurately enhancing the state's ability to
provide other public goods as well.
Political exigencies were also behind the Goldschmidt Administration's
embrace of industrial policy. The Goldschmidt campaign embraced a platform
promising state economic development reform along industrial policy lines as a
vehicle for recruiting electoral support. Once in office, the Goldschmidt
Administration viewed Regional Strategies as a vehicle for perpetuating its tenure in
office.
State Leaders will Demonstrate an Ability to Override Opposition to their Industrial
Policy Interventions
Autonomous state leaders will be able to override opposition to their
industrial policy activities by private non-state groups in seeking to secure their goals.
What does this analysis have to say about the Goldschmidt Administration's ability to
override opposition to its industrial policy goals? Opposition to the Goldschmidt
Administratio~'s industrial policy goals was expressed in sectional terms--economic
interests expressed along territorial lines. The local groups with which the
Administration dealt in overseeing implementation of Regional Strategies were
territorial based and concerned with extracting lottery money and other benefits from
the state.
This analysis identified two avenues of local involvement in Regional
Strategies. In Central Oregon and Klamath County, powerful growth coalitions
captured control of the Regional Strategies implementation process. They were able
to do so due to the capacities for planning and mobilizing for economic development
they possessed. In contra,st, no dominant growth coalitions emerged in Southern
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Oregon. In Southern Oregon, implementation of Regional Strategies was
characterized by maneuverings among diffuse and fragmented groups, none of which
proved ascendant
More so than anything else, the Goldschmidt Administration's dealings with
local groups revolved around its efforts to see multi-county tourism strategies
implemented. In Central Oregon, the Goldschmidt Administration's preference for
seeing multi-county tourism strategies implemented converged with the interest of the
local growth coalition. Central Oregon's multi-county tourism strategy was the
product of an accommodation between Central Oregon's pro-tourism growth coalition
and the Goldschmidt Administration.
Southern Oregon also implemented a multi-county tourism strategy. But the
nature of the arrangement that prevailed between the Goldschmnidt Administration
and local groups in Southern Oregon was far different. No powerful growth coalition
emerged in Southern Oregon, where diffuse and fragmented groups instead prevailed.
Rather than being the product of an accommodation, the multi-county tourism strategy
implemented in Southern Oregon was the product of local acquiescence. to a
Goldschmidt Administration dictum.
Last, there is the case of Klamath County where, as in Central Oregon, a
powerful growth coalition emerged to capture control of the strategy implementation
process. Unlike Central Oregon, however, Klamath County's growth coalition aimed
to use the strategy process to pursue goals in contravention of the Goldschmidt
Administration's preference for multi-county tourism strategies. And in the end, of
course, the Regional Strategy implemented in Klamath County embodied not the
Administration's goals but those of the local growth coalition.
Did the Goldschmidt Administration successfully override sectionalism in its
Regional Strategies intervention? There is no simple yes-or-no answer. Where
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sectionalism was manifest in weak and fragmented tenns and sectional constituencies
sought to extract benefits from the Administration, Southern Oregon being the prime
example, the Administration demonstrated an ability to use the discretionary authority
it enjoyed over state lottery spending to override sectional constituencies and attain its
goals. Where sectionalism was expressed through more powerful entities, however,
the Administration's record in securing its goals was more ambiguous. The
Administration succeeded when it reached accommodation with the powerful Central
Oregon growth coalition whose agendas was closely aligned with the
Administration's. On the other hand, the Administration failed to override opposition
when confronted with a largely self-sufficient local growth coalition whose
preferences diverged from its own, as in the case of Klamath County.
The Programmatic Choices that Shape Industrial Policy will be Based Upon Objective
Analysis
Effective information collection and processing is central to the capacity of
state leaders to formulate and pursue goals apart from those of private groups. HB
3011 called for the de-politicization of policy choice. It directed counties to base their
strategy selections upon an analysis of the "specific economic opportunities and
liabilities [and] unique resources in the region that might be marshaled in support of a
regional strategy." Counties were supposed to select the one with the greatest
potential for creating family wage jobs, a tenn which HB 3011 defmed with precision.
By this provision of HB 3011, the architects of the Regional Strategies program
appear to have aimed to place the strategy selection process upon an objective footing.
Yet, as regards strategy selection, the Goldschmidt Administration was not
without preference. Ample evidence of its proclivity for tourism strategies has been
presented. Administration officials asserted that their preference for tourism strategy
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was based upon economic analysis that showed that promoting tourism could fuel
rap,id job growth in Oregon. Independent analysis presented herein supported the
view of tourism as a potentially high growth industry and has been construed as
lending support to the assertion that the Goldschmidt Administration's proclivity for
tourism promotion as an economic development strategy was indeed analytically
defensible. This does not tell the whole story, however. For when it came to
implementing Regional Strategies, practice diverged from design.
More than anything else, it was over the issue of strategy selection that the
accommodations and disputes that defined implementation of Regional Strategies
unfolded. Strategy selection was less a product of objectively assessing the relative
merits of different strategy options than a product of political maneuvering,
expediency, and efforts aimed at ensuring equity. The analysis presented here pointed
to three impulses to the role these concerns assumed in the strategy selection process.
One was the Goldschmidt Administration's goal of using Regional Strategies
as a vehicle for perpetuating its tenure in public office. Analysis of the Southern
Oregon strategy helps make this point. It would be hard to argue that the decision to
implement a tourism strategy in Southern Oregon was a function of objectively
selecting from among various strategy options that which offered the greatest benefits
versus costs. The evidence is to the contrary. For whatever tourism's prospects for
generating jobs, little evidence was presented that promoting tourism could do so in
Southern Oregon. Instead, Southern Oregon's decision to implement a tourism
strategy amounted to acquiescence to an Administration dictate. The forcefulness and
expeditiousness with which the Administration acted to impose a multi-county
strategy upon Southern Oregon was driven in part by the importance it attached to
demonstrating the efficacy of the Regional Strategies arrangement within the short
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window afforded by the legislature's schedule if an effective case was to be made for
program reauthorization. The impulse to the implementation of a multi-county
tourism strategy in Southern Oregon was in short, political, not economic.
There is something contradictory about the Administration's actions in
Southern Oregon. It drafted a rigorous set of principles to guide strategy selection but
then abandoned these principles in the name of political expediency. This should not
be surprising, however. For when state leaders deliberately aim to depoliticize policy
choice as a vehicle for pursuing the self-serving goal of political self-perpetuation,
they are making a policy decision that is driven de-facto by political calculations.
Under such circumstances, policy choice cannot be properly said to have been de-
politicized.
In formulating and overseeing implementation of Regional Strategies, the
Goldschmidt Administration did not operate in a vacuum but in an environment in
which other groups were active as well. The two most important were the state
legislature and local growth coalitions. Because legislators had to authorize and fund
Regional Strategies, politics mattered. The Goldschmidt Administration's selection of
Central Oregon as a Regional Strategies prototype was driven in part by its desire to
secure legislative endorsement of Regional Strategies while Central Oregon was
picked as a prototype to offset rural disgruntlement over the Administration's
endorsement of Portland's Convention Center and due to the position key lawmakers
from Central Oregon occupied on the T&E Committee. Seen in this light, the
Administration's selection of Central Oregon as a prototype appears to have been
based primarily upon political calculations.
Lawmakers agreed to endorse Regional Strategies but in doing so, plac~
limitations upon the discretion the Administration hoped to exercise. As regards
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policy choice, two limitations are of particular interest: the Sunset Clause and no-
seconds rule. In the Sunset Clause and no-seconds rule, we see evidence of what Gurr
and King (1987) have termed "politicallimitations" upon the autonomy of state
leaders--limitations arising out of the division of power between different branches of
American government
Neither the Sunset Clause nor the no-seconds rule had much to do with
objective calculations of how Oregon's resources might best be tapped to promote
economic restructuring. It was likely that economic restructuring would take several
iterations of Regional Strategies intervention. Nonetheless, legislative reluctance to
cede the Administration too much authority led to the insertion of the Sunset Clause
into HB 3011. The Administration opposed the no-seconds clause because it wanted
to be able to competitively evaluate and prioritize local strategy proposals, funding for
implementation those most promising. This was unacceptable to lawmakers, however,
who wished to ensure that every area of the state received a share of the Regional
Strategies appropriation. As with the Sunset Clause, it was politics, not objective
calculations of how best to promote economic restructuring that led to the insertion of
the no-seconds rule into HB 3011.
These limitations impaired the Administration's ability to secure key
industrial policy goals. The Sunset Cl,ause drove the Administration to emphasize
expeditiousness in implementing Regional Strategies in Southern Oregon and Klamath
County which so as to bolster the case for reauthorizing Regional Strategies. The no-
seconds rule placed the Administration in a position of having to approve Strategy
funding for every area of the state regardless of the relative merits of local strategy
proposals. Put another way, the likely effect of no-seconds was to preclude
competitive evaluation of strategies and instead make equity a driving force behind the
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award of strategy dollars. Absent the Sunset and no-seconds clauses, Southern
Oregon's might have been deferred until more concrete restructuring plans could have
been drawn up beyond those which to a large degree, amounted to simply using state
dollars to subsidize local public works projects.
The role local growth coalitions played in implementing Regional Strategies
points to the third factor that led to the subordination of objective concerns in the
strategy selection process. In both Central Oregon and Klamath County,
implementation of Regional Strategies was captured by powerful local growth
coalitions. Coalesced around preordained economic development agendas--the
promotion of tourism in Central Oregon and the building of the Salt Caves dam in
Klamath County, they used the control they exercised over the strategy
implementation process to further their agendas. The Central Oregon and Klamath
County growth coalitions showed little inclination to engage in the type of economic
analysis called for in HB 3011 or even, more tellingly, to acknowledge competing
ideas. Probably nothing illustrates this point better than the extremes Team Klamath
went to in promoting tourism as Klamath County's strategy.
Were the decisions that shaped the Regional Strategies program primarily a
function of objective analysis? On balance, the answer would appear to be no. While
there was an expressed intent to place policy choice on objective grounds by the
Goldschmidt Administration, in practice, objective analysis was subordinated to
pressures emanating from a number of sources. These included the emphasis the
Administration placed upon seeing the Regional Strategies program authorized and
reauthorized, legislative resistance to having its authority encroached upon by the
Administration, lawmaker demands for equal division of state lottery money, and the
power of local growth coalitions. Thus, the policy choices that defined the Regional
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Strategies program were guided not by economics but political expediency and
sectionalism.
State Leaders Will Target Their Industrial Policy Interventions Upon Emerging
Sectors of the Economy
Perhaps no feature of this analysis is as inescapable as the Goldschmidt
Administration's predisposition towards the implementation of tourism strategies.
The Administration viewed tourism as a recession resistant industry likely to fuel
rapid job growth. It viewed tourism not only as a vehicle for generating jobs but "as a
hook" for visitors who might later return permanently to live and work in Oregon's
less developed regions.
In their study of recreational spending in rural Georgia, Bergstrom et al.
(1990) found that recreational spending not unlike that undertaken under the aegis of
the Southern Oregon Regional Strategy fueled large employment multipliers.
Bergstrom's findings can be viewed as endorsing the Goldschmidt Administration's
view that tourism could playa key role in fueling economic restructuring in Oregon's
less developed regions. Still, there is no certainty that the implementation of regional
tourism strategies would induce capital investment. In at least one case, in fact,
Regional Strategies failed to induce such investment, this being the failure of investors
to carry through on their announced plans for expanding Josephine County's Paradise
Ranch resort. Medium and large sized fIrms typically employ site location consultants
in making business location decisions and are thus unlikely to establish business
facilities in Oregon on the basis of recreational visits to the area (Schmenner 1984).
These fIrms were unlikely to invest in rural Oregon on the basis of recreational visits.
This analysis failed to corroborate the Goldschmidt Administration's claims that
tourism is an anti cyclical industry which "continues to create jobs whether other parts
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of the economy rise or fall." There is, in fact, at least one reason to believe that
Oregon's tourism sector is highly prone to volatility. This pertains to the heavy
dependence of Oregon's tourism sector upon visitors from Californian's travelling by
car. In 1979, for example, fully 40 percent of Southern Oregon's tourism trade was
attributable to Californians travelling by car (Oregonian July 18, 1979). The 1979 oil
crisis severely curtailed auto travel in the U.S. This turned out to be costly for
Southern Oregon; the reduction in vehicular traffic that arose from the 1979 energy
crisis cost Southern Oregon $200 million in tourism revenues (Oregon Journal July
17, 1979). This was not the first time Southern Oregon's fortunes suffered as the
result of an energy crisis. The period following the 1973 Arab oil embargo saw visitor
traffic at Southern Oregon's Crater Lake Park decline by 15 percent. At the Oregon
Caves National Monument in Josephine County, the figure was 11.4 percent
(Oregonian November 21, 1973). As events of 1990 demonstrated, gasoline crises are
far from a thing of the past. Environmental and geopolitical considerations ensure
future recurrences. If tourism holds forth the promise of fueling rapid job growth, it
may nonetheless prove to be an unpredictable and unreliable path to restructuring local
economies in Oregon's less developed regions.
Then there is the issue of tourism industry incomes. According to the Oregon
Employment Division, a mere 15 percent of jobs created from the implementation of
tourism strategies in Central and Southern Oregon were likely to exceed the family
wage standards established in the Regional Strategies program's founding legislation.
Many tourism jobs are part-time and seasonal. The architects of Central Oregon's
tourism strategy argued, citing a figure of $4 per hour for a tourism related job, that
the low wages associated with tourism should nonetheless not comprise a barrier to
the implementation of tourism strategies because of the "reality of the two earner
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family." The conclusion reached herein was that if implementing tourism strategies
held forth the likelihood of fueling rapid job growth, it was likely to be job growth
built upon a marginalized, low wage work force.
It's also instructive to recall Southern Oregon's penchant for retirement
living. Many of the retirees that settled in Southern Oregon were attracted to the area
by its recreational amenities. Also, adoption of a tourism strategy found favor with
elements of Josephine County's retirement community. This raises the likelihood that
promoting tourism strategies might lead to additional retiree relocations to Southern
Oregon, or other regions promoting tourism strategies. Such an outcome would, in
fact, appear consistent with the Goldschmidt Administration's aim of using tourism as
a hook. Yet, retirement communities typically. have low average incomes, poor
housing and high taxes. Also, as the population of senior citizens rises in a
community, the community's costs for medical care and social services are likely to
rise (Fitzpatrick and Logan 1985). This raises the prospect of fiscal crisis for
communities with heavy concentrations of senior citizens, especially if future changes
in federal Medicare and social security entitlements increase the cost of providing
health care to seniors incurred by local and state government.
State Industrial Policy is Characterized by Concerted Action Amongst the Economic
Development Agencies of State Government
The Goldschmidt Administration inherited a fragmented state government
apparatus when it took office. Governor Goldschmidt believed that successful
economic restructuring required that Oregon's capacity for economic development be
increased. He envisaged Regional Strategies as a vehicle for coordinating the
activities of state agencies involved in implementing his industrial policy program.
The Administration's initial plan called for subordinating key quasi-autonomous state
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commissions to the Governor's authority. Doing so could have increased coordination
among the state agencies over which these commissions presided: The
Administration's plan was frustrated, however, by legislators reluctant to place too
much authority in the hands of Oregon's governor.
Denied the authority it sought over Oregon's semi-autonomous comrnissions,
the Goldschmidt Administration was instead provided with a loosely defined mandate
for state agency coordination revolving around EDD's role in negotiating the
compliance of other state agencies with demands channeled through local strategy
project lists. This arrangement did secure Curry County the right- of-way local
officials were seeking from the state highway department and provide Josephine
County access it was seeking to a highway department kiosk. But these were
administrative matters of relatively minor consequence. There is little indication that
the arrangement HB 3011 established for coordinating state agency involvement in
Regional Strategies proved efficacious in delivering complex and costly strategy
projects. The role EDD assumed in seeking to secure Southern Oregon's "highest
regional priority," the improvements to Highway 140, produced little more than
rhetoric. Repudiating EDD's mediatory effort, state highway department planners
refused to depart from their well institutionalized six year capital planning process.
Klamath County failure to use Regional Strategies to secure authorization and funding
for a graduate program at orr provides another case in point.
Standing apart from these failures are the two instances in which the
Goldschmidt Administration succeeded in centralizing and concentrating state
economic development activity. These were Central Oregon's highway improvements
and Southern Oregon's multi-county tourism marketing campaign. Instructively,
however, neither project was secured through conventional channels of authority. By
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all indications, the Central Oregon highway improvements were constructed at the
behest of Mike Hollern, the Bend area developer and Goldschmidt campaign supporter
installed as head of the state transportation commission and not through ODOT's
routine capital improvements planning process. Implementation of the Southern
Oregon Strategy similarly saw the Administration sidestep conventional channels of
authority, this time to boost and concentrate state tourism marketing activities.
Central Oregon's highway improvements, the Southern Oregon tourism
marketing campaign and the improvements Southern Oregon sought for Highway 140
were all complex and costly projects. Efforts to secure these projects produced
divergent outcomes. The first two were secured, the last, not. The key distinction
between these projects appears to be the degree to which they were valued by the
Goldschmidt Administration and commensurately, the degree to which the
Administration acted to circumvent conventional channels of administrative authority.
The Goldschmidt Administration unequivocally endorsed both Central Oregon's
highway improvements and the tourism marketing campaign. Governor Goldschmidt
gave his personal endorsement to Central Oregon's highway improvements when he
met with the Committee of Seven in January, 1987. The importance the
Administration attached to the tourism marketing campaign was attested to by Debbie
Kennedy, the Goldschmidt protege made head of EDD's tourism division. There is, in
contrast, little to indicate that Governor Goldschmidt viewed improvements to
Southern Oregon's Highway 140 as a priority. In turn, the Administration went to
extraordinary lengths to secure the projects it valued, circumventing established
channels of authority. In contrast, the Administration demonstrated little interest in
circumventing established channels for the Highway 140 improvements, not an
Administration priority.
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What can we say about the extent to which Regional Strategies served as a
vehicle for coordinating the activities of state agencies involved in implementing
industrial policy? Goldschmidt Administration plans for consolidating control over
the state apparatus were stopped by the legislature. Only when the Administration
resorted to routines outside the established administrative order that success in
concentrating and coordinating state authority was evinced most clearly.
THE AUTONOMY VARIABLES
How much autonomy did the Goldschmidt Administration possess in
formulating and implementing Regional Strategies? There is nO,easy answer to this
question. While the Administration demonstrated an ability to independently
formulate and secure sought after industrial policy goals in some cases, in others, the
Administration was frustrated in its ability to translate its policy preferences into
authoritative actions. Gubernatorial success varied with place and time and with the
constellation of actors involved in the policy process. The behavior evinced is
indicative of relative autonomy--the condition that exists when constraints limit the
capacity of state leaders to independently formulate and secure policy goals.
The amount of relative state autonomy evinced in the formulation and
implementation of Oregon's Regional Strategies industrial policy program was
affected by several variables. I identify these variables and situations below.
Economic Crisis
The literature points to economic crisis as a variable in determining the
amount of relative autonomy possessed by state leaders. This analysis points to
economic crisis as a driving force behind Oregon's transformation during the 1980s
from a state evincing little autonomy in economic development policy to a state
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evincing more autonomy under industrial policy. Oregon began the 1980s with
industrial recruitment as the centerpiece of state economic development policy.
Embodying the goals of Portland area business elites and a fragmented
implementation regime, industrial recruitment was indicative of a state possessing
little autonomy. Economic crisis during the early 1980s provided the impulse to
Oregon's shift away from industrial recruitment. The failure of industrial recruitment
to resolve Oregon's economic crisis led important constituencies to repudiate it,
opening the door for industrial policy. New political leadership embraced industrial
policy both as a vehicle for providing economic development--a public good--as well
as for securing political advantages in a struggle with competing political forces.
Popular demands for state economic development reform allowed the Goldschmidt
Administration to secure extraordinary authority over state lottery spending, the
principal instrument employed by the Administration to attain its goals.
Division of Powers
The division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of
American government is a variable in the amount of autonomy state leaders possess in
their public policy interventions. We've seen this come into play in the formulation
and implementation of industrial policy in Oregon.
Crisis gave Oregon's chief executive a mandate to reshape state economic
development policy along industrial policy lines. However, the extent to which
Oregon's executive branch could effectively pursue its industrial policy goals was
contingent upon authority granted by the state legislature. At the same time
lawmakers provided Oregon's chief executive with extraordinary authority useful for
securing certain of its key goals, it circumscribed executive capacity for securing other
goals. Responding to the crisis, lawmakers provided Oregon's chief executive with
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extraordinary authority over state spending. By the same measure, tensions founded
in localism, regionalism, and concern with having its authority usurped led lawmakers
to impose the Sunset Clause and no-seconds rule upon executive branch actors, which
variously alter certain executive branch goals and obviated instruments the state
executive aimed to rely upon in attaining other key goals.
Fiscal Capacity
State leaders must possess sufficient fiscal resources if they are to secure
their public policy goals. This analysis points to increased state fiscal capacity as a
key determinant of the amount of state autonomy evinced in the formulation and
implementation of industrial policy in Oregon.
Oregon was a fiscally weak state throughout the first half of the 1980s. The
principal source of state economic development funding was industrial revenue
bonding, which allowed little discretionary control. As revenue bonds, IRB's
comprised a dedicated source of state funding. Establishment of the state lottery
provided Oregon's political leadership with a funding source over which it could
exercise discretionary authority and expanded the state's economic development role.
Local Dependence
State leaders are more likely to secure their public policy goals if they can
exercise discretionary control over the spending of state funds. The possession of
state autonomy varies with the degree to which local interests are dependent upon
state leaders for revenues. State leaders are more likely to secure their goals in
circumstances in which local interests are fiscally dependent upon them for revenues
than in instances in which local interests are financially independent of the state. This
becomes clear when comparing the ability of Oregon's state leadership to secure its
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programmatic goals in the different regions. In Southern Oregon, fragmented and
fiscally weak. groups were dependent upon revenues controlled by Oregon's state
leadership. State leaders were therefore able to extract concessions that enabled them
. to realize their aims of implementing a multi-county tourism strategy. The Southern
Oregon experience stands' in sharp contrast to the case of Klamath County, where
implementation of Regional Strategies was dominated by a powerful growth coalition
possessing fiscal resources sufficient to allow it to repudiate the revenues offered by
Oregon's state leadership and commensurately, to curtail the ability of Oregon's state
leadership to secure its goals.
The Character of Private Capital Investment
The amount of autonomy possessed by state leaders is co~tingent upon the
willingness of private non-state actors to invest the capital upon which economic
development depends. Through industrial policy, Oregon aimed to promote economic
restructuring in areas lacking an inherent attraction for capital. While this analysis has
not aimed to measure the extent to which Oregon's industrial policy initiative actually
resulted in economic development, it does raise questions as to Oregon's ability to
induce capital investment. For example, despite Oregon's industrial policy initiative,
investment promised for Josephine County's Paradise Ranch resort failed to
materialize. Furthermore, to the degree that the industrial policy activities portrayed
herein induced private investment in Oregon's tourism sector, restructuring was likely
to be built largely upon a low wage, marginalized work force and perhaps to increase
communal propensity for future economic crisis. In sum, Oregon had little control
over the character of private investment necessary to goal attainment. Oregon's
reliance upon private actors for the investment capital upon which economic
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development depended points to a limit upon Oregon's ability to secure its economic
restructuring goals.
ENTREPRENEURIAL POLITICS
The Goldschmidt Administration's efforts to overcome limits upon its
autonomy produced a highly entrepreneurial form of politics in which the
Administration endeavored to reorder the political environment within which it
operated. The concept of entrepreneurial politics has received attention from Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Young (1971). In the widest sense, an entrepreneur is a political
leader who deliberately molds policy so as to respond to social problems and at the
same time, to create beholden political constituencies with which to promote the
leader's own future political aspirations. It is the merging of personal political and
practical concerns within policy that is the hallmark of a political entrepreneur.
For present purposes, the most useful characterization of entrepreneurial
politics is offered in Mollenkopf's (1983) analysis of the politics of urban
redevelopment. Mollenkopf argued for a view of urban constituencies which although
inherently divided by divergent economic interests, shared a common interest in
redevelopment. Left to their own devices, the disparities dividing these constituencies
precluded cooperation, with the result that no single constituency was able to control
the mechanics of the redevelopment process and hence, no redevelopment took place.
In Mollenkopfs view, successful redevelopment depended upon the ability of political
entrepreneurs to overcome these divisions and forge coalitions. The entrepreneur did
so by gathering and risking:
political capital and support in order to reshape politics and create
new sources of power by establishing new programs. The entrepreneur
does not simply play by the rules of the game, but attempts to win the
game by changing the rules. Using government to create beneficiary
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groups, political- entrepreneurs create supportive new constituencies
(Mollenkopf 1983).
Mollenkopf's characterization of entrepreneurial politics fits the Goldschmidt
Administration's role in fonnulating and implementing Regional Strategies.
Oregonians perceived a collective interest in economic development, evidenced by
voter approval of the state lottery. But prior to the Goldschmidt Administration's
installation in office, the unwillingness of the state's highly divided constituencies to
cooperate and a fragmented institutional structure impeded an economic development
planning effort of the scope necessary to serve their common interests. Through
Regional Strategies, Governor Goldschmidt set out to reorder this environment by
forging consensus and concentrating state resources. Doing so required that existing
power relationships be eliminated or circumvented. Toward this end, he created an
new industrial policy arrangement different from that of his predecessor, Governor
Atiyeh. He restructured EDD in an attempt to its power and consequently,
gubernatorial authority, over the fragmented state apparatus. Success required the
breaking of local power relationships that impeded economic restructuring. The best
example was the Goldschmidt Administration's unsuccessful attempt to break the hold
Klamath County elites had over local economic development by forcing them to
accede to a regional tourism strategy.
It is not surprising that these examples of entrepreneurial politics provided
the strongest evidence of the state's relative autonomy in industrial policy. Both
concepts--relative autonomy and entrepreneurial politics--are founded upon the
premise that state leaders merge the goal of providing public goods with the aim of
securing personal political benefits in making and implementing policy. The literature
has, however, largely failed to acknowledge the intersection between these two
concepts. The analysis offered here suggests future studies of state autonomy and
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state industrial policy activity should take greater account of the intersection of these
two concepts.
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NOTES
1. There is a certain irony in the importance Governor Goldschmidt attached
to seeing the Regional Strategies program reauthorized. In part, the importance he
attached to reauthorization reflected his desire to use the program as a vehicle for
promoting his electoral ambitions. As happened, Regional Strategies was reauthorized
and refunded, not only for the 1989-90 biennium but for the 1991-92 biennium as
well. Governor Goldschmidt declined to seek reelection when his 1987-90 term
expired, however, largely for personal reasons. Thus, success in seeing Regional
Strategies reauthorized did not translate into political perpetuation for the Goldschmidt .
Administration. Governor Goldschmidt's decision not to seek reelection was much to
the writer's disappointment For the writer had hoped that this analysis might yield
some lessons on the efficacy of using arrangements like that embodied ill Regional
Strategies as a vehicle for political perpetuation. Governor Goldschmidt's decision
not to seek reelection obviated this possibility.
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(3) The dep&ftlDelll Ual1 dinDurare CIIIIIpdltiDa aIDDIIf ftl'iDDl for aiatiar Onpa buaiftallS
and econDIIIIic actiYiIy.' '. .
SEC'%'JON L (1) ID ClI.n7iDr aut the pl'DYiaiou at lbia Act, the depanmnt ahaIl work to Allure
&bat all counLi.. an iDcluded ill a n,iOIl with aD u1oP&ed-~ aDd that Deb rerional SU'aLe1:7 .
is CDDIidered for iIIIp•....wioa 1101 IaIer thaD July 1. 1918.
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C2l A re,ion .ball DDt be enuthld Lo rundinr under this Act in' nceu of the amount apecUied in
the rerional l&ralq)' adopaed by the Governor prior &0 the ume tbat .ach other rerion of the l&ate
hal rec:eiftCI iniLial fundinr for the priority acuvitiel wiibin ill apprDVed l&rateC)'.
SECTION I. The department lball eolllUIt with the Lerialative CommitLee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Devel"fIII'Ul on the dairnauon of reriou, the adopuon of rerional a&rate,illS, the expendi.
wre of runcia on bebalf of luch l&ralqia and the accomplilhmenll of luch ILrateria.
SECTION JD. This Act beinr nee....", for the immediate p..."auon of the public: peace,
h.alth and ..felY, an emerpnc)' is declared &0 nilL. and UIiI Act &aka efTect on ill pauare.
P.-d b7 .....~ 1. 1117
~;,~-
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